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This study is concerned with the factors determining the United 
States Treasury bill rate during the period 1953-1964. The approach is a 
partial-equilibrium, comparative-static demand analysis of the existing 
stock of Treasury bills over monthly time periods. A basic premise under­
lying this study is that it is interesting and meaningful to analyze the 
determinants of the interest rate of a single asset.
Portfolio holdings of Treasury bills by commercial banks, non­
financial corporations, state and local governments, foreign governments 
and banks. Government securities dealers, and others are viewed as the 
demand for an asset having unique properties and good, though imperfect, 
substitutes in the form of money or other interest bearing assets. The 
stock of Treasury bills available for these institutional sectors to hold 
is determined principally by Treasury debt management decisions and Fed­
eral Reserve System open market operations. The Treasury bill rate is 
considered to be a price of a commodity that is determined by demand and 
supply forces operating through the market mechanism. The approach.
2
therefore, is partial-equilibrium, and represents an attempt to measure 
bill rate changes as determined by the direct market variables instead of 
the general-equilibrium approach which emphasizes the supply of and demand 
for "money."
In the simplest form, the Keynesian liquidity preference approach 
to interest rate determination concludes that "the interest rate" will be 
reduced by an increase in the stock of money or a decrease in the demand
to hold the stock (a shift in the liquidity preference schedule to the
1 2 3left). It has subsequently been shown by Turvey, Brechling, and Kragh
that the simple liquidity preference schedule, as normally shown, is 
valid only if the quantity of bonds remains constant. The liquidity pref­
erence schedule showing the quantity of money which would be held at 
various rates of interest is simply the "mirror image" of the stock of 
securities desired at various rates. The rate of interest depends upon 
both the stock of money and the stock of assets.^ Holding the stock of
^Ralph Turvey, Interest Rates and Asset Prices (London: George
Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1960), pp. 19-26.
2Frank P. R. Brechling, "A Note on Bond-Holding and the Liquidity 
Preference Theory of Interest," Review of Economic Studies. Vol. XXIV,
No. 6 (June, 1957), pp. 190-197.
^Borje Kragh, "The Meaning and Use of the Liquidity Curves in 
Keynesian Interest Theory," International Economic Papers. No. 5, 1955, 
pp. 155-169.
4"...the elementary post-Keynesian approach...shows what is in­
volved when attention is shifted from the demand for money to the determi­
nation of interest rates. If we reserve the demand function for money, we 
deduce that, ceteris paribus. a change in the quantity of money will alter 
interest rates. But there are also demand functions for short-term and 
long-term paper. By the same token, therefore, a change in the quantities 
of these assets will also alter interest rates. Thus knowledge of the 
demand function for money, though necessary, is not sufficient to explain 
interest rates." Ralph Turvey, "On the Demand for Money," Econometrica. 
Vol. 33, No. 2 (April, 1965), p. 460.
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money constant, a change in the quantity of assets therefore would cause 
the rate of interest to change. One of the principal purposes of this 
study is to measure the effect on the bill rate of changes in the quantity 
of Treasury bills.
The effect of the quantity of bills on the bill rate is also re­
lated to rival hypotheses of the determination of the term structure of 
interest rates. Term structure hypotheses could be placed on a spectrum 
between the extremes of the "expectational" hypothesis and the "institu­
tional" hypothesis. In the purest form the expectational hypothesis 
asserts that assets differing only in maturity dates are perfectly sub­
stitutable and that a long-term rate depends on an average of future 
5short-term rates. The relative quantities of assets in each maturity 
category are not assumed to affect relative interest rates.
At the other extreme the institutional hypothesis places emphasis 
on the segmentation of the market through institutional demand for spe­
cific maturities and the relative quantities of these securities avail­
able to be held.^ Although this is a study of the level of a single rate 
as opposed to relative rates of different maturities, it is evident that 
the general approach is nearer the institutional than the expectational 
end of the spectrum.
Examples of hypotheses near the "purely expectational" hypothesis 
are; Frederick A. Lutz, "The Structure of Interest Rates," reprinted in 
the American Economic Association Readings in the Theory of Income Distri­
bution, Edited by William Fellner and Bernard F. Haley (Philadelphia: The
Blakiston Company, 1951), pp. 499-529; and David Meiselman, The Term Struc­
ture of Interest Rates (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1962).
^Examples of the general approach of the institutional hypothesis 
may be found in J. M. Culbertson, "The Term Structure of Interest Rates," 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. LXXI, No. 4 (November, 1959), pp. 
485-517; and Joseph Conord. An Introduction to the Theory of Interest 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), pp. 304, 325, 330-339.
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This examination of the determinants of the Treasury bill rate has 
debt management and monetary policy implications. An attempt is made to 
measure the effect on the bill rate of a Treasury debt management or a 
Federal Reserve System open market transaction. The time period of the 
analysis begins after the Treasury-Federal Reserve System Statement of 
Accord as the maintenance of the wartime rate structure on Federal market­
able securities was relaxed, and interest rates on these securities were 
permitted to fluctuate through supply and demand forces in the open mar­
ket. This does not imply, however, that the bill rate (or any other 
Treasury interest rate) has been completely removed from the potential or 
partial control of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System. Tobin 
states that:
"Interest rates are already under government control. The market 
that determines them does so under the watchful eyes of the mone­
tary authorities, and in an environment of their making. If the 
Federal Reserve and Treasury do not like the market's results they 
can and do intervene to change them.'"?
Since the Statement of Accord the Federal Reserve System has not dominated
the market for Federal marketable securities as was true of the pegging
policy which existed throughout the war years and the early post-war
[ 'years. Since the accord the principal target variable for open market 
operations has been member bank reserves. From 1952 through 1960 most 
System open market operations were carried out in Treasury bills, and
James Tobin, "An Essay on Principles of Debt Management," Fiscal 
and Debt Management Policies (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1963), p. 187. Similarly, William Fellner has pointed out that: 
"...central banks will presumably not be willing to let the prices of 
government securities fall and fluctuate to such an extent that the 
market for these securities would scare away conservative buyers when the 
treasury engages in refinancing operations." Felner, Trends and Cycles 
in Economic Activity (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1956),
p. 371.
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although transactions affect the bill rate, the effect occurs indirectly 
through the market mechanism instead of being directly regulated as the 
target variable. A purpose of this study is to attempt to measure the 
effect of open market bill transactions on the bill rate.
The "bills only" policy of the Federal Reserve System was dis­
continued in February, 1961, as the System began executing open market 
transactions in longer maturities under the joint attempt by the Treasury 
and the System to raise the level of short-term rates absolutely, relative
to long-term rates, and relative to the short-term rates in other coun- 
8tries. The new policy, still in effect, gives higher priority to the 
interest rate as a target variable. The purpose of this operation ("twist" 
or "nudge") has been to induce foreign governments and banks, and indeed, 
domestic asset holders, to hold United States Treasury debt instruments.
In order to raise short-term rates the Treasury has greatly increased the 
quantity of bills relative to other maturities and the System has carried 
out a portion of its open market operations in maturities other than 
bills.
Precise estimation of the effects of these policies on the bill 
rate is complex. For instance, an open market transaction by the Federal. 
Reserve System affects both the demand for bills and the stock of bills 
available to be held. The stock of bills is directly affected by a trans­
action, whereas the demand for bills is affected indirectly with time 
lags, as credit conditions and the money supply change as commercial banks 
adjust to new reserve positions.
8For comments relating the apparent success of this policy to the 
hypotheses of term structure of rates, see: Harry 6. Johnson, "Major
Issues in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 
50, No. 11 (November, 1964), pp. 1409-1410.
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Because of the policy influences on both the demand for and the 
stock of bills, it is evident that a structural model of simultaneous 
equations is needed. A step in this direction has recently been taken by 
Frank deLeeuw as a part of the Brookings Institute-Social Science Research
9Council quarterly econometric model of the United States. His section 
of the model deals with financial behavior by institutional sectors in 
various securities markets. By using quarterly data, deLeeuw is able to 
relate equations of supply and demand for securities to the overall 
macroeconomic model.
Since significant movements of the short-term rate occur over 
time periods shorter than a quarter of a year, an adequate explanation 
of rate movements would require analysis over shorter time periods. In 
this study, significant monthly and weekly seasonal movements in the bill 
rate have been measured, indicating that an appropriate time period for 
successive observations would be less than quarterly. However, weekly 
observations are unavailable for many relevant independent variables; and 
although a great deal of applicable monthly data are available for the 
complete period, this eliminates the possibility of relating to a macro- 
economic model since the shortest period for most aggregative data is 
quarterly. Monthly periods have been chosen as an appropriate time inter­
val and the empirical estimates of bill rate relationships have been cal­
culated by single-equation regression methods. However, there are pitfalls 
in utilizing time intervals as short as a month in multiple regression 
equations. One of the most important problems has been pointed out by 
Stefan Valavanis:
9Frank deLeeuw, "A Model of Financial Behavior," The Brookings- 
SSRC Quarterly Econometric Model of the United States (Chicago: Rand 
McNally & Company, 1965), Chapter 13.
As the time interval is shortened, more and more variables change 
from predetermined to simultaneously determined. With shorter 
and shorter time periods, the causes that generate the random 
terms overlap more and more and invalidate the assumption of 
serially independent random disturbances.
This problem of positive autocorrelation of residuals is the most per­
plexing statistical problem in the whole study. Estimation difficulties 
were also encountered in attempting to measure seasonal movements in the 
bill rate. The simple moving^average methods of seasonal measurement 
yielded biased results because of the great volatility in the bill rate 
during 1958-1959. The more sophisticated X-10 Version of Census Method 
II, however, appears to provide meaningful estimates.
Some difficult problems have been encountered in collecting appro­
priate statistical data for this study. In some cases data are available 
only for a small portion of the time period 1953-1964, and in other cases 
data are not available at all. Some of the monthly series are very accu­
rate, whereas other series are provided on a sample basis and are subject 
to a large, unspecifiable error. Some data are in terms of "average for 
the month," and some data are in terms of the "level at the end of the 
month." In all cases these data are described in detail, and an attempt 
has been made to indicate in a qualitative manner the degree of their 
reliability. The use of digital computers with truncation after eight 
digits further complicates the accuracy of calculated results, especially 
in the multiple regression estimates.Therefore, the final empirical
10Stefan Valavanis, Econometrics (New York; McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1959), p. 167. The same warning is found in: Lawrence R. Klein,
A Textbook of Econometrics (Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson and Company,
1953), pp. 313-322.
^^For a discussion of truncation errors, as well as other data and 
specification problems mentioned here, see: Oskar Morgenstern, On the Ac­
curacy of Economic Observations (2nd Edition, Princeton: Princeton Uni­
versity Press, 1963).
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results should be interpreted as estimates which may be subject to rather 
large errors.
This study may be viewed as having three principal parts: descrip­
tive, theoretical, and empirical. Although these divisions are not clear- 
cut, they assist in explaining the general outline.
The first part is primarily descriptive. Chapter II covers the 
development of the Treasury bill market and outlines the operation of the 
market, describing the principal market participants. Chapter III de­
scribes the movements of the bill rate over the period 1953-1964, and 
attempts to measure the trend, seasonal, cyclical, and irregular moveipents. 
Chapter IV contains a discussion of the relationship of the Treasury bill 
rate with other interest rates and attempts to measure the degree of asso­
ciation through simple linear regression.
The second part deals with the theoretical framework and a dis­
cussion of relevant independent variables. Chapter V consists of the def­
inition and specification of the simple theoretical structures. Treasury 
debt management. Federal Reserve operations and the expected effect on the 
bill rate are examined more closely in Chapter VI.
The third part is mostly empirical, and builds upon the framework 
of the second part. In Chapter VII the relationships between the bill 
rate and the bill stock are estimated and the results interpreted. In 
Chapter VIII the relationship between the bill rate and bill holdings by 
institutional sectors is examined. Chapter IX provides a summary and re­
views conclusions.
CHAPTER II
A DESCRIPTION OF THE TREASURY BILL MARKET AND 
THE PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS
Introduction
The Treasury bill first came into use in Great Britain with the
12Treasury Bill Act of 1877. The 90-day Treasury bill replaced the 
13Exchequer bill, a five year maturity instrument, to provide greater 
flexibility to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in raising short-term 
funds.
The Treasury Bill Act of 1877 limited the maturity of the bill to 
one year or less. The act allowed the Treasury to regulate the form of 
the bill, the interest rate, and the conditions of issue, but the actual
12Sir Herbert Brittain, The British Budgetary System (London;
Allen and Unwin, 1959), p. 194. The Treasury bill was the idea of Walter 
Bagehot in 1876. Sir Stafford Northcote (Disraeli's Chancellor) had 
asked Bagehot for advice when it became apparent that the old Exchequer 
bill was inadequate for raising the needed short-term funds. The Treas­
ury bill, having the characteristics of the commercial bill of credit plus 
the backing of the Government, was Bagehot's solution to the problem. For 
a brief history of the Treasury bill in England, see: "The Treasury Bill:
The Story of an Economists Invention," Midland Bank Review, February, 1961, 
pp. 39.
13The history of the Exchequer bill is described in R. D.
Richards, "The Exchequer Bill in the History of English Government Fi­
nance," Economic History: A Supplement to the Economic Journal. Ill
(1934-1937), 1937, pp. 193-211.
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issue of the bills was the responsibility of the Bank of E n g l a n d .S in ce  
the beginning of their issue. Treasury bills have been in continuous use 
in England.
The use of the Treasury bill in the United States is a relatively 
recent development. The United States Treasury was authorized to issue 
Treasury bills on June 17, 1929.^^ The first issue was a 91-day maturity, 
dated December 17, 1929, to mature on March 17, 1930. The quantity ofr
bills sold in that first issue totaled $100 million.
The American version of the Treasury bill and the method^of its 
sale were closely modeled after the British system. As with the British 
bill, the terms of sale were prescribed by the Treasury (in Treasury De­
partment Circular Number 418),^^ with the invitation for tenders adding 
any further conditions or information for a particular sale. Also, as 
was the case with the British bill, the tenders were submitted to the 
central bank. In the United States the Federal Reserve Banks received 
payment from buyers and made the actual issue of the bills at the direction 
of the Treasury. The technique of the sealed-bid auction and the selling 
of bills at a discount instead of specifying an interest rate were other 
major similarities.
14Brittain, og. cit., p. 194.
^^Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of 
the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30. 1929. pp. 38, 273-279.
The specific authorization for the issue of Treasury bills was H. R. 1648, 
an amendment to the Second Liberty Bond Act. The amendment was introduced 
by Senator Smoot and Representative Hawley.
^^Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of 
the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1930, pp. 38, 285-287.
^^This Circular was dated November 22, 1929. With amendments, it 
is presently the basic regulation prescribing conditions of sale for the 
Treasury bill.
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It was apparent, though, that the United States Treasury did not 
plan to issue bills on as large a scale as the British. From early state­
ments of Treasury officials, it seems that the use of Treasury bills was 
planned to be rather limited, basically to supplement Certificates of In­
debtedness in short-term finance. The bill was originally intended to
meet those seasonal cash needs of the Treasury caused by temporary imbal-
18ances of receipts and expenditures prior to tax dates.
Although the principal function of the Treasury bill in the first
decade of use was in meeting seasonal needs, a small portion of the debt
19was being "rolled over" regularly in the form of bills. At the end of
December, 1941, approximately $2 billion of the Federal debt was in the
20form of Treasury bills.
By the end of World War II, the quantity of Treasury bills out-> 
standing totaled $17 billion. This large increase in the quantity of 
bills was a result of the rapid rise in the total Federal debt in the war 
period. During the war, minimization of the interest cost of the increas­
ing debt was one of the principal goals of the Treasury. The Federal Re­
serve System maintained ("pegged") the Treasury bill rate at a level of 
0.375 per cent. Since the Federal Reserve bought and sold bills in the 
market when the rate tended to deviate from the pegged rate, the Treasury 
bill was completely liquid. The low interest rate on bills (other Federal
18Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1929, op. cit., 
pp. 275-279.
19Replaced at maturity by identical securities.
20In the following discussion. Treasury bill is used as meaning 
United States Treasury bill. Every major Western European country and 
Canada has a short-term debt instrument called a "Treasury bill;" however, 
these bills do not have identical properties.
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securities were pegged less rigidly at a higher rate) Induced the Treasury 
to finance the deficit in part through the use of the bill.
By the end of December, 1952, $21.7 billion in bills were out-i 
standing, representing 14.6 per cent of total marketable Federal debt out­
standing (8.2 per cent of the total Federal debt). By December 31, 1956, 
the quantity of bills outstanding had increased to $25.2 billion, repre­
senting 15.4 per cent of total marketable debt. By December 31, 1964, 
bills outstanding totaled $56.5 billion, which constituted 26.6 per cent
of the total marketable debt, and 63.8 per cent of the marketable debt
21within one year to maturity.
The Treasury bill has become one of the most important marketable 
securities issued by the Treasury. It has largely replaced the Certifi­
cate of Indebtedness, and, since the introduction and routine issue of
longer-term bills, the use of tax-anticipation bills, and the experimental
22use of "strip" issues of bills, this instrument has gained greater 
flexibility in its use by the Treasury. Also, because of their high de­
gree of liquidity, bills are being demanded by more types of investors 
and in greater quantities.
The development of the Treasury bill market has progressed rapidly 
since the end of World War II. However, the behavior of the different in­
vestor groups has been rather unstable, with some rapidly increasing their 
holdings of bills, while others have been gradually decreasing their hold­
ings. Since the development of the Government securities market, the 
mechanics of the market, and the behavior of the principal investor groups
21Treasury Bulletin, various issues.
22These issues are described in greater detail in latter portions 
of this Chapter.
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are Important to an analysis of the Treasury bill market, this portion of 
the study attempts to describe the market in some detail. The emphasis 
will be on the following; (1) the Treasury bill itself; (2) the primary 
and secondary markets, with emphasis on market mechanics ; (3) the opera­
tions of the Federal Reserve System and its role in the market; and (4) 
the magnitude of holdings and the relative importance of the different 
investor groups in this market.
L Description of the Treasury Bill 
The Treasury bill is the shortest term obligation issued by the 
United States Treasury in the financing of the Federal debt. The Treasury 
bill differs from other Federal government debt instruments in maturity, 
method of sale, and interest rate.
The Treasury bill has a maturity not exceeding one year. In the 
period covered in this study, 1953-1964, 91-day bills were the only regu­
larly issued bill maturities until December 11, 1959, when the Treasury 
added a six-month bill to its regular weekly issue. Also, in 1960, nine- 
month and one-year bills began to be regularly marketed.
Bills are sold by the Treasury through the auction technique.
Those desiring to obtain bills in the weekly auction submit sealed bids 
to their district Federal Reserve Banks which forward the price and quan­
tity information to the Treasury. The Treasury arrays the bid prices from 
high to low and aggregates the volume bid for at each price. Then, begin­
ning with the highest bid price and moving toward lower prices, tenders 
are accepted until the cumulative volume is equal to the amount offered 
for the particular weekly tender. For each quantity accepted, the suc­
cessful bidder pays the price bid, while bids below that price at which 
the Treasury has been able to meet the required volume are disregarded.
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The Treasury bill does not yield a fixed interest rate. Success­
ful bidders pay a price that is less than the maturity value of the bill. 
The discount, the difference between the price paid and the maturity 
value, is considered the interest payment. A high price corresponds to a
low interest yield; conversely, the lower the price, the higher the yield.
Prices are quoted on the basis of the amount paid for $100 maturity value. 
For example, a price of $99.00 for a 91-day bill would be equivalent to a 
yield of 3.96 per cent if the bill were held to maturity. The interest 
rate on bills is conventionally computed and quoted on a "bank discount" 
basis. In the above example, the computation of the discount rate re­
quires dividing the amount of the discount by the number of days to
23maturity as a percentage of 360. On the other hand, the interest rate 
on most other United States government securities is quoted on the basis 
of a coupon, and thus the rates are not necessarily comparable to the rate 
of discount on bills. For the same maturity and amount invested, the dis­
count rate will be lower than the corresponding coupon rate. The differ­
ence arises because, (a) the discount rate is computed on the maturity 
value instead of the price paid, (b) the number of days to maturity is 
related to 360 days instead of 365, and (c) the coupon rate assumes semi­
annual compounding if more than one coupon period (six months) is involved. 
The first two of these dissimilarities tend to lower the discount rate
23In the example above, the computation would be; 
l O y S  . . 100 = 3.956.
The "true discount" rate equals:
. 100 = 4.052.
See: Ira 0. Scott, Jr., Government Securities Market (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Co., 1965), pp. 45-46; and, Henry N. Goldstein, "Should the 
Treasury Auction Long-Term Securities?," The Journal of Finance, XVII, , 
No. 3 (Sept., 1962), p. 450.
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relative to the coupon rate and the last dissimilarity causes a relative 
rise. The upward influence is not relevant with three-month periods. For 
periods of over six months, however, this influence is less than the down­
ward effect caused by (a) and (b) above.
24Goldstein, _0£. cit.. p. 450, shows that calculating the coupon 
equivalent yield (i) for a bill having exactly one year to maturity yields:
1 = - l]i
and generally, for a bill having more than six months to maturity:
where P is price and _t is days to maturity. This is, of course, before 
tax yield. Tax information regarding Treasury bills is-.provided by the 
Treasury Department and included on the tenders issued by the Federal Re­
serve Banks. The tender from the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank for December 
21, 1961 quotes from the Treasury statement:
"The income derived from Treasury bills, whether interest or gain 
from the sale or other disposition of the bills, does not have any 
exemption, as such, and loss from the sale or other disposition of 
Treasury bills does not have any special treatment, as such, under 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The bills are subject to estate, 
inheritance, gift or other excise taxes, whether Federal or State, 
but are exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed on the 
principal or interest thereof by any State, or any of the posses­
sions of the United States, or by any local taxing authority. For 
purposes of taxation the amount of discount at which Treasury bills 
are originally sold by the United States is considered to be 
interest. Under Sections 454 (b) and 1221 (5) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 the amount of discount at which bills issued 
. hereunder are sold is not considered to accrue until such bills 
are excluded from consideration as capital assets. Accordingly, 
the owner of Treasury bills (other than life insurance companies) 
issued hereunder need include in his income tax return only the 
difference between the price paid for such bills, whether on orig­
inal issue or on subsequent purchase, and the amount actually re­
ceived either upon sale or redemption at maturity during the taxable 
year for which the return is made, as ordinary gain or loss."
Although interest on coupon issues is similarly treated, the opportunity 
for capital gain rates would apply if the coupon security were sold prior 
to maturity. Also, see: William L. Raby, The Income Tax and Business
Decisions (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.; Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964), pp. 144 
and 293-294.
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Treasury bills are not restricted as to ownership, and are highly 
marketable. The short maturity and the high degree of marketability com­
bine to make the bill extremely liquid. If held the short period of 
time to maturity, the bill becomes money. In addition, a highly organized 
market exists making it possible to sell bills at any time at the market 
price.
Due to their liquidity, bills provide an ideal form for the hold­
ing of transactions, precautionary, or speculative balances. Temporary 
unused cash is turned into an interest bearing asset that can be liqui­
dated almost immediately when needed. Treasury bills are widely held by 
many investors of short-term funds. Tilford C. Gaines has described
Treasury bills as "beyond question the most widely held and most popular
25income-earning liquidity instrument in the United States money market.V 
Bills are held by commercial banks, insurance companies, nonfinancial 
corporations, foreign governments and banks, state and local governments, 
pension and trust funds, agencies of the Federal government, and individ­
uals. Government securities dealers maintain an inventory of bills that 
is quite sizeable. Also, the Federal Reserve Open Market Account is a 
large holder of Treasury bills, and has traded bills almost exclusively 
in the open market in the exercise of monetary policy. The popularity of 
the bill and its wide ownership make it the most actively traded Govern­
ment security.
Individuals and institutions desiring Treasury bills may purchase 
them directly from the Treasury, or purchase outstanding bills in the open 
market. Direct Treasury sales to bidders in the weekly auction are
25Tilford C. Gaines, Techniques of Treasury Debt Management. (New 
York; The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 177.
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considered the primary market for Treasury bills; buying and selling bills 
in the over-the-counter government securities market is considered the 
secondary market for bills. The mechanics of these markets for United 
States Treasury bills will be explained in greater detail.
The Mechanics of the Primary Market 
The primary market for Treasury bills involves the direct Treas­
ury sale through the weekly auction. Each week the Treasury markets an
issue of 91-day bills and a companion issue of six-month (182-day)
26bills. Usually the quantity sold by the Treasury for a particular week 
will be an amount just large enough to replace the issues that are matur­
ing in that particular week. When the Treasury desires to raise new funds 
over a period of time, the new issues will be increased in volume each 
week over the complete cycle of bills. This requires 13 weeks for the 
91-day bills, and six-months for the longer bills. At the end of 26 
weeks, the quantities of bills sold each week would again be equalized.
The nine-month, one-year, and tax-anticipation bills are used primarily
for the purpose of raising additional funds for the purpose of meeting
27the more seasonal needs of the Treasury. The bulk of the volume of 
Treasury bills is considered permanent short-term debt and is replaced 
weekly on maturing.
In June, 1961, a novel method of increasing the quantity of out­
standing bills was accomplished by the Treasury. It involved a special
26Prior to December, 1959, a single issue of 91-day bills was 
marketed weekly.
27Tax anticipation issues can be either in the form of Certif­
icates of Indebtedness or bills. If they are issued with a maturity of 
less than one year, bear a discount rate, and are sold through sealed 
bids, they are considered bills. See: Gaines, 0£. cit., p. 181.
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tender for $1.8 billion, made up of 18 different maturities of $100 
million each. The maturities were matched to the maturities of 18 out­
standing issues of bills whose times to maturity were spaced one week 
apart from a minimum of 50 days to a maximum of 169 days. Subscriptions 
were required in even multiples of $18,000 from bidders, with successful 
bidders receiving an equal allotment of each of the 18 different matu­
rities.^®
This method of increasing the quantity of bills outstanding, re­
ferred to as a "strip" issue, has been used several times since 1961. In 
October, 1963, for instance, an additional $1.0 billion of bills was is­
sued, covering 10 different bill maturities ranging from 101 to 164 days.^^
Unless the date conflicts with a holiday, the announcement of a 
forthcoming sale of issues of bills is made on a Thursday, a week in ad­
vance of the date of issue. Subscriptions are accepted until 1:30 P.M. 
(EST) on the Monday preceding the issue. The bids are tendered to the 
Federal Reserve Bank, or the Branch Bank, in the bidder's district.
The individual bidder may submit a competitive or a noncompetitive 
bid. Competitive bids must list the price that à .bidder is willing to pay 
for a desired quantity of bills. The bid price is based on a $100 matu­
rity value, and is stated to three decimal places. For example, a bid 
price might be $99.191, which would represent a discount rate of 3.20 per 
cent per annum. The competitive bidder may enter as many competitive bids 
as he desires, simply listing the prices he is willing to pay and the
28Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of 
the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30. 1961. pp. 91 and 260-262.
29Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of 
the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30. 1964» pp. 190-191, and 
197.
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quantities desired at each price. On the other hand; a price is not 
specified in a noncompetitive bid. A noncompetitive bidder is assured of 
having his bid accepted in full at a price determined by the accepted com­
petitive bids.
Immediately after opening the bids, the Federal Reserve Banks list 
the prices of the bids and the quantity bid for at each price and forward 
the information over leased wires to the Treasury. The Treasury consoli­
dates the information from the twelve Federal Reserve Banks and begins 
the determination of which bids it will accept and which it will reject.
First, all noncompetitive bids are filled in full at the price to 
be determined, as shown below, by the mean price of accepted bids. The 
difference between the amount that the Treasury offers and the total 
quantity of noncompetitive bids is then filled from the competitive bids. 
The Treasury fills the competitive bids in full for the highest bidders, 
moving down the array of prices until the cumulative quantity, including 
the noncompetitive bids, is approximately equal to the allotment. Once 
the low acceptable bid is determined, all bids below this price are re­
jected. Typically the bids at the low price are not accepted in full.
The Treasury determines a percentage of those bids at the "stop-out'* price 
that will provide a total"*quantity approximately equal to the volume pre­
viously announced. Each individual bidder at the "stop-out" price re­
ceives approximately the same percentage allotment. Since the bills are 
issued in even denominations of $1,000 this seldom equals the exact amount 
the Treasury had intended to offer.
The price of the noncompetitive bids is determined by computing 
the weighted arithmetic mean of the accepted competitive bids. The vol­
ume of noncompetitive bids from any individual bidder is presently limited
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to $200,000 maturity value for 91-day bills, and $100,000 maturity value 
for the six-month bills.
A competitive bid is entered each week for the Federal Reserve 
Open Market Account. The bid is rejected if it is below the "stop-out" 
price. If the bid is high enough to be accepted, the bid price is paid. 
The Federal Reserve Open Market Account only enters bids to replace those 
bills that are maturing. Federal Reserve holdings can be reduced by sub­
mitting a tender at such a low price that it is sure to be rejected, there­
by allowing this issue of bills to "run-off." If the Open Market Account
wishes to add to their holding of bills, they must buy them in the open 
30market. Payment to the Treasury is made only in maturing issues, there­
fore limiting the Federal Reserve Open Market Account to a quantity in the 
weekly auction no larger than is required to replace maturing bills.
The announcement of the acceptance and rejection of tenders is 
made by the Treasury on the Tuesday morning following the close of the 
bidding on Monday afternoon. The Treasury's press release for an allot­
ment of 91-day bills for Tuesday, June 25, 1957, provides an illustration.
The Treasury Department announced last evening that the 
tenders for $1,600,000,000 or thereabouts, of 91-day Treasury 
bills to be dated June 27 and to mature September 26, 1957, 
which were offered on June 20, were opened at the Federal Re­
serve Banks on June 24.
The details of this issue are as follows:
Total applied for - $2,515,157,000
Total accepted - $1,602,304,000 (includes $402,862,000 
entered on alnon&ompetitive basis and accepted in full 
at the average price shown below)
30Gaines, og. cit., p. 177.
31Treasury Department press release, A. M. Newspapers, Tuesday,
June 25, 1957, Washington, D. C.
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Approximate equivalent 




(78 per cent of the amount bid for at the low price
was accepted.)
Federal Reserve Total Total
District Annlied for Accented




Atlanta 41, 647,000 37,181,000
Chicago 296,315,000 222,335,000
St. Louis 33,974,000 33,374,000
Minneapolis 16,587,000 14,511,000
Kansas City 53,659,000 43,442,000
Dallas 43,553,000 33,213,000
San Francisco 122.502,000 95.108,000
TOTAL $ 2,515,157,000 $ 1,602,304,000
Two things are quite evident from the press release. First, the 
spread between the high and low bid prices is quite small. On this 91-day 
issue, the spread between the high and low bid price is 0.7 cents on a 
$100 maturity value (the discount rate differential is 0.028 per cent).
The spread between the average and the low, which may be a more relevant 
comparison, is 0.2 cents (0,009 per cent). Second, by far the largest 
volume of bidding occurs at the New York Federal Reserve Bank. In this 
particular instance the bids through the New York Federal Reserve Bank 
accounted for 67.7 per cent of the bids submitted, and 59.7 per cent of 
the bids accepted.
The majority of New York bidding is conducted by dealers in Govern­
ment securities and the larger New York banks. Many of the small buyers
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of bills throughout the country do not bid directly for bills but rather 
have one of the larger New York banks place their bids. Therefore, a 
large New York bank will usually be bidding for its own account as well 
as for its "customers," that is, the small buyers. Only banks are per­
mitted to submit tenders for other than their own account.
Government securities dealers bid for securities to sell to other 
accounts at a price higher than they pay. Dealers are in competition with 
each other in submitting their bids to the Treasury, and then must compete 
with each other in selling these bills after issue. Consequently, they 
wish to obtain the desired quantity of bills at the lowest possible price. 
A dealer who consistently bids too low would have no new issues of bills 
to sell, and if he consistently bids too high would have to sell his bills 
at a loss, or at least at a lower profit margin than more successful bid­
ders .
With the money market "experts" submitting their bids at the New
York Federal Reserve Bank— being aware of the moment by moment changes in
the market— it would seem that the competitive bidders in New York would
have a certain advantage over the bidders in the other Federal Reserve
Districts. The situation at the New York Federal Reserve Bank near the
close of the bidding for the weekly issue of Treasury bills has been
described by Robert V. Roosa;
Actually, most competitive tenders in New York are not submitted 
at the Federal Reserve Bank until the last half hour before the 
bidding closes; many arrive within the last minutes. The close 
physical proximity of the money market institutions to the Federal 
Reserve Bank permits the special transmittal of tenders by messen- 
ger.3^
32Robert V. Roosa, Federal Reserve Operations in the Money and 
Government Securities Markets (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1956), 
p. 38.
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After the Treasury's Tuesday morning announcement, the bidders as­
certain the quantity of bills that they will be awarded, and must pay for, 
on Thursday. Payments for the bills may be made by exchanging maturing 
bills, charging the reserve account at the district Federal Reserve Bank, 
or by draft. All bidders except incorporated banks, trust companies, and 
dealers in Government securities are required to deposit two per cent of 
the maturity value of the volume bid for at the time of submitting the 
tenders.
After the Treasury announcement on Tuesday morning, the activity 
in the trading of United States Treasury bills shifts from the primary 
market to the secondary market. Government securities dealers begin 
marketing this new issue of bills on Tuesday morning on a "when issued" 
basis, attempting to dispose of their allotment before payment is re­
quired.
The Mechanics of the Secondary Market
Dealers in United States government securities normally obtain
approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the total weekly allotment from the 
35Treasury. Those bidders in the primary market who had their bids re­
jected, or who received only a partial allotment at the "stop-out" price, 
may buy those same bills in the secondary market from a Government secu­
rities dealer.
33Tenders accompanied by an express guaranty of full payment by an 
incorporated bank or trust company also are exempt from the two per cent 
deposit.
3*Gaines, og. cit., pp. 178-179.
35Ibid.. p. 178. "Dealers themselves, as a group, usually bid to 
get allotments of about $300 million thirteen-week bills, and about $150 
million twenty-six week bills, although this amount may vary considerably 
from one auction to the next, depending upon the outlook for secondary 
market demand for the bills.
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Government securities dealers are willing to buy or sell any vol­
ume of bills of any maturity at almost any time. A transaction of a mil­
lion dollars is considered small; and a transaction of $25 million to $30
36million is considered large. Practically all trading in all types of
United States government securities in the secondary market is done
37through the Government securities dealers. Trading of those Government 
securities that are near maturity dominates the market. The volume of 
trading in securities of less than one year to maturity accounted for 
between 70 to 80 per cent of total trading in the period 1951-1958. The 
volume of trading in Treasury bills alone have accounted for more than
3850 per cent of the total transactions in every year over the same period.
Active trading takes place in all issues of Treasury bills. There are 13
different maturities of original 91-day bills outstanding at all times
39with the maturity dates spaced one week apart. Since an original six-
month bill with less than 91 days to maturity is perfectly substitutable
40for an original 91-day bill with the same number of days to maturity, 
there are 13 different maturities of original six-month bills outstanding 
with maturity dates spaced a week apart, from 13 weeks to 26 weeks to 
maturity.
36Allan H. Meltzer and Gert von der Linde, A Study of the Dealer 
Market for Federal Government Securities. Materials prepared for the 
Joint Economic Committee, 86th Congress, Washington, D. C., 1960, p. 19.
37Hereafter, government securities will mean United States Govern­
ment securities unless further description is given.
38Ibid., p. 65.
39On a Thursday the longest maturity, normally, will be 91 days 
and the shortest maturity will be 7 days. However, on a Wednesday, the 
longest maturity normally will be 85 days and the shortest maturity 1 day.
40The six-month bills are assumed as companion issues to the 91- 
day bills. A six-month bill is scheduled to mature on the same day as 
that 91-day bill issued 13 weeks later.
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The dealer charges no direct brokerage fee to either buyer or 
seller for making a transaction. A differential or "spread" is main­
tained between the price a dealer will pay for a particular bill and the 
price at which he will sell. Each dealer has a bid price (the price at 
which he is willing to buy) and an asked price (the price at which he is 
willing to sell), for each maturity of bills outstanding. Since bills 
are quoted on a yield basis, the bid yield will be higher than the asked 
yield (or in price terms the bid price will.be lower than the asked 
price). The differential between the bid and asked yield is quite small. 
If on the same day. a dealer could purchase and sell a bill with 71 days 
to maturity, quoted as 3.38 per cent bid and 3.30 per cent asked, he would 
make a gross profit of only 16 cents on a $1,000 transaction. However, 
the gross profit on a small transaction of $1 million would be $157.78, 
and on a transaction of $10 million the gross profit would be $1,577.80. 
The quoted differences between the bid and the asked yields are considered 
"outside" prices. A large trader could probably make a transaction at 
one-half the "outside" spread.
Almost all of the nonbank dealers use the same large New York
41bank for clearing operations. The bank holds the securities for the 
dealers and makes a small charge of about ten dollars each time the 
securities are delivered to a new buyer. This cost, of course, is taken 
into account by the dealers in setting the differential between the bid 
and asked yields.
Market purchases are largely of two types, "regular" delivery or 
"cash" delivery. With "regular" delivery, the securities are delivered
41Gaines, og. cit., p. 217; and Meltzer and von der Linde, op. 
cit.. p. 25 and p. 112. The bank is listed as Manufactures Trust Company 
in the latter reference.
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and payment made on the following business day. The "cash" purchase is
delivered and paid for on the day of the order. "Regular" delivery is
tie normal method of sale. Payment may be in either Federal funds of
42clearinghouse funds.
Dealers, unlike traders, maintain positions in, _i.je,, an inventory 
or stock of, the securities they trade. A trader functioning as an agent, 
would simply arrange transfers between a buyer and seller. Positions in 
Government securities are maintained by dealers principally for the pur­
pose of having various maturities of bills and other securities readily 
available for buyers, but cyclical fluctuations in positions reflect a 
degree of speculative a c t i v i t y . T h e  stock of Government securities in 
dealer's portfolios fluctuates cyclically--positions increasing with 
actual or anticipated declines in interest rates, and decreasing when 
rates move upward.
42Gaines, og. cit., p. 217. "...the contract may call for settle­
ment in clearingMhu8e%funds or Federal funds; all settlements made in
funds located outside of New York are automatically in Federal funds, 
since settlement will be over Federal Reserve wires. There has been a 
tendency in recent years for more and more transactions in short-term 
securities to be for cash delivery and for settlement in Federal funds, 
and much the largest part of all transactions in such issues is now in 
this form."
For a distinction between Federal funds and clearinghouse funds, 
the following footnote is quoted from Scott, og. cit., p. 101. "Federal 
funds are deposit liabilities of the Federal Reserve banks. Like cur­
rency, a draft on a Federal Reserve bank is cash in the sense that it 
can be immediately converted into deposits at a Federal Reserve bank. 
Clearinghouse funds, by contrast, are cash tomorrow. In other words, a 
draft on a Federal Reserve bank gives the holder immediate ownership of 
Federal funds. The holder of a check drawn on a commercial bank member 
of the New York Clearing House Association cannot acquire Federal funds 
until the next day. This is due to the fact that a bank presenting a 
check at the clearing will not receive credit for the check in his account
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York until the following day."
^^Gaines, 0£. cit., p. 210.
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Although the types of securities making up dealer positions vary 
from time to time and from dealer to dealer, it appears that more than 90 
per cent of the total position is made up of securities within five years 
to m a t u r i t y . T h e  aggregate percentage holdings of bills, as an average 
of end-of-year figures for the dealers in 1953-1958, ranged from a low of 
19 per cent to a high of 66 per cent of total holdings. Federal Reserve 
System data on the monthly average of daily net positions of Government 
securities dealers show that in the period January, 1961, through Decem­
ber, 1964, holdings of Government securities within one year of maturity 
fluctuated between a low of $1.6 billion and a high of $3.8 billion.
A great deal of the total trading in Government securities is
interdealer trading. Published figures indicate that approximately 30
45per cent of all trading is between dealers. Dealers normally trade 
with one another in order to adjust their inventories. If a dealer's 
stock of a particular maturity becomes lower than desired, he may buy a 
quantity of these maturities from one or more other dealers. Dealers 
can, and do, ask other dealers for quotes on securities, and make pur­
chases of those securities which they feel can be sold at higher prices. 
This type of interdealer trading tends to keep rates and spreads rela­
tively constant among dealers. On an especially large transaction for a
44The positions referred to here are net positions; that is, the 
difference between the gross "long" and gross "short" positions. Scott, 
op. cit., p. 98, defines a long position as buying securities and owning 
them, and a short position as selling securities he does not own and 
borrowing the securities to make delivery.
45The publication of positions and trading volume of Government 
securities dealers has been published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin 
since 1961. This data, in slightly different form, is available for the 
calender year 1958 in Part II of Treasury-Federal Reserve Study of the 
Government Securities Market. Board of Governors of the Federal System, 
1960.
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certain maturity, a dealer may sell short and be forced to buy from other
dealers to obtain the quantity necessary for the transaction.
Over the period of this study, 1953-1964, the number of dealers
recognized by the Federal Reserve System has varied between 15 and 20.
In the period 1958-1959, in the study of the dealer market, Meltzer and
von der Linde identified 17 dealers, 12 nonbank and 5 bank dealers; and
at the time of Gaines's study (1961-1962), 19 dealers were operating, 13
46nonbank and 6 bank dealers. In addition, there are a great many bro­
kers and commercial banks through which transactions may be executed. 
Nevertheless, these transactions usually end up being handled by one of 
the "central" Government securities dealers, especially if the transaction 
is a large one.
Substantial concentration exists in the dealer market. In the
eleven years, 1948-1958, the three largest firms accounted for 43.4 per
cent of the total transactions; the six largest, 61.5 per cent; and the
eight largest, 82.8 per cent. This breakdown by total transactions is
only slightly different from the concentration in trading of Treasury 
47bills alone.
As is evident from the fact that one-third of the dealers are 
banks, the dealers do not deal solely in Federal obligations. Most
Meltzer and von der Linde, oR" cit.» p. 2; and Gaines, og. cit.» 
pp. 66-67. The dealers (1958-1959) were listed by bank and nonbank clas­
sifications. The bank dealers were; Bankers Trust Co., Chemical Bank New 
York Trust Co., Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co., First 
National Bank of Chicago, and Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. The nonbank 
dealers were: Bartow, Leeds & Co., Briggs, Schaedle & Co., Inc., C. F.
Childs & Co., Inc., C. J. Devine & Co., Discount Corporation, First Boston 
Corp., Aubrey B. Lanston & Co., New York Hanseatic Corp., Wm. E. Pollock 
& Co., Inc., Chas. E. Quincey & Co., D. W. Rich & Co., Inc., and Salomon 
Bros. & Hutzler.
47Meltzer and von der Linde, o£. cit.« pp. 66-67.
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dealers trade, in some degree, in state and local government securities, 
corporate bonds, and other financial instruments. There is also a degree 
of specialization in the types of Federal marketable securities traded. 
Some dealers do over 90 per cent of their total volume of trading in bills, 
while for other dealers bill trading constitutes only one-half of total 
volume. The percentage of trading in Treasury bills has increased over 
the period of analysis as bills have accounted for an increasing portion 
of the short-term Federal debt.
The volume of transactions in this market is immense. An indica­
tion of the relative size of the dollar volume for the Government securi-
f
ties market and other markets for a particular year is provided in the
following quotation:
Trading volume in the U. S. securities market is larger than the 
volume of transactions in any of the organized securities ex­
changes. Transactions on the New York Stock Exchange, for instance, 
amounted to $32.7 billion in common and preferred stock and $1.4 
billion in bonds during 1958. This total NYSE trading volume com­
pares with sales of U. S. securities through the dealer market of 
$176 billion in 1958. Data on the volume of transactions in corpo­
rate and municipal securities in the over-the-counter are not 
available but it is safe to assume that they would show a much 
smaller transactions volume in those markets than the 17 dealers 
have reported for the U. S. securities market.^8
In the week ending November 18, 1961, the end of week average of daily
volume showed gross transactions in Treasury bills alone as $1,554
million; made up of purchases of $689 million and sales of $865 mil-
49lion.
Clearly, for a small number of dealers to handle such a large 
volume of securities, while maintaining large positions, an efficient
48Ibid.. p. 68.
49This information was supplied by the Market Statistics Division 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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form of financing must be available. Traditionally this financing was 
done through borrowing from the New York City money market banks. Re­
cently, however, higher Interest rates resulting from Increased demand 
for short-term funds has forced dealers to look to additional sources for 
financing. Nonfinancial corporations, through the repurchase agreement, 
have been providing Increasing percentages of dealer financing.
The repurchase agreement Is the sale of securities by a dealer, 
and a simultaneous agreement to "buy back" these securities at a speci­
fied future date. Typically, the repurchase agreement Is for Treasury 
bills, and the duration must be less than 15 days (normally the duration 
Is only one to five days). The sale price of the repurchase agreement 
and the price to be paid upon termination are computed to provide a 
specific rate of return to the buyer for the period of time that the re­
purchase agreement Is undertaken.
The buyer Is usually a bank, nonfinancial corporation, or the 
Federal Reserve System Open Market Account. Not only Is the repurchase 
agreement of benefit to the dealer In financing his position, but benefit 
accrues to the buyer as well. In the case of a bank or nonfinancial 
corporation, the duration of the repurchase agreement can be arranged to 
make the funds available at precisely the time needed. For a bank, a re­
purchase agreement may serve as a slightly longer-term alternative to the 
lending of Federal funds, and may provide a slightly higher Interest re­
turn. The nature of the repurchase agreement makes the risk of holding 
repurchase agreements based on bills even smaller than the risk of hold­
ing bills which are subject to price fluctuations between purchase and
Hyman Minsky, "Central Banking and Money Market Changes," The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. LXXI (May, 1957), No. 2, pp. 176-178. 
Minsky provides an excellent description of the beginning of corporate 
participation In dealer financing.
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sales date.51 As an outlet for funds available for only one or two days, 
repurchase agreements provide an alternative not available through the 
purchase of bills In the open market. The normal spread between the bid 
and asked yields on bills does not justify the purchase of these Instru­
ments for a holding period so short.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, alone among the Federal Re­
serve banks, engages In purchases and sales of repurchase agreements with 
nonbank dealers. Bank dealers have access to borrowing through the dis­
count privilege with the Federal Reserve Bank. The Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York may lend through repurchase agreements for up to 15 days on 
securities of less than 15 months maturity. In effect, termination of 
the agreement may be made by either party at any time; the duration of 
the agreements, however, are normally for periods shorter than one week.
The repurchase agreement Is, from the point of view of the Federal 
Reserve System, a method of making temporary adjustment In commercial bank 
reserves, and In smoothing "money market pressures." The purchase and 
termination of repurchase agreements has the same effect on commercial 
bank reserves that open market activities accomplish. The "purchase" of 
a repurchase agreement from a dealer tends to increase bank reserves, and 
the "sale," or termination, of the agreement serves to decrease reserves. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York may choose this method of affecting 
bank reserves. Instead of open market transactions. If the need for ad­
justment Is clearly a temporary one, or if the desired impact of open 
market transactions is not yet clear.
Assuming yields do not change and a purchase and sale are made 
at the following yields, a bill with 70 days to maturity, quoted as 3,04 
par cent bid and 3.00 per cent asked, would have to be held one day to 
break even.
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"Money market pressures" arise in periods of tight money. When 
commercial banks are selling securities in order to increase their re­
serves, the positions of the dealers will increase even though the prices 
at which dealers are willing to buy are decreasing. In addition to the 
increasing inventory,' dealers encounter difficulty in obtaining financing 
from their regular bank and nonfinancial corporate sources. Normally, in 
these periods, the New York Federal Reserve Bank will be a buyer of re­
purchase agreements to relieve the money market pressures from the deal­
ers. When the Treasury is borrowing large amounts of new funds, similar 
pressures may fall on dealers as they carry larger positions in the 
securities and financing is difficult to obtain.
The sale of repurchase agreements to the New York Bank is initir 
52ated by the dealer. Each day, from contacts.; with the dealers from the 
Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee, the New York 
Bank is aware of the changes in dealer positions, and the resulting degree 
of difficulty in obtaining funds. The dealer requests to the New York 
Bank are made only after the regular bank and corporate sources prove in­
sufficient for dealer needs, and before borrowing is attempted from some 
of the larger New York banks whose rates for short-term lending to dealers 
is consistently greater than the rate dealers pay to their more regular 
lenders.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York normally charges the New 
York discount rate to dealers on the repurchase agreements, but may charge
52Roosa, j22. cit., pp. 83-87, A good, and quite detailed, dis­
cussion of the use of the repurchase agreement by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York is presented by Roosa, Evidently the responsibility has 
not always been with the dealer, Minsky, og, cit., pp. 176-177. Minsky 
indicates that prior to 1956, repurchase agreements with the New York 
Bank were Initiated by the New York Bank,
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the bill rate instead. The New York Bank never charges a rate that is  ̂
lower than the discount or the bill rate. Repurchase agreements between 
the New York Bank and the nonbank dealers are usually for Treasury bills. 
For the Federal Reserve System, this temporary assistance in financing 
dealers' positions is important since smooth functioning of the market is 
crucial to carrying out countercyclical monetary policy.
Federal Reserve Operations in the Bill Market
Of the more important Federal Reserve System powers in executing 
monetary policy are; changes in reserve requirements of member commer­
cial banks, changing the rediscount and advance rates, and buying and 
selling Federal securities in the open market. It is generally agreed 
that the most important of these powers is open market operations. If 
the intensity of use of these powers is an adequate guide to importance, 
open market opérations can be considered as the tool used to exercise 
monetary policy.
Through the use of open market operations, the Federal Reserve 
System is making short-term adjustments in bank reserves to offset tempo­
rary and seasonal changes as well as influencing the stock of money and
the interest rate (the assumption being that money supply and interest
rate changes will in turn have some effect on the level of spending and
investment). The Federal Reserve System, through directives issued by the
Federal Open Market Committee, and carried out by the Manager of the 
System Open Market Account, is continuously buying and selling United 
States government securities in the open market. In the period of this 
analysis, 1953-1964, these open market operations were carried out almost 
entirely in Treasury bills. The method of using the open market tech­
nique, and the recognition of its value in monetary policy, have been
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evolving for several decades. The more recent innovations are of princi­
pal interest in this postwar study; and a general description of the
relevant developments will be summarized in approximate chronological
53order.
In the period 1942-1946, the rate on Treasury bills was pegged at
0.375 per cent. All other Obvernment securities had supported rates, and
the Federal Reserve System used open market transactions to maintain a
yield pattern that approximated the prewar rates. On July 2, 1947, the
Treasury and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System agreed
to end the pegging of rates. In regard to the bill rate, the reason for
this action was obvious. The Federal Reserve Banks held practically all
Treasury bills outstanding. Of $16 billion outstanding, the Federal Re-
54serve Banks held all but $1.5 billion. The Certificate of Indebtedness, 
yielding around 0.8 per cent and posted at that level, had forced the 
elimination of the Treasury bill (with the rate posted at 0.375 per cent) 
from the short-term market. Only six months after the Federal Reserve 
Banks abandoned support, the bill rate climbed to near one per cent.
Between 1947 and 1951, the Federal Reserve System used open market 
operations to maintain "orderly" yields on Government securities thereby 
assisting the Treasury in debt refinancing operations, while at the same
53For a detailed description of the goals of monetary policy dur­
ing the complete period and on evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
policies see: Daniel S. Ahearn, Federal Reserve Policy Reappraised, 1951-
1959 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). Ahearn's survey of 
the events leading to the accord, and the arguments regarding "bills only" 
are especially relevant. Also of merit is: United States Monetary Policy
Revised Edition (Ed.) Neil H. Jacoby (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Published for the American Assembly, Columbia University, 1964).
^^Thirtv-tfourth Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System Covering Operations for the Year 1947, pp. 92-93.
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time attempting to buy and sell securities to affect member bank reserves 
in accordance with general economic conditions. The two goals were 
generally conflicting.
The Federal Open Market Committee desired to operate more freely 
in executing open market transactions to attain the goals of flexible 
contracyclical monetary policy. The Treasury resisted the System's 
efforts to reduce the degree of debt management support as long as possi­
ble. But on March 4, 1951, the Federal Reserve System and the Treasury 
issued the following announcement:
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have reached full 
accord with respect to debt management and monetary policies 
to be pursued in furthering their common purpose to assure the 
successful financing of the Government's requirements and, at 
the same time, to minimize monetization of the public debt.^S
Throughout 1951 and into 1952, the short-term market operated with less 
direct support from open market transactions of the Federal Reserve System. 
The Open Market Account was a supplier to the market for short-term secu­
rities, and also reduced their holdings in the short-term issues by 
allowing securities to run off without replacement as they matured. How­
ever, in the fall of 1952, the Federal Reserve System again supported 
Treasury financing of a large issue of Certificates of Indebtedness.
On March 5 and 6, 1953, the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee 
agreed to change the wording of a directive of December 8, 1952, relating 
to the policy of supporting interest rates on Treasury obligations. 
Significant policy implications are apparent in the change in wording
Thirty-Eighth Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System Covering Operations for the Year 1951. p. 4. 
Additional details are given in the same source on pages 99-101. Also 
see Allan Sproul, "The 'Accord' - A Landmark in the First Fifty Years of 
the Federal Reserve Systeny" Monthly Review. Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, Vol. 46, No. 11 (November, 1964), pp. 227-236.
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from: "...maintaining orderly conditions in the Government securities
market," to the approved form "...correcting a disorderly situation in 
the Government securities m a r k e t . T h i s  statement constituted another 
step in carrying out the intent of the Federal Reserve System in the 
Statement of Accord of 1951, and further signified the desire for "inde­
pendence" by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to exercise contra- 
cyclical monetary policy. In addition to the change in wording of the 
directive, the following policies were approved by the Federal Open Market 
Committee:
(1) Under present conditions, operations for the System 
account should be confined to the short end of the market (not 
including correction of disorderly markets);
(2) It is not now the policy of the Committee to support 
any pattern of prices and yields in the Government securities 
market, and intervention in the Government securities market 
is solely to effectuate the objectives of monetary and credit 
policy (including correction of disorderly markets);
(3) Pending further study and further action by the 
Committee, it should refrain during the period of Treasury 
financing from purchasing (1) any maturing issues for which 
an exchange is being offered, (2) when-issued securities 
and (3) outstanding issues of comparable maturity to those 
being offered for exchange.5'
The policy of exercising open market transactions in the short­
term maturities was confined primarily to the purchase and sale of Treas­
ury bills.
^^Fortieth Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System Covering Operations for the Year 1953. p. 87.
^^Ibid., p. 88. Excellent reviews of open market policies are 
available in: Clay J. Anderson, A Half-Centurv of Federal Reserve
Policymaking, 1914-1964 (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1965); 
and David P. Eastburn, The Federal Reserve on Record: Readings on Current 
Issues from Statements by Federal Reserve Officials (Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia, 1965).
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The Federal Reserve deviated from the so-called "bills only" 
policy Infrequently, and then only temporarily, to correct disorderly
C Omarkets for Government securities. In December, 1955, the Federal Open
Market Committee authorized purchase of up to $400 million of Certificates
of Indebtedness dated December 1, 1955, and maturing a year later. The
59Federal Reserve actually purchased $267 million of this Issue. In 
February, 1957, as the Manager of the Federal Open Market Account was 
carrying out the monetary policy directives of the Federal Open Market 
Committee to sell securities, the supply of bills was reduced to a level 
of slightly more than $100 million, and Certificates and notes were sold 
In the open market Instead of b i l l s . I n  July, 1958, several maturities
58No attempt Is made here to evaluate the "bills only" policy. 
Interest In this study lies principally In the effect of the policy on the 
bill market In that total transactions In bills are greater than under a 
policy under which all maturities are traded.
The "official" arguments supporting "bills only" are; "The Eco­
nomics of 'Bills Preferably'," The Ouarterlv Journal of Economics, LXXIV, 
(August, 1960), pp. 341-373; and Winfield W. Rlefler, "Open Market Opera­
tions In Long-Term Securities," Federal Reserve Bulletin. XLIV, (November, 
1958), pp. 1260-1274.
Representative criticisms are available In: Paul A. Samuelson,
"Recent Monetary Controversy," The Three Banks Review (March, 1959), pp. 
3-21; Warren L. Smith, Debt Management in the United States. Study Paper 
No. 19 of materials prepared In connection with the Study of Employment 
Growth, and Price Levels, Joint Economic Committee, Washington, D. C.,
1960; Sidney Welntraub, "The Theory of Open Market Operations: A Comment,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics. XLI, (August, 1959), No. 3, pp. 
308-312; and David I. Fand and Ira 0. Scott, Jr., "The Federal Reserve 
System's 'Bills Only' Policy: A Suggested Interpretation," The Journal
of Business, (January, 1958), XXXI, No. 1, pp. 12-18.
59Forty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System Covering Operations for the Year 1955, pp. 109-110.
^^Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Forty-Third Annual Report 
for the Year 1957» p. 26. Also see: Edward J. Geng, United States
Treasury Bills: Liquidity and the Growth of the Market, mimeographed
version of Master of Business Administration Thesis, New York University, 
1962, p. 58.
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In addition to bills, Including some long-term Issues, were purchased by 
the Federal Reserve System In order to correct disorderly market condi­
tions.^^ These three Instances were the only departures from the "bills 
only" policy between Its adoption and late 1960 when International mone­
tary problems stimulated a reconsideration of monetary policy goals.
The presumed acuteness of the balance-of-payments problem, and
the continuing outflow of gold from the United States, was Intensified as
the 91-day bill rate In the open market fell to a low of 2.13 per cent In
August, 1960, while the market three-month bill rate In the United Kingdom
moved to 5.6 per cent and the "discount rate" of the Bank of England was
6 per cent. In October, 1960, In order to ease the downward pressure on
the bill rate from open-market purchases, the Federal Reserve System began
to purchase securities In the open market with maturities of one to five
years. On February 20, 1961, the Federal Reserve began purchasing notes
63and bonds, some with maturities In excess of five years. The policy of 
conducting open-market operations with longer-term maturities, as well as 
bills has continued through 1964. In addition, the Treasury, In refinanc­
ing the Federal debt and In financing new debt, has Increased the quantity 
of Treasury bills outstanding In an effort to Increase the short-term 
Interest rates.
Although the "bills only" policy seems to have been temporarily 
terminated, the bulk of system open market transactions are In Treasury
^^Forty-Fifth Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Fed­
eral Reserve System Covering Operations for the Year 1958. p. 69.
62"Interest Rates In Leading Countries," Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
Vol. 47, (August, 1961), No. 8, p. 894.
63Forty-Eighth Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System Covering Operations for the Year 1961. p. 43.
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bills. Table 1 shows the yearly total outright transactions in bills and
in the maturity categories: within one year, one to five years, and over
64five years. Even in 1961 and 1962 when non-bill transactions were rela­
tively great, bill transactions were several times greater than the com­
bined transactions of all other categories.
Public Holders of Treasury Bills 
Although the Federal Reserve System is clearly the single most 
important trading force in the market, the combined holdings of several 
investor groups are larger. The individual institutions in these groups 
tend to act in unison in their market behavior, and therefore have a 
great influence on the aggregate demand for Treasury bills. The bill 
holdings of the principal bill holding groups will be briefly reviewed.
Information regarding ownership of Treasury bills is derived al­
most entirely from monthly estimates made in the "survey of ownership" by 
the Treasury and published in the Treasury Bulletin. The accuracy of 
these data ranges from excellent for Federal government agencies and trust 
funds, the Federal Reserve System, and member commercial banks; to prac­
tically nonexistent for foreign governments and banks, nonfinancial 
corporations, and state and local governments. For most of the period 
1953-1964, no owners^^ data for Treasury bills are available for non­
financial corporations and state and local governments. Recently, esti­
mated ownership data from survey information was initiated for these two 
sectors. For nonfinancial corporations, sample survey data on bill hold­
ings extend back to February, 1960; for state and local governments, data
64These transactions are outright, therefore not including re­
purchase agreements.
TABLE 1.— Maturity distribution of total outright transactions of the Federal Reserve System,
(in millions of dollars)
Year Trpflaiirv mils
Coupon Issues Maturing
Purchases Sales Redemptions Within 1 year In 1-5 years After 5 yearsPurchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
1954 2,903 1,354 1, 978 -- — - — - - - -- —-
1955 2,009 1,416 1,257 167 — - -- -- - - --
1956 3,125 2,018 888 -- - - -- - - --
1957 2,407 2,161 984 — — 153 — — - — -- ——
1958 5,489 2,633 1,590 1,200 - - 10 —— 55 ——
1959 2,866 1,574 937 — — -- — - —- --
1960 4,370 2,631 1,445 202 218 113 14 - - --
1961 5,794 4,486 1,015 600 1,474* 1, 923 97 788 --
1962 6,813 6,211 1,353 1,085 402 1,569 108 362 - -
1963 7,291 4,360 1,232 56 54 844 50 609 - -
1964 9,433 5,437 2,093 5 — — 465 -- 551 --
Excludes $295 million of maturing issues.
Sources: Stephen H. Axilrod and Janice Krummach, "Federal Reserve Security Transactions,” Fed­
eral Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 50, No. 7 (July, 1964), Appendix Table 2, p. 837. Data for 1964 are from 
the Fifty-First Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Svstem Covering Onera^ 
tions for the Year 1964 (Washington, D. C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1965),
p. 228. The Treasury bill data for 1964 is not exactly on the same basis as for the years 1954-1963.
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are available from December, 1960. The investor groups and the number of 
institutions that are presently surveyed by the Treasury are summarized 
in Table 2. Also included in the table is the Treasury's estimate of the 
percentage of the total sector holdings covered by the survey.
TABLE 2.— Coverage of the U. S. Treasury survey of ownership as number of 
reporting institutions in each sector, and the estimated percentage of 







of Total Sector 
Holdings
Government agencies and 
trust funds a 100
Federal Reserve Banks a 100
Commercial banks 6,200+ 90
Mutual savings banks 500+ 90
Life insurance companies 300+ 90
Fire and casualty insurance 
companies 500+ 90
Savings and loan associations 490+ 50
Nonfinancial corporations 470+ 50
State and local governments 500+^ 70^
The Treasury survey combines the holdings of Government agencies 
and trust funds and the Federal Reserve Banks. The figures are given 
separately in a summary table of the Treasury ownership data, in the Fed­
eral Reserve Bulletin.
^The size of the survey for this category was increased in Jan­
uary, 1964 from 295 general funds to 316 general funds, plus approximately 
190 pension and trust funds.
Source: Treasury Bulletin, monthly issues, 1953-1964.
It should be pointed out that the percentage holdings of each 
sector is the estimated percentage of total Government securities held by 
a particular sector, and no further breakdown is provided as to the
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estimated holdings of each type of security as a percentage.of total 
sector holdings.
The principal investor sectors that are not now included in the 
Treasury survey of ownership are dealers and brokers in Government secu­
rities, and foreign governments and banks. The Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York has been collecting both positions and transactions of Govern­
ment securities dealers since the Treasury-Federal Reserve investigation 
of the dealer market in 1959, These data are available (not necessarily 
in comparable form) back to November 1957. In its present published form, 
holdings are given by maturity groupings and not by types of securities. 
For the international sector estimates of the combined holdings of 
Treasury bills and Certificates are available on a monthly basis from 
1950.̂ ^
From the published data on bill holdings, it is possible to esti­
mate roughly the importance of the different investor groups in the 
Treasury bill market. In the following discussion an attempt will be 
made to indicate the approximate bill holdings of the principal investor 
groups as of the end of December, 1964. This estimate will be only a 
very rough approximation, and is subject to a great deal of discretion 
and pure guesswork. The purpose in attempting to estimate sector hold­
ings is to illustrate the relative importance of sector demand for 
bills.GG
Supplement to Banking and Monetary Statistics. Section 15, 
"International Finance," Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
March, 1962.
^^The estimation of bill holdings follows the general method used 
by Edward J. Geng, og. cit. Also useful in this attempt is Michael E. 
Levy, Part I, Federal Debt and Its Ownership. Cycles in Government Secu­
rities. National Industrial Conference Board, 1962.
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As of December 31, 1964, there were $56.5 billion in Treasury
bills outstanding, which represented 26.6 per cent of total outstanding
marketable Federal debt, and 63.8 per cent of marketable Federal debt
67within one year of maturity or first call.
Government agencies and trust funds
The Government agencies and trust funds secure Treasury bills
through the Federal Reserve System, which acts as the agent. Most of the
holdings of the trust funds are concentrated in the Old Age and Survirors
Insurance fund, the Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, the Civil Service
68Retirement and Disability fund, and the Railroad Retirement account. 
Although these holdings move modestly in cyclical patterns (and somewhat 
seasonally), they are characterized basically by an upward trend. Most 
of the security holdings by the government sector are relatively long­
term, and bill holdings are small. The effect of bill holdings by the 
Government sector is a net reduction in the supply of bills available in 
the market. Holdings by Government agencies and trust funds as of 
December 31, 1964 were $1.3 billion, only 2.3 per cent of total bills. 
These bill holdings represented 75.6 per cent of agency and trust funds 
holdings of the "within one year" maturity, but only 10.8 per cent of 
total sector holdings of marketable Federal securities.
Federal Reserve Banks
As has been pointed out earlier, bill holdings by the Federal 
Reserve System move in a cyclical fashion (although in the opposite
^^The quantity of bills outstanding is always measured as the 
value at maturity.
68Gaines, og. cit., p. 146.
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direction to most other cyclical holders), as well as seasonally and at
times seemingly in irregular patterns. At the end of December, 1964, the
Federal Reserve Banks held $6.5 billion of Treasury bills, representing 
11.5 per cent of total bills outstanding. Of total Federal Reserve hold­
ings of marketable Federal debt, bills constituted 17.5 per cent; of total 
portfolio holdings of Federal securities maturing within one year, bills 
made up 30.3 per cent. Bills not held by Federal government agencies and 
trust funds and by the Federal Reserve System, are classified by the
Treasury survey as "held by the public."
Commercial banks
Treasury bills are part of those liquid assets in commercial bank 
portfàlios considered "secondary" reserves. Although bill holdings move 
cyclically, the pattern is not clearly apparent.
In 1952, bill holdings of commercial banks had increased into the 
vicinity of $6 to $7 billion, declining rather rapidly from this level to 
a low of slightly less than $2 billion in 1956 and fluctuating between $3 
and $5 billion throughout 1957-1959. In mid-1960, bill holdings moved to 
a secondary low of $2.5 billion, then rose sharply to $9 to $10 billion 
in 1961. Since mid-1961, bill holdings declined to $6.5 billion in mid- 
1962, increased to the $10 billion level in November, 1962, and have 
fluctuated between $6 and $11 billion through 1964. An apparent explana­
tion of the great increase in holdings from mid-1960 is the action by the 
Treasury in increasing bills outstanding and beginning the regular issue 
of six-month, nine-month, and one-year bills, using these securities to 
replace Certificates of Indebtedness. Bills in 1960-1961 began to make 
up a larger proportion of short-term United States Government securities.
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The explanation of commercial bank portfolio policy Is very com­
plex and there Is some controversy among economists regarding behavior of 
bank holdings of marketable Federal securities during cyclical fluctua­
tions. It has been frequently suggested that when bank reserves are under 
pressure, banks would liquidate short-term Government securities; however, 
Dudley G. Luckett has recently Indicated that banks probably liquidate 
long-term securities I n s t e a d . O n  a shorter-term basis, monthly seasonal 
movements are apparent In the bill holdings of commercial banks, and since 
bill holdings for December are being compared for the different sectors.
It should be pointed out that commercial bank holdings for December are 
seasonally above holdings for any other month.
The movement of bank holdings of bills over the period 1953-1964 
does not represent any simple upward or downward trend movement, and It 
has been Indicated that some structural shifts have possibly occurred In 
bank holdings of bills.
Bill holdings on December 31, 1964, according to the Treasury 
survey, amounted to $11.0 billion. Of those banks reporting In the sur­
vey, this quantity of bills represented 20.4 per cent of total bank 
holdings of Federal marketable debt, and 59.3 per cent of bank holdings 
of securities within one year to maturity.
^^Dudley G. Luckett, "Compensatory Cyclical Bank Asset Adjustment," 
The Journal of Finance. XVII, (March, 1962), No. 1, pp. 53-62.
70See Chapter VIII below; also William H. Brown, Jr., Forty-Third 
Annual Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research, The Uses of 
Economic Research. New York, 1963, pp. 78-81. Brown has generously pro­
vided preliminary results of his seasonally adjusted data relating to the 
Treasury bill market.
^Hllnsky, ©2. cit., pp. 179, 185-187.
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Since the Treasury survey covers approximately 90 per cent of bank 
holdings, a 10 per cent increase in the quantity of bill holdings re­
ported in the survey would indicate holdings of all commercial bnaks to
72be around $13.2 billion. This amount represents 23.4 per cent of the 
total quantity of bills outstanding.
Nonfinancial corporations
Although the information on bill and Government securities hold­
ings has been available only since 1960, it has been known for some time
that corporations were large holders of short-term Federal debt, and
73particularly Treasury bills. From a survey questionnaire in 1956, it 
was learned that, "for a time this spring. General Motors held more Treas­
ury bills in its investment portfolio than did the entire Federal Reserve 
74System." Corporate holdings seem to move seasonally, with large hold­
ings of bills and tax-anticipation issues preceding the quarterly tax 
dates, followed by a rather abrupt decline in the weeks following payment 
dates. Empirical studies suggest that corporate holdings of Treasury 
securities are closely related to their accrued Federal tax liabilities.
72The semi-annual commercial bank survey in the February, 1965 
Treasury Bulletin indicates that the nonmember banks held $1.7 billion in 
bills, which would give a total of member plus nonmember holdings as $12.7 
billion. The approximate increase of 10 per cent yields an overestimate 
in this case.
73The exact importance and extent of these holdings over the period 
1952-1956 is questionable. See Colin D. Campbell, "Investments in United 
States Government Securities by Nonfinancial Corporations, 1952-1956; 
Comment," and Hyman P. Minsky's "Reply," The Ouarterlv Journal of Econom* 
ica. LXXI, (May, 1958), No. 2, pp. 292-300.
74Charles E. Silberman, "The Big Corporate Lenders," Fortune, 
(August, 1956), as reprinted in (Ed.) Lawrence S. Ritter, Money and Eco­
nomic Activity (2d ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), p. 127.
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and are not very responsive to interest rate c h a n g e s . A s  corporations 
become more adept in managing their cash flows and as interest rates have 
risen secularly since World War II, a greater percentage of their idle 
balances are being held in the form of Treasury bills, short-term issues, 
and repurchase agreements. The holding of short-term instruments has 
shown an upward trend over the period of analysis, but since this con­
clusion has been pieced together from several empirical studies, the de­
gree of trend in holdings is not known. William J. Frazer, Jr., in an 
empirical study, has commented that:
It appears that the view is increasingly taking hold among these 
corporations that the return from expert management of the cash 
account is well worth the effort. Further, as a result of this 
improved management of the cash account, adjustments in cash 
needs are primarily made by changes in the holdings of United 
States government securities.^
The Treasury survey showed that for the 469 corporations respond­
ing for December, 1964, bill holdings totaled $5.0 billion. Of this 
total, $3.1 billion were in regular weekly issues, $0.6 billion in longer- 
term bills, and $1.4 billion in tax-anticipation bills. Bill holdings of 
the corporations surveyed represented 55.2 per cent of total holdings of 
all Treasury securities held by these 469 corporations, and 74.7 per cent 
of those securities within one year to maturity.
Since the Treasury survey is based on a sample that includes 
approximately 50 per cent of total corporate holdings, it would be
Nancy Teeters, "Nonfinancial Corporations Holdings of U. S. 
Government Securities," mimeographed, 1961; and "Corporate Participation 
in the Government Securities Market," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City, (December, 1960), pp. 9-15.
^^William J. Frazer, Jr., "Large Manufacturing Corporations as 
Suppliers of Funds to the United States Government Securities Market," 
The Journal of Finance. XVIII, (December, 1958), No. 4, p. 503.
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estimated that all nonfinancial corporations held in the vicinity of $10 
billion, or roughly 18 per cent of all bills outstanding. In addition, 
17,816 corporate pension and trust funds held $.6 billion in bills at the 
end of 1964.
State and local governments
In the Treasury survey of ownership, holdings of state government 
pension funds are listed separately from holdings by general funds. Since 
the holdings of the pension funds are relatively small, they are grouped 
in with holdings of the general funds. State and local government hold­
ings of short-term Treasury securities and Treasury bills, depend prima­
rily on the temporary surpluses of receipts over expenditures as taxes 
are collected at the end of periods, and used during subsequent periods. 
Also, those funds that may have been raised through borrowing for use on 
predetermined construction projects are channeled into highly liquid, 
short-term, riskless securities until needed. Given the trend in state 
and local expenditures, it is expected that the upward trend of the last 
several years will continue. Although state and local governments keep 
Federal securities in their portfolios at the short end of the maturity 
scale, a smaller percentage of their total holdings are in bills than for 
nonfinancial corporations.
On December 31, 1964, the 316 state and local government general 
funds included in the Treasury survey held $3.7 billion in bills, and 191 
pension and retirement funds held $.219 billion. For the surveyed general 
funds, bill holdings represented 81.5 per cent of total holdings of Fed­
eral securities within one year to maturity, and 26.4 of total sector 
holdings of Federal securities.
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As of December, 1964, the Treasury estimates that about 70 per 
cent of total state and local holdings are Included In the ownership data. 
Making a rough increase In the reported general fund, bill holdings of 30 
per cent Indicates that approximately $4.8 billion was held at the end of 
the year, 1964 and adding $.2 billion for pension funds yields an approxi­
mation of $5.0 billion. This total Is approximately 8.8 per cent of the 
total quantity of bills outstanding.
Dealers
Bill holdings of dealers In Treasury securities are subject to a 
great deal of variation, even within a period as short as a day. Bill 
holdings follow a wlthln-week pattern because of the Monday auction by 
the Treasury and the disposition of these newly Issued bills during the 
week. There Is also a longer-term seasonal pattern, with dealers' posi­
tions reflecting the seasonality of all other holders, as dealers are 
forced to absorb this seasonal trading Into their positions.
No trend Is clearly apparent In the fragmentary data available.
The cyclical holdings of dealers reflect larger positions as rates decline 
(prices rise) and smaller positions as rates Increase (prices fall).
Since the Federal Reserve Bulletin data covering dealer positions 
are weekly averages of dally holdings, the holdings of this group will be 
viewed as the dally average for the week ending December 30, 1964. For 
that date, the average dally position In maturities of less than one year 
was $3.3 billion, or approximately 85 per cent of total dealer holdings.
A Study of the Dealer Market, 0£. cit.. pp. 27-48. Also, Treas­
ury-Federal Reserve Study of the Government Securities Market. Fart II,
O P . cit.. Appendix C, pp. 138-139; the breakdown in the dealer position by 
type of security is available from October 1957 through December 1958.
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On the basis of bill holdings relative to holdings of the one-year matu­
rity category on the same date for 1960, it appears that bills account 
for around 70 per cent of the one-year classification. This yields a 
crude estimate of bill holdings of approximately $2.7 billion.
Dealer holdings include bank dealers, and therefore the estimated 
bill holdings involve double counting if bank dealers' holdings are in­
cluded with both dealers and banks. Nevertheless, it is interesting that 
the fifteen to twenty dealers probably held around 5 per cent of all bills 
outstanding.
Foreign governments and banks
In the period 1953-1964, holdings of Treasury securities by the 
foreign sector have moved consistently upward. This movement has been due 
largely to increasing dollar claims against the United States. A balance 
of payments shift would probably reverse this trend; and exogenous factors 
such as devaluation of currencies, political problems, or a deepening of 
international tensions would probably cause irregular movements in these 
holdings.
Foreign holdings are highly concentrated in short-term issues.
In December, 1964, foreign governments and banks were reported as holding 
$8.8 billion in Treasury bills (since no Certificates of Indebtedness are 
outstanding). This amount does not include approximately $3.3 billion of 
non-negotiable, non-interest-bearing special United States notes held by 
the International Monetary Fund. The breakdown of the $8.8 billion by 
geographical areas include the following: Europe - $5.6 billion, Canada -
$0.8 billion, Latin America - $0.2 billion, and Asia - $1.0 billion. 
Foreign holding of bills account for 15.6 per cent of total bills Issued.
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Foreign holdings of Treasury notes and bonds excluding inter­
national agencies totaled $1,5 billion on the above date, which added to 
the $8.8 billion holdings in bills and Certificates would indicate total 
holdings by foreign governments and banks as $10.3 billion. Bill hold­
ings constitute 85 per cent of total holdings of Treasury securities by 
the foreign sector.
Other public holders
Data on bill holdings by life insurance companies, fire and 
casualty insurance companies, and mutual savings banks are based on a 
rather complete survey, and are available for the complete period. Treas­
ury security holdings by these groups generally have declined since the 
war, and bill holdings at present are relatively unimportant in their 
portfolios. Although the survey information for savings and loan associa­
tions covers only 50 per cent of holdings, and does not extend back prior 
to the beginning of 1960, it is evident that this group is not an impor­
tant holder of Treasury bills. Because of the limited importance of these 
groups in the bill market, it has been decided to lump them together into 
a group considered to react similarly in their market behavior.
As of December 31, 1964, bill holdings of this combined group 
totaled approximately $1.3 billion which is only 6.5 per cent of the com­
bined holdings of the group in United State Treasury securities, but 55.6
per cent of holdings by the group of Treasury securities maturing within 
one year. The combined holdings represent approximately 2.3 per cent of 
total bills outstanding.
No information whatsoever is available for holdings of Treasury 
bills by individuals. They are included in the Treasury with "all
others," which includes the residual of the groups above who are not
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completely surveyed, and those groups not reporting to the survey. The 
residual holdings represent a larger percentage for Treasury bills than 
for any other security classification. Over the period, residual hold­
ings range from around 80 per cent of bills outstanding in 1953 to around 
40 per cent in 1964.
Summarv and Conclusions 
The attempt to account for the ownership of all Treasury bills at 
a particular point of time has yielded very imprecise results as approxi­
mately $7 billion, or 12.5 per cent of total bills outstanding remain in 
the residual category. It should also be stressed that the procedure 
used to increase the bill holdings of investor groups is tenuous. The 
quite naive assumption is that if the Treasury survey covers 50 per cent 
of a sector's holdings, this represents 50 per cent of each type of 
security and each maturity classifications. Table 3 summarizes the hold­
ings of various investor groups but it should be interpreted as an ex-
78tremely rough estimate.
Bill holdings by commercial banks and the Federal Reserve System 
are relatively large, volatile, and (perhaps most important for a statis­
tical analysis) accurately reported over the relevant period. Bill hold­
ings for banks in leading cities are available on a weekly basis which 
might permit some view of at least a portion of the banking sector during 
within month periods. Data on holdings of other investor groups are
78Teeters, og. cit.. p. 18. "Observation...indicates that a much 
larger percentage (somewhere in the neighborhood of 70 to 80 per cent) of 
the change in total corporate holdings was accounted for by the holdings 
of the large corporations reporting directly to the Treasury."
TABLE 3.— Estimated Treasury bill holdings of investor sectors on December 31, 1964, as total holdings, 
percentage of bills outstanding, percentage of marketable U. S. Treasury securities in sector portfolios 
maturing within one year, and as percentage of sector holdings of total marketable U. S. securities
Bill Holding
As Per Cent of
Type Amount Bills
Outstanding
Marketable U. S. Securities
($ billion)* Maturing Within 
One Year Total
Total 56.5 100 63.8 26.6
Government agencies and 
trust funds 1.3 2.3 75.6 10.8
Federal Reserve Banks 6.5 11.5 30.3 17.5
Commercial banks 13.2 23.4 59.3 20.4
Nonfinancial corporations 10.0 17.7 74.7 55.2
Corporate pension and 
trust funds .6 1.1 70.0 27.6
State and local governments 5.0 8.8 81.5 26.4
Dealers 2.7 4.8 80-90 60-80
Foreign 8.8 15.6 ? 85.4
Combined insurance and mutual 
savings banks 1.3 2.3 55.6 6.5
Individuals, others, and 
residual 7.1 12.5 - - - -
Details do not add to total because of double counting when bank dealers were classified both as
banks and dealers. Rounding also enters into totals.
Sources: Treasury Bulletins and Federal Reserve Bulletins.
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either not available over the desired period, or relatively unimportant 
to total bill holdings. In the empirical portion of the analysis.
Chapter VII^ attention will be concentrated on the bill holdings of these 
surveyed sectors. The lack of holding data for some sectors and data for 
short periods for other sectors severely limits the ability to measure 
the effect on the bill rate of demand changes.
CHAPTER III
THE MOVEMENTS OF THE BILL RATE
Introduction
It is necessary to make a choice of a single rate among the dif­
ferent measures of the bill rate available before attempting to describe 
the movements in the Treasury bill rate. Measures of the bill rate are 
regularly published for 91-day bills, six-month bills, nine-month and one- 
year bills, am well as for tax-anticipation bills, on a yearly, monthly, 
weekly, or daily basis. Since the longer-term bill issues are a rela­
tively recent development and since tax-anticipation bills do not provide 
a continuous series, the analysis will be confi^^d to the rate on the 91- 
day bill.
Monthly and weekly average 91-day bill open market rates are 
available from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. These average rates are com­
puted from daily closing bid prices collected from Government securities 
dealers. The Treasury publishes the full details of the weekly auction 
results in the Treasury Bulletin and in the Annual Report of the Secre­
tary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances. Actually, three rates 
are ayailable from these auction data; the yields computed from the re­




Since the present purpose of analyzing the Treasury bill rate 
time series is to gain information on the relative magnitude of movements 
due to different factors, and not necessarily to compute a usable season­
ally adjusted series, the monthly average of daily closing bid yields is 
adequately precise and will serve as the basis for the statistical calcu­
lations.
Actually, the monthly average of closing bid yields is not a
single average but a combination of several averages. There are at least
four different aspects of this problem of averages. First, this is an
average of 13 different bill rates, one rate for each different weekly
issue outstanding. The average rate on these 13 different issues should
not be confused with the rate for a bill with exactly 91 days to maturity.
The 13 issues outstanding were all originally 91-day bills, but the
maturities are spaced one week apart from 13 weeks to one week to maturity,
The average time to maturity computed over a period of time would be 46
days, ranging from a mean time to maturity of 49 days for Thursdays to a
79low of 43 days to maturity on Wednesdays. Second, this average is an 
average of the closing bid yields of each of the reporting dealers. 
Normally yields will be very closely grouped for all dealers, but price 
differences among dealers existing at the time of the market close are 
averaged. Third, it is the average of the daily closing yields for all 
trading days in the month. The closing yield is computed from dealers' 
quoted prices, which are not necessarily the prices at which transactions 
take place. Since these are bid prices, the observation error will prob­
ably be less than if the offer price were used because it seems that the
79See footnote 39, Chapter II, p. 24.
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offer price might be more subject to bargaining by a potential buyer than 
the bid price would be by a potential seller. Fourth, this yield is com­
puted from the average of dealers' closing prices, and is published to 
two decimal places (for example 2.63 per cent), which is clearly a rounded 
figure. There will also be some bias to the quoted monthly average rate 
depending on the first and last trading day of the month, especially if 
there is within-week variation in the bill rate. For example, if a month 
both begins and closes on trading days which may be within-week highs, 
then the monthly average rate may be slightly biased upward. These obser­
vation errors are relatively unimportant for our purposes, and are pointed 
out to indicate that the average monthly rate being used in the following 
calculations is not a precise measure of the rate that is being described. 
The degree of accuracy is taken into consideration in rounding the calcu­
lated figures below. Throughout this Chapter the bill rate is given in 
terms of bank discount.
The weekly auction rates from the Treasury sources will be used 
to make estimates of the variations in the bill rate that occur within 
time periods shorter than one month. These rates are slightly more accu­
rate calculations than the monthly average rate described above. The 
mean of the accepted bids (the price at which the noncompetitive bids are 
filled) will be the specific rate used. This rate is an average of the 
accepted competitive bids, and is computed from the weighted average of 
the bid prices which are required to be to exactly three decimal places 
(for example, $99,389).
The Treasury bill rate is quite volatile, at times showing large 
fluctuations over a short period of time. The mean average monthly bill 
rate for the period 1952-1964 is 2.462 per cent, with a standard deviation
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of .82 per cent, yielding a coefficient of variation of .33. The fre­
quency distribution of the monthly average of daily open market bill 
rates for the same period is shown in Table 4. The frequency distribu­
tion has been divided into classes with convenient intervals of 0.5 per 
cent and has not been constructed for the purpose of analysis. It is 
intended to be descriptive only, illustrating the general characteristics 
of the magnitude of the monthly bill rates over this period; and the 
classes were formed to facilitate comparison of the frequency distribu­
tion with, the bill rates plotted in the time series of Chart 1. The 
rates have not been generated randomly through time, and a frequency dis­
tribution covering a different period of time would appear very different, 
This is easily discerned by viewing the monthly average open market bill 
rate shown in Table 5 and illustrated graphically in Chart 1.
TABLE 4.— Frequency distribution of the monthly average of daily closing 
bid yields, 91-day Treasury bills, 1952-1964
Yield Class Number in Class Percent in Class









Source: Various issues of Federal Reserve Bulletin.
per cent per cent
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 19611958 1960 19621959
Source: Table 5
Chart 1.--Treasury 91-day bill rate, monthly average of daily closing bid yields, 1953-1964.
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TABLE 5.— Treasury 91-day open-market bill rate, monthly average of daily
closing bid yields, 1951-1964
Month 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
January 1.34 1.57 1.96 1.18 1.23 2.41 3.11
February 1.36 1.54 1.97 .97 1.17 2.32 3.11
March 1.40 1.59 2.01 1.03 1.28 2.25 3.08
April 1.47 1.57 2.19 .96 1.59 2.60 3.06
May 1.55 1.67 2.16 .76 1.45 2.61 3.06
June 1.45 1.70 2.11 .64 1.41 2.49 3.29
July 1.56 1.81 2.04 .72 1.60 2.31 3.16
August 1.62 1.83 2.04 .92 1.90 2.60 3.37
September 1.63 1.71 1.79 1.01 2.07 2.84 3.53
October 1.54 1.74 1.38 .98 2.23 2.90 3.58
November 1.56 1.85 1.44 .93 2.25 2.99 3.29
December 1.73 2.09 1.60 1.14 2.54 3.21 3.04
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
January 2.44 2.82 4.35 2.24 2.72 2.91 3.52
February 1.54 2.72 3.96 2.42 2.73 2.92 3.53
March 1.30 2.80 3.31 2.39 2.72 2.89 3.54
April 1.13 2.95 3.23 2.29 2.73 2.90 3.47
May .91 2.84 3.29 2.29 2.68 2.92 3.48
June .83 3.21 2.46 2.33 2.73 2.99 3.48
July .91 3.20 2.30 2.24 2.92 3.18 3.46
August 1.69 3.38 2.30 2.39 2.82 3.32 3.50
September 2.44 4.04 2.48 2.28 2.78 3.38 3.53
October 2.63 4.05 2.30 2.30 2.74 3.45 3.57
November 2.67 4.15 2.37 2.48 2.83 3.52 3.64
December 2.77 4.49 2.25 2.60 2.87 3.52 3.84
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletins, various monthly issues.
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The time series of the 91-day open market Treasury bill rate will 
be broken down into the usual components; trend, cyclical, seasonal, and 
irregular--with descriptions of each of the components. Each component 
has been approximated by several techniques, and some discussion of the 
statistical methods employed will be provided.
Trend
A slight upward movement of the monthly bill rate over this period 
is discernible from Chart 1. The simple linear trend equation computed 
by least-squares for the period 1952 through 1964 is:
Y = 1.4633 + .0128 T, 
where Y indicates the bill rate and T indicates time in months beginning 
in January, 1952. The standard error of the estimate is only slightly 
less than the standard deviation specified above, indicating that the 
rate ranges widely about the computed linear trend; or, more specifically, 
it indicates that time is an unimportant variable in describing fluctua­
tions in the bill rate. The linear trend indicates that for this period 
the bill rate increased, on average, slightly more than one hundreth of 
one per cent, or one basis point per month.
Three measures of the approximation of the trend-cycle were com­
puted; a 12-month moving average, a 15-month weighted moving average using 
Spencerian constants, and a 21-month moving average using the appropriate 
Spencerian constants. In order to avoid losing observations from the 
process of computing the moving averages, the bill rate time series from 
January, 1948, to May, 1963, was smoothed resulting in only a few lost 
observations at the end of 1962. The 12-month and 15-month averages are 
subsequently used in attempting to estimate the seasonality; the 21-month 
average la used in describing the cyclical patterns of the bill rate.
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Cyclical
The cyclical variations in the Treasury bill rate are apparent 
in Chart 1, and expressing the bill rate as a percentage of the computed 
linear trend show the same general pattern. Table 6 shows the bill rate 
as the percentage change from the previous month. Again the pattern is 
similar, but the percentage change values allow comparability of cyclical 
movements which are unaffected by the level of the rate. The largest 
percentage decrease was registered in February, 1958 (36.9 per cent) and 
the largest percentage increase was that for August, 1958 (85.7 per cent).
The original bill rate series can be divided conveniently into 
three almost equal periods which exhibit similar movements during the 
business cycles. These cyclical fluctuations conform generally with the 
cyclical movements in Gross National Product and other aggregate indica­
tors of the cycle. The division into cyclical periods centered at the 
trough of the three recessions is presented and allows comparison of the 
movements of the monthly average of the outstanding bill rate in the 
cycles that occurred between 1953 and 1964. The time periods for the 
division are constructed in terms of the number of months preceding and 
months following a National Bureau of Economic Research reference cycle
trough. Chart 2 shows the actual monthly average rates aligned at the
80reference cycle troughs. The National Bureau of Economic Research 
cyclical peak dates are indicated. The time periods, in chronological 
order, are: (1) from February, 1953, to February, 1956, with the trough
at August, 1954, (2) October, 1956, to October, 1959, with the trough at 
April, 1958, and (3) August^ 1959, to August, 1962, with the trough at
80This type of illustration is provided in: "Interest Rates in
the Current Cycle," Federal Reserve Bulletin (September, 1962), p. 11031
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TABLE 6.--Percentage change from the preceding month of the monthly aver­
age 91-day, open-market Treasury bill rate, 1953-1964
Month 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
January - 6.2 -26.2 7.9 - 5.1 - 3.1 -19.7
February .5 -17.8 - 4.9 - 3.7 0.0 -36.9
March 2.0 6.2 9.4 - 3.0 - 1.0 -15.6
April 9.0 - 6.8 24.2 15.6 .6 -13.1
May - 1.4 -20.8 - 8.8 .4 0.0 -19.5
June - 2.3 -15.8 - 2.8 - 4.6 7.5 - 8.8
July - 3.3 -12.5 13.5 - 7.2 - 4.0 9.6
August 0.0 27.8 18.8 -12.6 6.6 85.7
September -12.3 9.8 8.9 9.2 4.7 44.4
October -22.9 - 3.0 7.7 2.1 1.4 7.8
November 4.3 - 5.1 .9 3.1 - 8.1 1.5
December 11.1 22.6 12.9 7.4 - 7.6 3.7
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
January 1.8 - 3.1 - .4 4.6 1.4 0.0
February - 3.5 - 9.0 8.0 .4 .3 .3
March 2.9 -16.4 - 1.2 - .4 - 1.0 .3
April 5.4 - 2.4 - 4.2 .4 .3 - 2.0
May - 3.7 1.9 0.0 - 1.8 .7 .3
June 13.0 -25.2 1.7 1.9 2.4 0.0
July - .3 - 6.5 - 2.9 7.0 6.4 «6
August 5.Ç 0.0 6.7 - 3.4 4.4 1.2
September 19.5 7.8 - 4.6 - 1.4 1.8 .9
October .2 - 7.3 .9 - 1.4 2.1 1.1
November 2.5 3.0 7,8 3.3 2.0 2.0
December 8.2 - 5.1 4.8 1.4 0.0 5.5





-18 -12 -6 Trough +6 +12 +18
months preceding months following
P. - cyclical peak, July, 1953; trough, 
August, 1954 
P- - cyclical peak, July, 1957; trough, 
April, 1958 
P^ - cyclical peak. May, 1960; trough, 
February, 1961
Source: Table 5.
Chart 2.— Monthly average 91-day bill rates aligned at cyclical 
troughs for three cycles; 1953-1956, 1956-1959, and 1959-1962.
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February, 1961. Seven months of data are excluded between (1) and (2), 
and there is a three month overlap between (2) and (3). At the beginning 
of the period 13 months are excluded, and at the end of the period four 
months are excluded prior to the end of 1962. From this chart it is 
apparent that the decline and recovery in the bill rate in the second 
cycle (1956-1959) was much sharper than the first and third cycle. Also 
the recovery of rates from the third cycle differs from the other two as 
rates recovered considerably more slowly from the trough date.
A problem reserved for the latter portion of this study will be 
an attempt to explain these cyclical movements through empirical tests of 
demand and supply hypotheses. At the present stage of analysis, however, 
the statistical description of rate movements turns to an examination of 
the shorter-term fluctuations that can be measured by seasonal adjustment 
techniques.
Seasonal
More effort has been devoted to describing the seasonal movements
in the 91-day bill rate than was expended in determining the general trend
and cyclical movements. Since the purpose of this study is to attempt to
explain the movements of the Treasury bill rate over time using short time
periods, the seasonal description is more valuable for analysis of the
81short-term movements than the trend or the cycle. The seasonal indexes 
have proven difficult to isolate to a very satisfactory degree because of 
the large irregular movements in the bill rate series. Seasonal adjust­
ment techniques are also used in isolating within-month variations in the
81Nevertheless, the estimation of the trend-cycle is extremely 
important in obtaining appropriate measures of the seasonal influences.
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bill rate. Additional information is gained on the timing, direction, 
and magnitude of short-term movements in the bill rate by isolating weekly 
seasonal adjustment factors.
The short-term fluctuations, which will be referred to as seasonal
r  ■
movements due to their assumed periodicity, are considered ^  be caused by 
seasonal movements in the demand for and stock of bills. Specifically, 
the seasonal indexes that are isolated in the following attempts are as­
sumed to be due to institutional factors, namely, the periodic recurrent 
actions (which may at times be offsetting or in the same direction) of 
the Treasury, Federal Reserve System, commercial banks, nonfinancial cor­
porations, state and local governments, dealers, and foreign holders. It 
is assumed further that the seasonality of the bill rate is the result of 
weighted seasonal demand and supply preferences of these institutional 
participants'. The latter part of this study will be concerned with em­
pirical verification of some of these assumptions.
The majority of the following description of the seasonality of 
the bill rate will concentrate on monthly seasonal influences. The weekly 
factors which are important will be discussed separately and compared with 
the general conclusions drawn from monthly adjustments.
Several methods were used in the attempt to measure the season­
ality of the bill rate. Many of these methods were unsuccessful because 
of some very sharp irregular movements.
The ratio-to-12-month-movine-average method
This technique was employed to estimate the specific seasonal 
indexes for several different time periods. Due to wide variation in the 
individual monthly ratios, the specific seasonals were calculated by the
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same method over different time periods to arrive at monthly adjustment 
factors that were not unduly large or small. The great amplitude of the 
bill rate in the period from late 1957 to mid-1960 affects the value of 
the positional means since the larger ratios become more important with 
shorter time periods. Conversely, the stable, low level of rates that 
existed in the period 1948-1951, causes the positional means to tend 
toward lower values.
The results of the application of the ratio-to-12-month-moving- 
average in three different periods are shown in Table 7. The specific 
indexes computed for the periods 1952-1962 and 1951-1965 are subject to 
the effect of the extreme ratios of the 1957-1960 period, while the more 
stable ratios for the period 1960-1965 indicate either a lessening of 
seasonal movements from earlier periods or biases in estimating the sea­
sonal factors in the earlier periods.
The results of the ratio-to-12-month-moving-average specific sea­
sonals for the period 1952-1962 will be used as a rough guide for evalu­
ating the direction and size of the adjustment factors computed by other 
techniques. The specific seasonals for this period correspond favorably 
with the preliminary results of the adjustments done by William H.
Brown, Jr., who reported:
The normal seasonal pattern in bill yields indicates a falling 
off from a seasonal high in December to a temporary low in March, 
followed by a rise in April and May, and then a fall to a low in 
July. Rates then rise to a temporary high in September and fall 
back somewhat before reaching their peak in December.
^William H. Brown, Jr., "Seasonal Variations in Interest Rates," 
Tested Knowledge of Business Cycles. 42nd Annual Report of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 1962, p. 82.
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TABLE 7.— Stable seasonal factors for the average monthly discount rate
on 91-day U. S. Treasury bills
Month "Specific Seasonals" for the Series1952-1962» 1951-1965^ 1960-1965^
January 104.4 102.5 101.4
February 99.1 98.8 102.8
March 96.1 96.7 101.4
April 98.7 99.1 99.2
May 96.6 95.8 98.0
June 96.5 94.2 98.1
July 91.6 95.0 99.1
August 98.3 101.0 99.8
September 105.0 103.3 99.9
October 100.0 102.8 98.0
November 101.9 103.1 100.9
December 111.8 107.2 101.3
Calculated by positional mean of the ratio-to-moving-average,
^Calculated as Table lOA by X-10 version of Census Method II.
Source: The original rates that were adjusted were taken from
the table "Money Market Rates," Federal Reserve Bulletin.
As yet, there has been no officially published seasonally ad-
83justed measures of the Treasury bill rate. Nevertheless, market re­
ports from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and Federal Reserve 
Banks indicate that some measure of bill rate seasonality is present. In 
a recent Staff Paper in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, it was noted that
83With the exception of Brown's work, the only other evidence of 
seasonal adjustment of any United States Government securities rates, are 
reports by Government securities dealers in their market surveys.
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’’...there has been a marked change since 1960 in the seasonal behavior of
84rates on 3-month Treasury bills." Brown's seasonal adjustment of several
term-to-maturity bill yields, also indicates a changing seasonal influ- 
85ence.
Since the seasonality of bill yields is possibly changing over 
time, attempts were made to measure the seasonal indexes by techniques 
providing moving adjustment factors instead of the rigid factors obtained 
from the ratio-to-moving-average method.
86Wald's method of seasonal adjustment
This method, measuring seasonality as an additive factor instead 
of the multiplicative foirm of the ratio-to-moving-average method, was 
computed for the monthly bill rate for the period 1952-1962. With the 
exception of the first and last years, the seasonal indexes from Wald's 
method were in the direction indicated by the ratio-to-moving-average 
specific seasonal indexes. However, the magnitude of the adjustments were 
greatly exaggerated in 1954, 1958, and 1959, which were years in which the 
bill rate was characterized by very sharp and sudden changes. The lack of 
success of this method was probably due partially to the large irregular 
movements of the rate, but it also seems likely that the assumption of an 
additive seasonal adjustment is inappropriate in the case of the Treasury
84Frank R. Garfield, "Economic Change and Economic Analysis," 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 49 (September, 1963), No. 9, p. 1210.
85Brown, og. cit., p. 80.
86Wald's method of adjustment is described in: Robert Ferber and
P. J. Verdoon, Research Methods in Economics and Business (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1962), pp. 328-331; and Gerhard Tintner, Econometrics 
(New York: John Wiley and Son, 1952), pp. 227-233.
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bill rate. Brown also attempted an additive adjustment of the bill rate,
but concluded that: "because the size of the additive adjustment seems
to be too large when rates are cyclically low, amounting almost to a third
of the total yield of Treasury bills, it was decided that the multiplica-
87tive adjustment was preferable."
The failure of the additive adjustment indicates the need to use 
a technique for adjustment that yields multiplicative indexes, but with 
moving seasonal factors instead of rigid ones.
The Bureau of the Census Method II
The seasonal factors calculated by this method agreed in direction
88and average magnitude with the earlier attempts. However, when the 
seasonal adjustment factors were examined over time for each month, it was 
found that the factors for 10 of the 12 months moved from near 100 at the 
beginning of the period to a peak or a trough in 1958, then back at the 
end of the period to near 100 again. The largest movement of a seasonal 
factor over the period 1952-1962 was for the month of October with the 
adjustment factor moving from 95 in 1952, to 116 in 1958, then back to 99 
in 1961. The adjustment factors for the same dates for the month of July 
were 101, 81, and 94. This movement seems too extreme to be considered 
moving seasonality, and most probably is due to the successive smoothing
87Brown, o£. cit.
88The version utilized was a simplified version written by Milo 
Peterson, and available as a library program from IBM. The program 
description closely follows the procedure outlined in: Julius Shiskin
and Harry Eisenpress, Seasonal Adjustments by Electronic Computer Methods. 
Technical Paper 12 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.,
1958).
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89of the irregular variation. Although the indicated direction of the 
seasonal factors were generally the same as the specific seasonals of the 
ratio-to-moving-average method; it seems very unlikely that the adjust­
ment factors computed by this program adequately reflect the moving sea­
sonality.
The linear regression method of seasonal adjustment. This ap­
proach, developed by the Deutsche Bundesbank, was investigated as a
90possibility in attempting to measure the changing seasonal pattern.
This method yields indexes that may be additive, multiplicative, or
91simultaneously additive and multiplicative.
Basically the regression technique allows the original observa­
tion to be the dependent variable (Y), and the 12-month-moving-average
89Shiskin has cautioned that Census Method II gives results that 
are unsatisfactory if there are sharp movements in the data, and that 
particular care is necessary in the interpretation of the indexes near 
the sharp changes and at the beginning and end of the period adjusted.
See; Julius Shiskin, "Statistics for Short-Term Economic Forecasting," 
Business Cycle Indicators, Volume I, (Ed.) Geoffrey H. Moore (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 602; also, "A Technical Note on the 
Seasonal Adjustment of Highly Irregular Series by Univac Method II," 
(Department of Trade and Commerce, Ottawa, Canada, 1959) mimeographed.
90Application of the Regression Method to the Analysis of Sta­
tistical Time Series (1959); The Practice of Seasonal Adjustment with 
Regression Equations (I960), by the Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt (Main), 
Also, "Experience in the Application of Regression Computing to the Sea­
sonal Adjustment of Statistical Time-Serice," Reprint from: Monthly Re­
ports of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Vol. 13, No. 8, August 1961, pp. 19-24; 
and Julius Shiskin, "Electronic Computer Seasonal Adjustments: Test and
Revisions of U. S. Census Methods," Seasonal Adjustment on Electronic 
Computers (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1961), 
pp. 94-95 and 130-138.
^^A comment here seems relevant; "Sometimes the additive and 
multiplicative hypotheses are combined in the same model, though this 
seems hard to justify from a logical standpoint." J. Durbin, "Trend 
Elimination for the Purpose of Estimating Seasonal and Periodic Compo­
nents of Time Series," Proceedings of the Symposium on Time Series 
Analysis. (Ed.) Murray Rosenblatt (New York: John WileyXand Sons, Inc.,
1963), p. 3.
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values of the Y's the Independent variable (X). A linear correlation for 
each month (with the number of paired X, Y values depending on the number 
of years for which moving average data are available) Is computed In the 
form:
Ÿ  = a + bX.
The seasonally adjusted series (S) Is obtained through:
For the moving Index, time (t) Is Included In the formula In the form of:
Y = a + bX + ct + dXt,
with the adjusted series being computed from:
q = Y -..a ct;,
“ b * dXt '
Several attempts were made using this method, with the Indepen­
dent variable (X) being In turn the 12-month-movlng-average, the 15-polnt 
Spencerian constant, and the 21-polnt Spencerian constant. Each formula­
tion was computed both with and without time as a variable.
The results of these attempts were generally In the same direction 
as the specific seasonals computed by the ratlo-to-movlng-average method. 
However, when time was Included as a variable, none of the estimates for 
"c" and "d" was statistically significant.
Without time as an Independent variable, seasonal adjustments by 
this method yield stable adjustment factors. The result of these attempts 
showed "mixed" seasonal factors with the "a" and "b" values adjusting the
Q Ooriginal values (Y) In opposite directions. Indicating a possibility of
92"Mixed" adjustment factors occur when a < 0  and b > 1, or when 
a > 0 and b < 1, with the relative magnitudes of the "a" and "b" values 
determining whether any particular adjustment will result In an Increase
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a combination of additive and multiplicative adjustments. However, when 
the extreme ratios were excluded from the regressions, the "a" values 
moved nearer to a value of zero, reaffirming the earlier suspicion that 
the additive adjustment was inappropriate with this series. Although the 
exclusion of the extreme ratios brought "à" nearer to a zero value, the 
final adjustment was changed only slightly yielding seasonally adjusted 
series which correspond closely with the ratio-to-moving-average specific 
seasonally adjusted series. The hope that this method would produce a 
reasonable measure for moving seasonality was not fulfilled.
The X-10 Version of the Census Method II, which has only recently 
93been developed, generally yields results more conservative than the 
original Census Method II, and seems to give better adjustment to highly 
volatile series. This approach selects a "best" moving average as the 
basis for calculating the seasonal adjustment factors. Many of the 
deficiencies noted above in the seasonal adjustment by the original Census 
Method II do not seem to apply to the results of the X-10 version.
or a decrease in an original observation. The general situation with this 
type of adjustment is to make a smaller percentage adjustment of small 
original values of the series, and a larger percentage adjustment of 
larger original values. Since these adjustments are not the same for 
all values in a particular month, it appears that the adjustment factors 
are "moving." The indexes, nevertheless, are rigid and similar to the 
adjustment that would be obtained with the ratio-to-moving-average 
specific seasonal indexes.
93Stephen N. Marris, "The Treatment of Moving Seasonality in 
Census Method II," Seasonal Adjustment on Electronic Computers» op. cit., 
pp. 257-309. Although this article was the basis for the X-10 revision, 
several other changes were made during the experimental stages. A de­
scription of the differences between this program and the original Census 
Method II are described in "Specifications for the X-10 Version of the 
Census Method II Seasonal Adjustment Program," Bureau of the Census,
Office of the Chief Statistician, April 19, 1963, mimeographed.
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The results obtained by this method seemed to be quite reasonable
as moving seasonal factors. Nevertheless, there is some indication of
the ”U" shaped or "humped" pattern when the final adjustment factors of
each month are separately viewed over time. February, March, and July
are examples of the "U" shaped movement; April, October, and December
show "humped" patterns. The extremes of the adjustment factors from the
X-10 version of Census Method II are much smaller than those from the
original Census Method II. The widest variation calculated was for the
month of October with the final adjustment factors moving from 99.6 in
1952 to a peak of 107.7 in 1957, then back to a low of 99.5 in 1964,
This movement of plus 8.1 and minus 8.2 points seems more reasonable as
"moving seasonality" than the 20 point movement for October's factors
calculated by the original Method II.
The final monthly seasonal adjustment factors calculated by the
X-10 version are shown in Table 8. This table is designed to facilitate
the comparison of the movement of the seasonal factors for each month
over several years. This adjustment by the X-10 revision provides an
adjustment factor that is not subject to the extreme "humped" and "U"
94shaped patterns of Method II discussed above. An interesting conclusion
from Table 8 is that generally the degree of seasonality in the bill rate
95seems to have lessened since around 1961. Using the range between the
94The statements regarding the "reasonableness" or "goodness" of 
a set of adjustment factors are clearly subjective. Some interesting 
attempts to appraise seasonality on a more scientific basis are discussed 
below in the text.
95This result may be compared to Garfield's statement above 
(footnote 84); and Brown's statement that "There are a number of reasons 
to believe that the seasonal on short-term securities was reduced in 1961
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TABLE 8.— Moving monthly seasonal factors for the average monthly bill 
rate (daily average of closing bid yields), computed by the X-10 Version
of Census Method II, 1952-1964
Year January February March April May June
1952 99.4 95.1 95.8 99.4 99.0 95.0
1953 100.4 94.8 95.7 99.5 98.2 95.0
1954 101.3 94.9 95.6 99.4 97.3 94.7
1955 102.4 95.3 95.3 99.4 96.1 94.6
1956 102.9 96.1 95.0 99.2 94.7 94.4
1957 103.5 97.2 94.9 99.1 93.7 94.2
1958 103.8 98.7 95.2 99.0 92.9 94.2
1959 104.1 100.1 95.8 99.1 92.6 94.2
1960 104.1 101.3 96.7 99.1 92.9 94.2
1961 104.0 102.1 97.5 99.0 94.0 94.4
1962 103.7 102.8 98.4 98.7 95.0 94.8
1963 103.5 103.0 99.1 98.4 96.2 95.3
1964 103.0 102.8 100.0 98.3 97.0 95.5
July August September October November December
1952 99.5 104.5 103.3 99.6 100.3 109.4
1953 97.4 104.0 103.8 101.3 101.2 109.2
1954 95.1 103.2 104.3 103.3 102.4 108.8
1955 92.7 102.3 104.8 105.5 103.8 108.3
1956 91.4 101.4 1.051 107.1 104.8 107.7
1957 90.6 100.6 105.0 107.7 105.5 107.2
1958 91.0 99.8 104.4 106.9 105.7 106.8
1959 91.9 99.1 103.7 105.5 105.5 106.5
1960 93.6 98.8 102.9 103.3 104.7 106.1
1961 95.1 98.7 102.3 101.3 103.7 105.8
1962 96.5 98.7 101.6 99.9 102.9 105.5
1963 97.6 98.7 100.8 99.5 102.1 105.1
1964 98.4 98.8 100.2 99.5 101.6 104.8
Source: Computed as Table 12 of the X-10 Version of Census Method
II from the series January, 1951 through June, 1965.
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highest and lowest seasonal factors in each year as a guide to the degree 
of seasonality, there was a steady increase from 14.4 points in 1952 up 
to 16.3 points in 1956, then a steady decrease to 9.3 points in 1964.
In summarizing this lengthy discussion of monthly seasonality, 
several important qualifications should be made regarding the different 
approaches used in attempting to isolate the seasonal factors. First, 
the methods used were all purely empirical, and as such, provide little 
basis for using inference statements regarding the validity of any par­
ticular method of adjustment. As yet, the tools necessary to perform
inferential calculations are not fully developed, and have not come into 
96general usage. The newer techniques of multiple regression using dummy
variables and spectral analysis are coming into wider usage, and show
promise of providing methods of measuring the characteristics of time-
97series from a theoretically tenable basis. These approaches avoid the
but not completely eliminated. It was largely eliminated in 1962. Two 
reasons confirm our previous thinking on the cause of the seasonal: (1)
There was a substantial reduction in the variation of the supply of bills 
made available to the public by the federal government in 1962 and some 
reduction in 1961. (2) In 1962 the variation during the year in net cash
borrowing from the public was considerably smaller than it had been re­
cently." Brown, 0£. cit., p. 80.
^^John A. Brittain, "A Bias in the Seasonally Adjusted Unemploy­
ment Series and a Suggested Alternative," Review of Economics and Sta­
tistics, XLI (November, 1959), No. 4, pp. 405-411; and, John A. Brittain, 
"A Regression Model for Estimation of the Seasonal Component in Unemploy­
ment and Other Volatile Time Series," Review of Economics and Statistics. 
XLIV (February, 1962), No. 1, pp. 24-36.
97For discussion and examples of utilizing dummy variables in 
multiple regressions for measurement of seasonality, see: Michael C.
Lovell, "Seasonal Adjustment of Economic Time Series and Multiple Re­
gression Analysis," Journal of the American Statistical Association, 58, 
(December, 1963), No. 304, pp. 993-1010; Ferber and Verdoon, 0 2 . cit.; 
and, A. James Maigs, Free Reserves and the Money Supply (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 75-80. On spectral analysis, 
see: C. W. J. Granger, Spectral Analysis of Economic Time Series (Prince­
ton; Princeton University Press, 1964).
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moving-average measurement of the trend-cycle, and consequently avoid the
problems encountered in adjusting a series as volatile as the Treasury
bill rate. All of the methods described in this chapter utilize the
98moving-average as the basis of the trend-cycle measurement. Most of 
the difficulties encountered in measuring the seasonality of the bill 
rate were due primarily to the inadequacy of the moving-average in explain­
ing the trend-cycle.
Another important qualification which should be re-emphasized is 
that the monthly series which has been used for the original data is an 
average of daily closing rates of thirteen different bill maturities. The
results might have been different if a yield of a single bill maturity on
99a single trading day of each month had been used. In order to investi­
gate this possibility, weekly seasonality of the average yield on new 91- 
day bills in the weekly Treasury auction was measured.
Weeklv Seasonality 
Given the volume of trading in the United States Treasury bill 
market, and the size of individual transactions, it seems logical to 
assume that an intra-monthly seasonal pattern may exist independently of 
the monthly pattern. In fact, the monthly pattern may simply reflect an 
average of a "real" seasonal movement which is weekly. Any bill maturity 
could be used in investigating the intra-monthly patterns, but there are
98Several attempts were made using dummy variables in multiple re­
gression equations for measuring the seasonality of the bill rate. Due to 
problems of formulating proper relationships, all attempts proved un­
successful. 
99Brown has seasonally adjusted a thrity-day to maturity bill rate 
(1952-1961), and a fifty-five-day to maturity bill rate (1954-1961) on a 
weekly basis; as well as the 91-day bill rate on a weekly and monthly 
basis (1948-1961).
78
several advantages in using the rate on new 91-day bills established in 
the weekly auction.
The means of the accepted bids in the weekly bill auctions pro­
vide the basis for this weekly bill rate series. The Monday deadline for 
submitting bids is assumed to be the date that this rate is established. 
This is the Monday following the announcement of the tender of the pre­
vious Wednesday, and preceding issue on the following Thursday. The 
source of these rates is the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treas­
ury on the State of the Finances for the relevant years. The time period 
is from January 1952 through December 1964.
The technique used here for weekly seasonal adjustment involves 
dividing the series into four separate series, one series for each of the 
four weeks; and adjusting each of the four series separately by the same 
methods employed for adjusting monthly data. This method is described by 
Shiskin:
To seasonally adjust weekly series by the electronic computer pro­
gram prepared for monthly series, each weekly series is divided 
into four separate series, one comprising the first weeks of each 
month, another the second weeks of each month, and so.on. Each of 
these four series is then run through the monthly census seasonal 
program and the results are rearranged chronologically into a 
continuous weekly seasonally adjusted series. Data for the four 
missing weeks of each year are obtained by averaging seasonal 
factors for the preceding and following weeks.
This technique raises some conceptual problems. One of the most 
important is in interpreting the meaning of the weekly adjustment factors.
Julius Shiskin, "Statistics for Short-Term Economic Forecast­
ing, " Bu8ine8 S_£2 cleJj|ndi£ator8, Vol. 1, (Ed.) Geoffrey H. Moore, (Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 602 and 604. On intra-monthly
series, see also: M. J. Conlon, "Intramonthly Series in Economic Fore­
casting," American Statistical Association. 1960 Proceedings of the 
Business and Economic Statistics Section, pp. 36-43.
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The adjustment factor for a first week of a particular month has relevance 
only to the first weeks of the preceding and following months. For in­
stance, if the original values of the first week were always lower than 
the original values for the second week, this would not be reflected in 
the rearranged seasonal factors. The weekly seasonal adjustment factor 
for the first week in January is measured against the first week only of 
other months, and is not statistically related to any values of the 
second, third, or fourth weeks. Another comment which should be kept in 
mind is that the value for the first Monday in each month can be for any 
day from the first day of the month to the seventh day of the month. The 
vagaries of the calendar are particularly frustrating when attempting to 
measure weekly seasonality. Conlon has experimented with 10-day intervals 
in measuring intra-monthly seasonality, but that would complicate the 
problem in this particular circumstance since the 10-day intervals would 
bring about a variation in the maturity length of the bills.
The X-10 Version of Census Method II was used to calculate the 
weekly seasonal adjustment factors. Since this method of adjustment 
seemed workable with monthly data, and since the movement of each of the 
weekly series generally resembles the movement of the monthly series, the 
results should be as good. The weekly series adjusted here was from 
January, 1952 through June, 1965.
The important comparison of the seasonal factors are among the 
seasonals for the four different weekly series and the relationship to the 
monthly factor. It seems apparent that differences exist between the 
seasonal factors for various weeks of the same month. Although this
101̂  ,Conlon, 22» cit.
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conclusion has been qualified above, there seems to be a definite weekly
I
pattern to the 91-day bill rate. Brown has pointed out that:
While most of the series were adjusted on both a monthly and 
weekly basis, it became apparent that the weekly adjustment 
gives a much better picture of the actual seasonal movement.
For example, during August there is a definite rise in the 
weekly seasonal factors for Treasury bills, ...whereas the 
monthly adjustment indicates no significate seasonal in that 
month.102
Reading from Brown's chart, it appears that the weekly seasonal factors
for August, 1960, increase from about 88 at the beginning of the month
to possibly 105 by the end of the month. Although the numerical results
presented in Chart 3 and Chart 4 do not correspond exactly with Brown's,
103they lead to the same general conclusion.
Chart 3 illustrates the weekly seasonal factors after rearrange­
ment in chronological order after the four separate weekly adjustments, 
and the original and seasonally adjusted rates for the year 1960. As 
further illustration of weekly seasonality of the bill rate. Chart 4 
shows the seasonal factors for the years 1956, 1960 and 1963. Evidence 
of moving seasonality is apparent by a comparison of these seasonally 
adjustment factors, with the degree of seasonality decreasing.
102Brown, 0£. cit.. p. 80. Brown has assisted very generously in 
the attempts to measure the seasonality of the bill rate by making his 
preliminary adjustments available to me. His source for the 91-day bill 
rate was the Federal Reserve Bulletin which differs occasionally from the 
Treasury source, but seldom by more than .001 per cent. In some cases, 
we differ in determining which rate should be listed as the appropriate 
rate for the first week in a month. The procedure here was to subtract 
three days from the Thursday issue date to arrive at Monday's rate. The 
rates in the Federal Reserve Bulletin are Saturday (end of week) rates, 
requiring a subtraction of five days.
103The computed seasonal factors are chronologically 92.7, 91.8, 
100.1, and 101.1; the monthly seasonal factor for August computed as 
Table lOA of the X-10 Version (Stable Seasonal Factors) was 101.0.
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Chart 4.--Weekly seasonal factors for the years 1956, 1960, and
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The general conclusion from the attempt to compute weekly adjust­
ment factors is that, although the weekly patterns are similar to each 
other (as well as similar to the monthly seasonal factors), a fully satis­
factory explanation of the movement of the Treasury bill rate would re­
quire explanation of the intra-monthly movements. Methodologically, this 
becomes very difficult, particularly because of the autocorrelation re­
sulting from extremely short time period. Because of the lack of weekly 
ownership data, transactions volume, and other important independent 
variables, the estimation becomes statistically impossible.
Irregular
Quantitatively, the irregular movements in the Treasury bill rate 
are more important than the seasonal movements. The X-10 Version of 
Census Method II computes the irregular factor by dividing the seasonally 
adjusted series by the weighted 15-month-moving-average of the adjusted 
series. The irregular factor is therefore the residual after seasonality 
is removed from the original rates, and the trend-cycle is removed from 
the seasonally adjusted series.
It should not be inferred that the irregular factor is equivalent 
with exogenous movements, or that what is measured in necessarily un­
explainable by statistical methods. The irregular factor measures that 
portion of the series that has hot been ascribed to seasonality and the 
trend-cycle. In the empirical analysis of the later chapters, an attempt 
is made to explain all movements in the bill rate including the irregular 
movements by least-squares methods.
In Table 9 the computed irregular factors are given for the period 
1952-1964. The irregular factors for each week have also been computed, 
but since they are similar to the monthly series they have not been shown 
separately.
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TABLE 9.— Irregular components for the average monthly market 91-day bill
rate, 1952-1964
Year January February March April May June
1952 99.4 100.6 101.8 94.6 99.4 103.5
1953 98.5 101.0 98.1 100.5 100.5 103.3
1954 96.7 92.7 109.1 107.8 94.0 85.0
1955 103.4 97.6 98.5 110.3 98.7 92.0
1956 99.2 99.2 94.8 102.3 106.2 101.1
1957 98.7 102.6 101.9 94.8 98.2 102.9
1958 104.9 86.7 97.9 101.8 98.0 82.2
1959 99.3 97.1 101.0 99.0 97.5 103.6
1960 104.5 101.3 94.0 96.7 114.6 92.2
1961 95.6 103.5 104.3 96.7 101.2 102.9
1962 102.3 100.4 100.7 98.6 98.6 100.0
1963 101.1 100.0 100.7 99,3 99.3 99.7
1964 99.4 98.8 101.1 99.7 100.8 102.0
July August September October November December
1952 104.6 100.0 94.3 98.3 100.5 100.5
1953 102.0 103.2 99.4 86.6 99.3 112.2
1954 95.0 107.2 110.2 102.2 91.0 98.1
1955 100.6 101.1 100.5 101.0 99.1 103.1
1956 96.6 97.0 100.7 98.5 100.4 101.4
1957 101.5 97.1 99.1 102.2 103.7 106.8
1958 76.3 103.0 117.0 107.0 100.4 98.1
1959 100.9 94.5 103.4 98.0 97.8 103.9
1960 94.6 96.3 104.8 100.0 102.7 95.9
1961 99.2 103.4 95.7 97.0 100.0 99.6
1962 105.2 100.4 97.5 98.9 100.0 98.6
1963 100.6 101.2 99.1 101.8 100.9 97.7
1964 98.9 99.7 99.2 100.6 99.2 99.7
II.
Source: Computed as Table 23 of X-10 Version of Census Method
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Summary and Conclusions
The simple linear trend of the average monthly bill rate has been 
slightly upward over the period 1953-1964. The trend by itself however, 
explains very little of the movement in the bill rate.
The bill rate has fluctuated quite widely, and is subject to very 
sharp movements. Although the rates move in similar fashion during 
business cycles, the degree of the movement seems dependent on the sever­
ity of the cycle.
The extreme fluctuation in the bill rate during 1958 made the 
description of the seasonality particularly difficult. Several methods 
were attempted before a reasonable measure of seasonality was obtained by 
using the X-10 Version of Census Method II. The results of measuring 
seasonality showed definitely that a monthly seasonal pattern existed, 
and that this pattern was a changing one over time. A weekly measure of 
seasonality was obtained showing that intra-monthly variations in the 
Treasury bill rate were quite important, and seemingly partially explana­
tory of the monthly seasonal patterns.
This Chapter has been basically descriptive rather than analytical, 
Very little has been said in regard to the causes of the movements in the 
bill rate series, as the purpose of this Chapter has been to isolate and 
measure the trend, cyclical, seasonal, and irregular fluctuations. These 
measurements will provide the basis for attempting to assign causes to 
bill rate movements.
Chapter IV is basically descriptive also. It compared the fluctu­
ations in the bill rate with fluctuations in other maturities of United 
States government securities.
CHAPTER IV
THE RELATIONSHIPS OF THE MOVEMENTS OF THE TREASURY BILL 
RATE AND INTEREST RATES OF OTHER SECURITIES
Introduction
The rate of interest is normally treated as an important variable 
in macroeconomic general-equilibrium analysis. In these theoretical 
systems, some variation of the liquidity-preference theory or the loanable- 
funds theory provides the basis for explaining the determination of the 
rate of interest.
The rate of interest is usually viewed as some average interest 
rate of selected securities, or as the rate on a single security which is 
regarded as "representative." The rationale for including this single 
rate, as opposed to several rates or a structure of rates, is that the 
movements of various rates are highly correlated, moving in the same direc­
tion at approximately the same time. This study attempts to analyze the 
factors determining the rate on one particular security. Treasury bills, 
in a microeconomic, partial-equilibrium framework. If the bill rate is 
not strongly affected by macroeconomic movements, and in turn has little 
effect on the movements of other relevant variables, the partial-equilib­
rium approach would seem legitimate. If, on the other hand, the interrela­
tionships among the bill rate and macroeconomic variables have quite strong
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interdependence, a general-equilibrium approach would be necessary in
104analyzing the determinants of the bill rate. A principal purpose of 
this study is to evaluate the usefulness of the partial-equilibrium 
analysis of bill rate determination.
By taking a partial-equilibrium approach, the problems of having 
to choose between liquidity-preference of a loanable-funds theory, and 
whether to view supply and demand of securities or the demand and supply 
of money, are largely avoided. The partial-equilibrium approach neces­
sarily imposes a very general and sweeping ceteris paribus assumption.
Many very important and established economic relationships will be treated 
lightly or not at all. For instance, the yield on capital, and hence most 
aspects of non-monetary interest rate theories, will not be considered.
The implications of this approach are extremely important to the 
validity of this study. It is necessary therefore to examine very care­
fully the relationship between the bill rate and some other rates on 
"substitutable" securities.
The Relationship between the Bill Rate and Rates 
on "Substitutable" Securities
A glance at the Federal Reserve System publication Historical 
Chart Book illustrates the similarity in the patterns of rate movement 
over time of the various monthly Governmental and corporate issues. 
Generally the long-term Federal government bonds yield higher market rates 
than shorter-term Federal government obligations, and corporate bonds 
yield higher rates than long-term Federal government bonds.
104Richard G. Lipsey, An Introduction to Positive Economics 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963), pp. 129-134, and Assar Lindbeck,
A Studv in Monetary Analvsis (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1963),
especially Chapter 1.
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The factor principally responsible for the rate differentials on 
corporate and government securities is risk. There is absolutely no risk 
of default of principal with Federal obligations. With corporate bonds, 
the risk of default often is slightly greater (depending on the corpora­
tion), but this uncertainty is considered a factor in market yield differ­
entials. Longer-term Federal government securities generally show higher 
market interest yields than shorter-term Federal government securities and 
the reasons might well be described under the general heading of risk.^^^ 
Although there is no risk of capital loss with government securities, 
other types of risk are present. Types of risk in holding government 
securities have been conveniently categorized by Tobin. First, "All 
categories of government debt, including demand debt, share their princi­
pal risk, namely uncertainty about purchasing power of the dollar.
Since the risk is shared by all government securities, this is not a 
basis for rate differentials. "The second risk of governmental obligations 
is due to uncertainty about future interest rates. This risk affects 
differently obligations of different m a t u r i t i e s T o b i n  elaborates on 
the second type of risk by viewing separately effects on holders with 
short horizons and long horizons. For the holder of short horizon the 
certainty of the maturity value would naturally make shorter-term securi­
ties less risky than longer-term securities. For the holder of long
105State government Aaa securities have market yields below long­
term Federal government securities, but another feature blurs this rela­
tionship; that is the tax-exempt feature of some state obligations. Other 
features such as rights near maturity, callable versus non-callable, and 
restricted ownership are not considered here.
^^^Tobin, 0£. cit.. p. 163. 
^°^Ibid.. p. 164.
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horizon the risk of maturities is reversed. Tobin points out that if
interest rates generally move together. Government securities of different
maturities are substitutes in portfolios of both investors of short and
long horizon. Also:
There is a third situation, in which the target date is neither 
at the beginning nor at the end of the maturity spectrum.
Maturities both longer and shorter than the horizon entail 
risk, the more risk the more they diverge from the target 
date. But longer and shorter maturities can be combined as 
an imperfect hedge; and in this situation they are comple­
ments, rather than substitutes.
Several possible reasons for long-term rates to exceed short-term 
rates may be suggested on the basis of Tobin's comments. First, the long­
term rates may be dependent only on the expectations of the future course 
of short-term rates. Second, given the relative quantities of various 
maturities to hold, there may be a relatively greater demand to hold the 
short-term obligations because portfolios of holders with short horizons 
exceed portfolios of holders with long horizons. Third, given a degree 
of uncertainty as to the target date, holders may prefer to "underesti­
mate” rather than "overestimate" the date, because of the greater change 
in price of long-term securities than short-term for any interest rate 
change, giving rise to a liquidity premium with rate differentials between 
short-term and long-term securities. The rate on long-term securities 
should exceed the rate on short-term securities.
Some reasons for the rate differentials may be illustrated by 
comparing two investors with uncertain horizons, one holding bills and 
one holding ten-year maturity bonds. If it became desirable to convert 
these securities into cash, due either to price level changes, interest
^^^Ibid.. p, 165.
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rate movements  ̂ or a need for cash, the blllholder has advantages over the 
bondholder. Bills can be traded more quickly and with less risk of mone­
tary loss because the short-term market is better organized than the long­
term market. Also, if the market moves unfavorably or if cash is needed, 
a blllholder has only three months to wait td realize his principal with­
out going to the market, while a bondholder must wait ten y e a r s . B a s i ­
cally, it seems that a bill has a greater degree of liquidity than a ten 
year bond. The concept of liquidity however, is significantly more compli­
cated, and deserves additional attention.
In a recent article, J. R. Hicks^^^ has examined the concept of 
liquidity in detail. Hicks minutely examines Keynes' definition of 
liquidity that:
As a rule, advances to customers are more profitable than invest­
ments, and investments are more profitable than bills and call 
loans; but this order is not invariable. On the other hand, bills 
and call loans are more "liquid" than investments, _i.̂ ., more 
certainly realisable at short notice without loss, and investments 
are more "liquid" than advances.m
Hicks, in examining this definition, provides some interesting tentative 
conclusions about the meaning of the term liquidity.
An asset may be "realisable at short notice without loss" in the 
sense that the price at which it is realisable at short notice is 
much the same as that at which it is realisable at longer notice.
Or, more accurately, the length of the notice that is given does 
not in itself have any important effect on the price at which the 
asset can be sold.
109Joan Robinson, "The Rate of Interest," Econometrica, 49. No. 2 
(April, 1951), pp. 92-111.
110J. R. Hicks, "Liquidity," The Economic Journal. LXXII, (Decem­
ber, 1962), No. 288, pp. 787-802.
J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Monev. Vol. II (London: Macmillan
and Co., Ltd., 1930), p. 67.
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The characteristic just described Is an Important characteristic 
which Is related to liquidity, but It Is not (I think) liquidity. 
Fortunately It has a name of Its own. An asset which can be sold 
quickly just as well (apart from ups and downs of the market) as 
It can be sold after negotiation and perhaps advertising Is a 
marketable asset. Evidently there are degrees of marketability.
...We seem therefore to be entitled to say (as a fair gloss on 
the Treatise definition) that liquidity Is a characteristic which 
Is only possessed by perfectly marketable assets; but that they do 
not possess that characteristic to the same extent.
Marketability, then. Is a necessary but*not sufficient requisite 
for liquidity. The greater the degree of marketability, the greater should 
be the turnover rate per period, and also the lower should be the trans­
action cost (per dollar volume, or as a percentage of the bid price). 
Recently, H. Lawrence Miller, Jr., has argued that differences In trans­
action costs among securities may Indicate degrees of difference In their 
113liquidity. An Important aspect of Miller's argument Is that transac­
tions costs measure, among other things, the time and effort to actually 
effect the transaction— and that the time Involved to bring buyer and 
seller together Is Important.In the concept of liquidity.
Although time effecting the transaction, which may be measured In 
part by relative transaction costs. Is a factor In the meaning of liquidity. 
It seems that liquidity Implies something In addition. "Without loss" re­
quires some basis for computation of gain or loss and each type of asset 
may have a different basis— as well as different bases for each holder.
An obvious basis would be the acquisition price of the asset, but the
^^^Icks, o£. cit.. pp. 790-791.
113H. Lawrence Miller, Jr., "On 'Liquidity' and 'Transaction 
Costs'." The Southern Economic Journal, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, Part 1 (July, 
1965), pp. 43-48. I am Indebted to Professor James M. Murphy for helpful 
discussion regarding the liquidity concept.
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generality of the term "liquidity" would be lost since the liquidity of 
any particular asset is dependent on various acquisition prices of the 
present holders. In this sense liquidity would have a very diverse mean­
ing, dependent on the various acquisition prices and the movement of the 
rate since the time the "oldest" holder acquired the asset. A more mean­
ingful concept of liquidity, and certainly one of greater generality, 
might be usefully oriented toward Tobin's differentiation of holders of 
short and long horizon. Various holding periods and the expected degree 
of rate fluctuation over relevant periods, with expectations based on 
past experience, provides a standard of "interest rate loss" to various 
assets.
Recently, Hicks and Luckett^^^ among others, have attempted to 
define liquidity on the basis of relative dispersion, or expected disper­
sion (measured as the standard deviation), of rates of different assets 
over a particular holding period. Although Luckett is principally con­
cerned with maturity measures of the Federal debt, his measure is relevant 
to this discussion:
Substitutability for money is more likely related to their ’holding 
period yield'— the rate of interest plus or minus the capital gain 
or loss attendant upon holding a given security for a given length 
of time. Thus, the quarterly holding period yield, expressed as a 
percent per annum, of a particular security is -
H = r + 400 (^2 - Pi)
where H is the holding period yield for three months r the (per 
annum) rate on the security, P. the buying price at the beginning 
of the quarter, and Pg the selling price at the end of the quarter.
114Hicks, cit. and Dudley G. Luckett, "On Maturity Measures of 
the Public Debt," The QuarterIv Journal of Economics. Vol. LXXVII, No. 1, 
(February, 1964), pp. 148-157.
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It is true, of course, that the prices of long-term securities will 
typically move over a wider range than those of short-term and hence 
that variations in the holding period yields of long-term securities 
will be greater than those of short-term and hence that variations 
in the holding period yields of long-term securities will be greater 
than those of short-term securities...
...we may suppose that the marginal moneyness of the different 
maturities of debt takes on its value relative to variations in 
their respective holding period yields. We take as our measure 
of this variation the standard deviation of the holding period 
yields..
Relative to the ten-year bond, the Treasury bill has greater 
marketability (a higher turnover rate and lower transaction costs) and 
has greater liquidity (lower standard deviation of holding period yields). 
"Liquidity" and "risk" are complicated and troublesome terms. Neverthe­
less, it would seem likely that the more nearly securities are alike in 
these characteristics, the more nearly they will come to yielding the same 
market rate of interest at any point in time. Generally, the market rate 
of interest on an eleven-week Treasury bill should not be very much dif­
ferent from the market rate on an eight-week Treasury bill. The more 
that securities are unlike in risk, maturity, marketability and liquidity, 
the greater the difference in yield movements over time. The more similar 
are the features that securities possess, the more substitutable they be­
come in security-holders' portfolios, and the more dissimilar the features, 
the less they are substitutable.
Nevertheless, due to arbitrage, yields among different Federal 
securities will not diverge greatly for very long periods of time, and 
generally yields move in the same direction at approximately the same time. 
Indeed, this generalization was a basic assumption in the Federal Reserve
115Ibid.. pp. 154-155.
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System's "bills-only" policy. Even more recently than "bills-only" it was
pointed out that:
Short- and long-term rates on U. S. Government securities have 
moved closely together over most of the period since 1950.
Changes in credit conditions in one maturity sector of the 
Government securities market tend to be reflected more or less 
rapidly in other sectors. These changes also tend to be trans­
mitted, though with varying force, to markets for private 
securities, affecting the availability of funds and the ease 
with which financing can be arranged as well as the interest 
cost.116
The degree of the relationship among interest rates on various 
securities becomes important, and has relevance to whether microeconomic 
variables could be viewed as determining a particular rate, or whether it 
would be more appropriate to attempt to explain the rate of interest using 
macroeconomic variables. If an extremely high degree of correlative re­
lationship existed among rates, those variables which would explain the 
movements of any particular rate would do equally well in explaining any 
other rate.^^^
In order to examine the similarity of movement among rates, simple 
linear correlations were computed between the average monthly Treasury
Stephen H. Axilrod and Ralph A. Young, "Interest Rates and 
Monetarv Policy," Federal Reserve Bulletin, 48 (September, 1962), No. 9, 
p. 1127. This article provides some very high quality description and 
analysis, and is relied on heavily in later Chapters of this study.
^^^For an effective theoretical and empirical attempt to explain 
an "average yield to maturity on Federal obligations" using primarily mac­
roeconomic variables, see: Ralph Turvey, Interest Rates and Asset Prices
(London: George Allen and Unwin, If60). The specific rate used as the
dependent variable in his regression equations was made up of "...a 
weighted average of four interest rates on U. S. Government taxable secu­
rities which are published regularly in the Federal Reserve Bulletin: the
rates on new issues of Treasury bills, 9-12 month issues, 3-5 year issues 
and long-term bonds. These were weighted 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively in 
order to achieve a rough reflection of the average maturity structure of
the debt held by the private sector..." pp. 70-71.
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118bill open-market rate and the rates of several other riskless securities.
The dissimilar characteristics between bills and these other marketable
securities are either in liquidity, marketability, or both. Correlations
were computed between the monthly average bill rate and; (a) the correr
spending monthly Federal funds rate, (b) the monthly rate on 9-12 month
United States securities, (c) the monthly rate on three to five-year United
States Treasury notes and bonds, and (d) the monthly rate on Treasury bonds
119that are neither due nor callable for ten or more years. The results of 
these simple correlations for the time period January, 1952 through Decem­
ber, 1964, are illustrated in Table 10.
It should be remembered that "expectations," referred to earlier 
as a reason for interest rate differentials, is not considered in these 
regressions. The simple correlation coefficients are smaller the longer 
the maturity. Viewing the correlation coefficients just off the diagonal 
indicates closer relationship between longer-term securities or between 
short-term securities than between a long-term and a short-term security.
A general conclusion, again ignoring expectations, is that the longer the 
term to maturity of securities of equal price-level risk, and default risk
118Joseph W.j Cenard, An Introduction to the Theory of Interest. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959). Conard makes use of
scatter diagrams to show these relationships. An example using simple 
linear correlation of rates is: Arthur M. Okun, "Monetary Policy, Debt
Management and Interest Rates: A Quantitative Appraisal," Stabilization
Policies (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 331-
380. Okun correlated quarterly rates on government securities, corporate 
bonds, and bank rates.
119A basic difference in these rates of bills are quoted on a dis­
count basis (as is the Federal funds rate), while the rate on notes, bonds, 
and Certificates of Indebtedness are on a coupon basis.
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TABLE 10.— Results of simple correlations between the Treasury bill rate 
(r^), the rate on 9-12-month Treasury securities (r_i), the rate on three- 
to-five-year Treasury securities (rg,^), and the rate on Treasury bonds 
due in more than ten years (riQ+): monthly series; January, 1952 through
December, 1964
Equations
^b = .086 + .857 r_^
fb = - .073 + .984 C2_5
fb = -1.742 + 1.210 r^Q^
matrix of simple correlation coefficients
^b ^-1 ^3-5 ^10+
?b 1.000
r-1 .967 1.000
^3-5 .919 .970 1.000
^10+ .809 .860 .942 1.000
Source: The rate for long-term bonds was taken from the Annual 
Report of the Secretary of the Treasurv on the State of the Finances for
the Fiscal Year Ended June 30. 1964. The other rates were obtained from 
various monthly issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
All rates are averages of daily closing figures. The bill rate 
used here is the same as that described in Chapter III. The 9-12-month 
rate is an average of Certificates of Indebtedness and selected note and 
bond issues. The three-to-five-year rate is an average of selected note 
and bond issues. The rate for the long-term bonds are based on maturities 
neither due not callable for 15 years until March 31, 1952; on bonds 
neither due nor callable for 12 years through March 31, 1953, and from 
that time, bonds neither due nor callable for 10 years.
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the less substitutability with Treasury bills. On the whole, however, the
120rates show high positive correlation.
Another illustration of the general similarity of movement of these 
interest rates over time can be made by a comparison of the simple linear 
trend of the rates of Treasury securities over the period 1952-1964. The 
"a" values, "b" values, and the simple correlation coefficient "r" (for 
description of goodness of fit) are shown in Table 11.
TABLE 11.— Simple linear trend of Treasury bills. Treasury securities due 
within 9 to 12 months. Treasury securities due within three to five years, 
and Treasury securities due in more than 10 years; monthly series; Janu­
ary, 1952 through December, 1964®
Dependent variable Constant ^  value r
fb = 1.4633 + .0128 M .67
r-1 = 1.6368 + .0144 M .67
I3-5 = 2.1494 + .0139 M .77
= 10+ = 2.5699 + .0116 M .91
gThese rates are the same as those used in Table 10.
Source: See source of Table 10.
From Table 11, it can be seen that the average monthly increases 
over the period 1952-1964 are approximately the same for these four Treas­
ury securities, about .012 to .014 per cent discount per month. Also, it
120According to traditional criteria the correlation coefficient 
(r) is appropriate for the relationships. However, it should be remem­
bered that 2  always exceeds r^ (the coefficient of determination). Since 
r is always greater than r^, there is some danger that too much confidence 
will be attached to the larger measure. For a discussion of the technical 
aspects of this point, and for alternative measures, see Frederick A. 
Ekeblad, The Statistical Method in Business (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 511-519.
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is apparent (from the "a" values) that generally the longer the term to 
maturity, the higher the interest rate. In addition, the variability in 
the interest rates, as shown by the correlation coefficient which is in­
tended simply as a measure of dispersion of the rates around the linear 
trend line, increases as the term to maturity increases. This indicates 
less volatile movements in long-term interest rates than in the shorter- 
term rates.
Also, it is evident that the similarity of the trend slopes is 
partially instrumental in accounting for relatively high correlation co­
efficients in Table 10. In order to obtain a better representation of the 
relationship between the bill rate and the other rates, avoiding the trend 
relationships, monthly changes in the rates were correlated.
These first differences in each series were correlated by simple 
linear regression. The results are shown in Table 12. The degree of re­
lationship between monthly changes in the bill rate (r^) and the other 
individual rates (r) was significantly less than were indicated in 
Table 10.
Viewing only the rates on the Federal obligations, f a n d  
r^Q^ the values for the simple correlation coefficients are respectively 
.74, .61 and .50. This would seem to indicate that the degree of the re­
lationship between monthly changes in the bill rate and monthly changes in 
the other rates is closely associated with time to maturity. These results
also cast some doubt on the assumption of the high degree of association of
121various interest rates.
121For a similar conclusion, see: Warren L. Smith, og. cit., p.
128. Smith correlated the weekly change in the long-term bond rate with 
weekly changes in the Treasury bill rate for the period January 4, 1958,
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TABLE 12.--Results of simple correlation between monthly changes In the 
Treasury bill rate (r^), monthly changes In the rate on 9-12-month secu­
rities (f_,), monthly changes In the rate on three to five year securities 
(fg.g)) and monthly changes In the rate on Treasury bonds due In more than 
ten years (fiQ+): January, 1952 through December, 1964
Equations
'b = .0025 + .845 f-1
fb = .0026 + .940 =3-5
= .0005 + 1.564 =10+
Matrix of Simple Correlation Coefficients
fb ^-1 *3-5 =10+
fb 1.000
r-1 .743 1.000
^3-5 .613 .819 1.000
^10+ .501 .691 .862 1.000
Source: See sources of Table 10.
Yields on private securities could have been correlated with the
blll rate, but It was1 felt that reference to Okun's results would provide
122sufficient empirical evidence of the degree of these relationships.
to May 30, 1959. This resulted In a coefficient of determination of .1236, 
which Is extremely near the value obtained above for the correlation of 
monthly changes.
An opposing conclusion was reached by Axilrod and Young, og. cit., 
p. 1127, after comparing the time series of "differences between observed 
Interest rates and rates calculated from trend line, divided by standard 
deviation," for monthly levels of Treasury bills and twenty-year bonds for 
the period 1951-1962.
122Okun, op. clt. Okun's correlations are from quarterly series.
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His results tend to indicate that the yields on private securities are not 
as highly related to the bill rate as the yields on other Federal obliga­
tions. Some examples of his results of the correlation between levels of 
the bill rate and levels of rates on selected securities (1949-1 through
1959-III) show a coefficient of; .714 with corporate Aaa bonds, .556 with
corporate Baa bonds, .852 with prime commercial paper, and .841 with high 
123grade municipals.
These results are not inconsistent with the above assumption that 
differences in rates on securities are related to different characteris­
tics of securities. The differences between risk, maturity, and market­
ability are reflected in the values of the coefficients of correlation.
In all cases so far discussed, the relationships have been positive
ones, indicating that, generally, the rates on these various securities
124move in the same direction. Nevertheless, the degrees of the relation­
ships differ widely. The relationship between monthly changes in the bill 
rate and monthly changes in the Federal funds rate was positive, but of a 
low degree. It has been pointed out in a recent study of the Federal funds 
market, that:
Treasury bills are not really a good substitute for Federal funds 
because the latter are used primarily for one-day adjustments
123Ibid., Table IV-6, p. 363. Okun's coefficient of correlation 
(.855) for the quarterly bill rate and the long-term bond rate is higher 
than the coefficient of correlation obtained in Table 10 (.809). The 
probable reason for this is that quarterly observations are used by Okun, 
while monthly observations were used above. In addition, Okun is using 
the average of weekly new bill issue rates for the last month of each 
quarter, and the time period is slightly different.
124Okun calculated negative coefficients between the bill rate and:
(a) dividend yields on common stocks, -.501; and (b) earnings/price ratios 
of common stocks, -.463. Ibid.
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often Involving quick turnarounds. Purchases of Federal funds 
and borrowing from a Reserve Bank are better substltutes--a 
primary reason for the closer relation between the discount 
rate and the Federal funds f a t e . 1^5
Okun calculated the relationship between the bill rate and the dis­
count rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as having a coefficient
1of correlation of .955. The correlation of the bill rate with the dis­
count rate for monthly series Is the same as correlating the bill rate 
with Itself. This Is especially apparent If monthly changes In the bill 
rate are compared with the difference between the bill rate and the dls^ 
count rate. The movements of the two resulting series will be Identical, 
differing only by a constant, unless the discount rate changes. In the 
period of 1952-1964, (156 monthly periods), the discount rate of the Fed­
eral Reserve Bank of New York was changed 22 times, or an average of 
approximately twice each year.
Although rates on various securities move generally In the same 
direction, the empirical relationships that have been observed Indicate 
that the degree of association between the bill rate and other rates Is 
not so high as to rule out a microeconomic, partlal-equlllbrlum Investiga­
tion. If a security such as a Treasury bill has particular qualities which 
differentiate It from other assets. It seems legitimate to analyze the 
market for this security and attempt to measure the causal factors deter­
mining this rate (price). In a famous essay, Joan Robinson has noted:
Keynes' theory treated the rate of Interest as determined by the 
demand and supply of money. This was a useful simplification In
125The Federal Funds Market (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, Washington, D. C., 1959), p. 102. 
in AOkun, 0£. cit., p. 363.
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the pioneering days of the theory, but it was always obvious that 
there is no such thing as the rate of interest and that the demand 
and supply of every type of asset has just as.much right to be 
considered as the demand and supply of money.
Nearly the same conclusion has been stated by Gaines in his analysis of
the management of the Federal debt.
...the rate of interest on United States Government securities, 
as for any market price, is a function of supply and demand, the 
latter encompassing the prices of acceptable substitutes relative 
to their degree of substitutability, the structure of tastes, and
the state of expectations.^^8
It has also been shown through the empirical relationships that
there are securities which are very good substitutes for Treasury bills,
129particularly other Federal obligations.
The Term Structure of Rates 
The relationships among rates on securities which differ only in 
the length of their maturities, is interesting and important. Recently, 
much theoretical and empirical effort has been devoted to attempting to 
explain the term structure of interest rates— the pattern of the rates 
displayed graphically by measuring the market rates on the vertical axis 
and time to maturity on the horizontal axis. Various hypotheses to explain 
rate differentials have been formulated and supported with statistical 
evidence. Generally, the hypotheses regarding the pattern of the term 
structure of rates have been classified as: expectational, institutional
and eclectic.
127Robinson, op. cit., p. 5.
128Gaines, pp. cit., p. 257.
129This fact emphasizes the need for working from a clear concep­
tual basis in attempting to assign causes to bill rate movements. Basi­
cally, a consistent theoretical framework is necessary, and will be de­
veloped in Chapter V.
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The expectational theory states that the long-term rate is an 
average of the expected short-term rates over the life of the long-term 
debt. David Meiselman, in explaining the expectation hypothesis (associ­
ated with the work of Frederick A. Lutz, among others) has provided a 
summary of some of the principal tenants.
The expectations hypothesis follows from the assumption that 
short- and long-term securities can be treated as if they 
were perfect substitutes and that transactors, indifferent to 
uncertainty and having similar expectations, equate the for­
ward rates in the market to the expected rates. As a matter 
of descriptive reality, individual transactors may still 
speculate or hedge on the basis of risk aversion, but the 
speculators who are indifferent to uncertainty will bulk 
sufficiently large to determine market rates on the basis 
of their mathematical expectations alone.^
Although Lutz is credited with presenting one of the most logical 
statements of the expectational hypothesis, he also provided some qualifi­
cation of the "pure" expectational view by stating that:
..., in addition to costs and uncertainty, certain institu­
tional factors also influence the structure of interest 
rates....English banks aim at keeping a certain relatively 
fixed percentage of their assets in the f o m  of cash and 
short material....This makes it possible for the Treasury to 
cause the short rate to fall below the long fate simply by 
curtailing the issue of treasury bills. The discrepancy will 
last as long as the shortage of treasury bills continues, and 
is one which cannot be explained in terms of expectations.
Curiously, this statement by Lutz is essentially the position 
taken by the institutional view of the determination of the term structure 
of rates. The institutional theory asserts that substitutability between 
short-term securities and long-term securities is limited by preferences
130David Meiselman, The Term Structure of Interest Rates (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Ha11, Inc., 1962), p. 10.
• 131Frederick A. Lutz, "The Structure of Interest Rates," Reprinted 
in the American Economic Association, Readings in the Theory of Income 
Distribution, Edited by William Feliner and Bernard F. Haley (Philadelphia: 
The Blakiston Company, 1951), pp. 519-520, fn. 19.
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of borrowers and lenders, and consequently the relative quantities of
various maturities are important in determining rate differentials. J. M.
Culbertson has offered an hypothesis, critical of the purely expectational
view, that characterizes the institutional explanation. In summarizing
his theory, he has stated;
Rates on short-term and long-term U. S. government securities, 
which are tied to rates on related private debt, characteris­
tically move simultaneously in the same direction in the short 
run (over periods of weeks and months), with short-term rates 
changing over the wider range. The general coincidence of 
movement in rates reflects basically the simultaneous impact 
in various credit markets of changes in general credit condi­
tions resulting from changes in business conditions and 
monetary policy, and substitutability between short-term and 
long-term debt on the part of both borrowers and lenders.
However, this substitutability is limited in extent, and when 
the maturity structure of debt supplied to the economy under­
goes a substantial short-run change, either because of Treasury 
debt management operations or actions of private borrowers, 
this is reflected in the rate structure. Yields on short-term 
debt average lower than those on long-term debt because of the 
advantage of the superior liquidity of such debt to the holder 
and the liquidity disadvantage of issuing such debt to private 
borrowers.132
Clearly, there are a great number of possibilities for combining elements 
of the purely expectational and purely institutional hypotheses. Many 
different versions of the explanation of the term structure have been pro­
vided, differing primarily in the relative weights applied to the alterna­
tive hypotheses. The quotations above are included to provide some 
representative views of the alternative explanations.
An example of the eclectic approach is provided by Burton 6. 
Malkiel, who has collected evidence which leads him to conclude:
132J. M. Culbertson, "The Term Structure of Interest Rates," The 
QuarterIv Journal of Economics. LXXI, No. 4 (November, 1957), pp. 488-489.
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...my study reaffirms the Importance of expectations in the 
determination of the term structure,....Moreover, I disagree 
with both extreme views on the matter— the one which assigns 
to expectations the unique and complete role in determining 
the rate structure and the other, which offers them no role 
at all....I believe that emendations must be made to the 
expectations analysis to account for transactions costs, 
diversity of expectations, and institutional maturity pref­
erences on both sides of the market. These suggest that 
supply lëvels do affect the term structure.133
A very simple framework for explaining movements of the bill rate 
in terms of demand for and supply of bills is developed later in this 
study. This approach implies that changes in the supply of bills are 
relevant to the determination of the bill rate. Also, changes in the de­
mand for bills are assumed to be relevant, although measurement becomes 
much more difficult. A change in expectations of bill market participants 
certainly would be assumed to cause demand shifts, but the principal prob­
lem lies in the measurement of expectations. Meiselman, utilizing an 
error learning model, has avoided any requirement for an independent meas­
ure of expectations by calculating an expected rate from ex post rates. 
With relatively simple tools, Meiselman has provided some strong support 
for the expectational hypothesis.
It will be apparent in the following chapters that, although no 
attempt is made to explain the term structure of rates, this study of the 
determinants of the bill rate is much more closely allied to the institu­
tional than the expectational theory. Attempts are made in the later
133Burton G. Malkiel, "The Term Structure of Interest Rates," 
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings. Vol. LIV, No. 3 (May 
1964), pp. 542-543. See also Jacob B. Michaelson, "The Term Structure of 
Interest Rates and Holding-Period Yields on Government Securities," The 
Journal of Finance. Vol. XX, No. 3 (September, 1965), pp. 444-463.
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portion of the study to measure the effects on the bill rate of changing
supply and demand factors. In a discussion of Malkiel's paper quoted
above, Okun commented that:
A modified expectationist should believe that relative supplies 
make a difference, as Malkiel demonstrates. Longs and shorts 
are not perfect substitutes, even though the world is not seg­
mented. A priori arguments cannot determine the importance of 
relative supplies: It is a matter of degree which requires
statistical analysis....1 consider the issue very much open and 
sorely in need of more econometric work, especially work pursuing 
a less aggregative approach.
In a sense, the present study is on a lower level of aggregation than most 
of the studies surveyed in this section. Meiselman, for instance, utilizes 
yearly observations in the empirical support of his hypothesis. Although 
the term structure of rates is important to this study, an extensive anal­
ysis and test of hypotheses regarding rate differentials is considered 
outside the scope of the study.
The Relationships among Bills of Different Maturities 
Up to this point. Treasury bills of different length time-to- 
maturities have been assumed to be perfectly substitutable. Actually, 
substitution is not perfect although the degree of substitutability among 
different maturities is apparently high. Perfect substitutability would 
imply identical yields if expectations were ignored, and this is not the
134Arthur Okun, "Comment on Malkiel's 'The Term Structure of Inter­
est Rates'," American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings. Vol. LIV,
No. 3 (May, 1964), pp. 556-557. For some surveys of studies of the term 
structure of rates, see: Joseph Aschheim, Techniques of Monetarv Control
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), pp. 55-60; Conard, _0£. cit.;
Axilrod and Young, o£. cit.; Turvey, 22* cit«* pp. 91-99; and John H. Wood, 
"Expectations, Errors, and the Term Structure of Interest Rates," The Jour­
nal of Political Economv. Vol. LXXI, No. 2, (April, 1963), pp. 160-171.
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case. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the relationships among the
various classifications of Treasury bills.
There are, at any point in time, 13 different issues of original
91-day Treasury bills outstanding, plus 13 issues of original 182-day bills
135having more than 91 days to maturity, as well as various issues of nine- 
month bills, one-year bills, and tax-anticipation securities. For the reg­
ular issues of 182-day bills, nine-month bills, and one year bills, those 
having less than 91 days to maturity are perfectly substitutable with those 
original 91-day bills having the same maturitv.
Nevertheless, those issues of bills outstanding with less than 91 
days to maturity do not yield identical rates. Indeed, a pattern of rates
exist at any time, the most common pattern being one in which the greater
136the weeks to maturity, the higher the yield. The asked yields usually 
exhibit a slightly higher average difference than the bid yields because 
the dealer's spread is a relatively constant amount. When the amount is 
converted to "yield to maturity," the nearer the bill to maturity, the 
smaller is the yield which is derived from the amount.
Closing bid yields for outstanding issues of 91-day bills for the 
last trading day of the month are shown in Chart 5, for the seven months 
beginning November, 1955, through May, 1956. The vertical axis has been 
broken in order to make the differences more perceptible, and the maturity 
dates are measured on the horizontal axis. The patterns are plotted as of 
the end of the month, each pattern therefore moving four or five grids to
135Prior to December 11, 1959, only the 91-day bills were in exist­
ence. The description of the newer issues is provided in Chapter II.






























Source: Treasurv Bulletin, various issues.
Chart 5.— Yield to maturity patterns for 91-day bills outstanding 
at end of indicated month, for November, 1955, through May, 1956.
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the right due to the passage of time between the end-of-monj^ dates. It
is evident from the Chart that not only does the general level of rates
change over time, the pattern of the rates changes as well.
Chart 6 shows the relationship between bid and asked yields for
bills having 26-and-fewer weeks to maturity. Again the vertical scale is
broken, rates measured on the vertical axis, and maturity dates measured
on the horizontal axis. This particular pattern of rates is for April 23, 
1371962. The spread between bid and asked yields becomes very wide near 
maturity as the absolute spread is discounted over only a few days. It 
is interesting that the spread widens sharply between 13-week and 14-week 
bills. In this case there is a difference of three basis points in the 
dealer's spread between these two maturities, although the bid rates for 
the two maturities are identical.
The pattern of the bid rates shows a slight dip after 13-weeks to 
maturity, then increases rather sharply. The pattern of the asked rates 
increases relatively steeply and smoothly up to 13-weeks to maturity, dips 
sharply, then moves rather steadily upward.
In order to examine the degree of relationship among various types
of Treasury bills, the following average monthly rates have been corre-
, 138lated;
137These are quoted rates, and not necessarily the rates or spreads 
which will be realized. Also, these rates are quoted accurately to two 
decimal places, which clearly indicates rounding problems for a fixed 
dealer charge for large transactions. The rates are from The Wall Street 
Journal, April 24, 1962.
138These rates are from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. The descrip­
tion of the averages is included in Table 13. It would have .been inter­
esting to view the weekly relationships, but this was not done. Anyone 



















weeks until maturity 
Source: The Wall Street Journal, April 24, 1962.
Chart 6.--Pattern of bid and asked yields, showing quoted spread, 
for bills maturing In one-to-26 weeks, on April 24, 1962.
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(a) the new-lssue 91-day-auction rate',
(b) T2f the market rate on 91-day bills outstanding,
(c) rg, the new-lssue 182-day-auctlon rate,
(d) r^, the market rate on 182-day bills outstanding, and
(e) rg, the market rate on 9-12-month bills outstanding.
Since there were no bills other than 91-day bills prior to Decem­
ber, 1959, these relationships are calculated for the period January, 1960, 
through December, 1964. These simple linear regressions are done on a
monthly basis, with r^ serving as the variable on the ordinate In all
cases. The results are shown In Table 13.
The closeness of the relationship between the average new-lssue 
91-day Treasury bill rates and the rates on other bill maturities Is evi­
dent In Table 13. The a and b values Indicate that there was nearly a
one-to-one relationship between the correlated rates, with the constant
and the regression coefficient both decreasing slightly with the longer
maturities. The correlation coefficients also decrease as the average 
monthly new-lssue 91-day bill rate Is correlated with bills on longer ma­
turities. The value of the correlation coefficient shown In Table 10 for 
the average monthly open-market rate of securities (not Including bills) 
maturing within one year was .967; which compares with the correlation co­
efficient of .982 between the 91-day new-lssue bill rate and the 182-day 
new-lssue bill rate. These coefficients are slightly higher than the co­
efficient of .951 obtained between the 91-day new-lssue bill rate and the
exists In the published weekly series. The new Issue rates are for the 
Monday auction* while the market rates are averages of dally rates for the 
week ending the following Saturday. Lesp lag would be present If the Mon­
day auction rates were paired with the market rate of the preceding Satur­
day.
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TABLE 13.--Simple linear relationships between the average monthly levels 
of new 91-day bill rates (r^), and: the average monthly open-market 91-
day bill rates (r^), the new-issue 182-day monthly average rates (r^), the 
monthly average open-market 182-day rates (r^), and the monthly average 
9-12-month open-market bill rates (re); January, 1960 through December,
1964*
Equations
'1 = .028 + .997 rg
’̂l = .126 + .982 r^
^1 = .125 + .987 r^
^1 = .138 + .951 r^




^2 ^3 ^4 ?5
^2 .997 1.000
.982 .972 1.000
^̂ 4 .987 .981 .997 1.000
^5 .951 .938 .986 .980 1.000
All rates are monthly averages. The new-issue rates, rĵ  and r^, 
are averages for the Treasury bill auctions held during the month. The 
open-market rates are monthly averages of daily closing rates. The rates 
included in these averages are: for r2, all bills having less than 91-
days to maturity-regardless of their maturity at issue; all bills having 
between 91 and 182 days to maturity (r^); all bills having between 182 
and 360 days to maturity (r^).
Source: Monthly issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin. February,
1960-February, 1965.
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9-12-month opên^market bill rate. Although the difference in time periods 
(1952-1964 as opposed to 1960-1964) do not allow direct comparability be­
tween these results, the coefficients of determination in Table 13 are 
generally higher than the coefficients in Table 10.
In order to lessen the effect of the trend relation in these rates, 
the same correlations were calculated, for the same time periods, using 
first differences (r), and the results are presented in Table 14.
TABLE. 14.— Simple linear relationships between first differences of monthly 
new-issue 91-day bill rates (f^), and: the first differences of the open-
market 91-day bill rates (fg); the first differences of the new-issue 182- 
day bill rates (fg), the first differences of the monthly 182-day open- 
market bill rates (r^), and the first differences of the 9-12-month open- 
market bill rates (fg): monthly; January, 1960 through December, 1964
Equations
h = -.002 + .922 rg
h .003 + .879 fg
h .002 + .867 r^
.003 + .748 rg
matrix of simple correlation coefficients
^2 *3 \ '5
^1 1.000
^2 .962 1.000
'3 .953 .906 1.000
.942 .955 .970 1.000
'5 .887 .894 .925 .934 1.000
Sources and notes: See Table 13.
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The conclusions from Table 14 are generally the same as those above 
from Table 13. All the correlation coefficients for these first differ­
ence correlations are quite high compared with those obtained in Table 12, 
indicating a close relationship among the movements of these monthly aver­
age bill rates. The slopes of these regressions indicate a near one-to- 
one relationship between changes in the 91-day new-issue bill rate and 
changes in the 91-day open-market bill rate, with the ratio decreasing 
gradually as the time-to-maturity classification of the bill increase.
Additional information relative to the level of variation of these 
average monthly rates over this four year period is obtained from Table 15. 
Presented in this table are the arithmetic means, standard deviations, and 
coefficients of variation in percentage form, 100 . (s^/%), of the level of 
rates; plus the arithmetic means and standard deviations of the first dif­
ferences in the rates. A very close relationship exists among the average
level of the rates, the average changes of the rates, and the variation of
139the rates over this period.
The high values of the correlation coefficients between both the 
levels and the first differences of these relationships indicate that the 
degree of substitutability between bills of different maturities seems to 
be higher than substitutability between either the average monthly bill 
rate and longer-term rates on Treasury notes and bonds, or rates on pri­
vate securities. The relationship between the 91-day open-market bill rate 
and the 9-12-month open-market Certificate and note rate is quite similar
139Monthly changes for these five rates were not always in the same 
direction, although this was usually the case. A sign test for randomness 
of the direction of change indicated that there were too few runs of signs 
to conclude that these changes were random.
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TABLE 15.--Arithmetic means; standard deviations, and coefficients of vari­
ation for monthly levels of bill rates; and means and standard deviations 
for changes In bill rates of different maturities: for the period Janu­
ary, 1960 through December, 1964
Levels First jli^erences
Variables X sX c.v. X »x
’̂l 2.962 .517 17.5 -.010 .164
2.943 .522 17.7 -.009 .171
3.145 .509 16.2 -.015 .178
^4 3.128 .506 16.2 -.014 .176
^5 3.260 .479 14.7 -.168 .194
Source: Calculated from rates described In Tables 13 and 14.
to the empirical relationship calculated between the 91-day new-lssue rate 
and the 9-12-month open-market bill rate, even though the time periods 
were different, 1952-1964 and 1960-1964 respectively.
According to the values of the correlation coefficients, those 
securities Issued by the Federal government having less than one-year to 
maturity are highly substitutable for Treasury bills, and Treasury secu­
rities having maturities exceeding one-year, plus those securities Issued 
privately (regardless of maturity) are not as highly substitutable for 
bills.
It seems legitimate, therefore, to analyze the determinants of the 
rate on short-term Federal debt Instruments Independently, assuming the 
market forces in the short-term market are different from the forces In 
the longer-term market. The division at the one-year maturity classifica­
tion Is rather arbitrary, but according to the values of the correlation
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coefficients, it seems that the degree of association between the bill rate 
and variables of greater than one-year to maturity is not so significant. 
The high degree of substitutability between 91-day bills and bills of 
other maturities seems to justify speaking of a market for Treasury bills, 
treating the different bill maturities as highly substitutable.
Nevertheless, the high degree of association between the bill rates 
and the 9-12-month Certificate and note rates raises some doubts as to 
whether the market is for bills or for securities of equivalent risk having 
less than one-year to maturity. If the market for bills is to be studied, 
some account must be taken of those securities having less than one-year 
to maturity because of the apparent high degree of substitutability with 
bills.
Summarv
The degrees of association between bills and longer-term maturities 
and private securities seems low enough to justify a microeconomic, par- 
tial-equilibrium theoretical framework for the analysis of the bill market. 
Given the degree of association among levels of all interest yields, the 
theoretical framework becomes important. In the empirical portion of this 
study, independent variables must be chosen on the basis of relevance to 
the Treasury bill market, not simply on the basis of relevance to the gen­
eral level of all rates. The selection of variables to explain the bill 
rates must be consistent with predetermined theoretical hypotheses, rather 
than selecting those variables which prove reduction of unexplained vari­
ances and provide high coefficients of multiple determination. Given the 
great amount of monetary, debt, and security market data, a high coeffi­
cient of multiple determination is not very difficult to obtain;
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especially if problems such as multicollinearity, autocorrelation, or other 
statistical biases are Ignored. Care must be taken to Include only those 
variables which are theoretically relevant and plausible.
Therefore, In the following Chapter, the taslc theoretical frame­
work for explaining the movements of the Treasury bill rate will be devel­
oped. '
CHAPTER V
SOME THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE ANALYSIS
Introduction
The usual approach in a general-equllibrium model of Interest rate 
determination is to view money as the asset demanded and debt instruments 
as the asset supplied. The demand schedules relate to cash or funds de­
manded at various interest rates (prices), and the supply schedules relate 
to quantities of bonds that are supplied at various interest rates (prices),
This concept of supply and demand, however, is too general for the 
partial-equilibrium analysis used in this study, if for no other reason 
than that only a single debt instrument. United States Treasury bills is 
examined. Although it is true that a holder of bills has made a choice 
between holding bills instead of cash, it also is true that he has 
chosen among all other interest-bearing assets. In order to isolate Treas­
ury bills as a commodity, bills are viewed as being supplied and demanded. 
The supply schedules refer to the quantities of bills that would be sup­
plied to the market at various interest rates (prices), and the demand 
schedules refer to the quantities of bills that purchasers desire to buy 
at various interest rates (prices).
The United States Treasury is the sole supplier of bills in the 
primary market, and only the Treasury can increase or decrease the total
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quantity, or stock, of bills. However, due to the marketability of the 
Treasury bill, all present holders of bills are potential suppliers in 
the secondary market. At any time bill-holders, such as commercial banks 
or non-financial corporations, may wish to sell a part of all of their 
bill holdings for any of a multitude of reasons. At the same time, there 
are bill-holders who are ready to increase their holdings and there are 
non-holders who desire to buy bills. These secondary market transactions 
are conducted through Government securities dealers, who also are increas­
ing or decreasing their portfolios of various bill maturities. The great 
volume of Grading of bills is evidence that at all times decisions to buy 
and sell are being made and executed.
Viewed in this manner, it is evident that each participant in the 
bill market is continually making decisions as to the quantities of bills 
he wishes to hold in response to his financial situation and the conditions 
of the securities markets. Holding financial situations, conditions of the 
securities markets, expectations, and all other relevant variables con­
stant, some type of supply and demand schedules can be drawn to explain 
the actions of the individual market participants. These individual sched­
ules may then be aggregated into market demand and supply schedules. This 
approach thus allows a partial-equilibrium analysis of the movements of 
the bill rate, in which the Treasury bill is considered as a commodity and 
the rate of interest as its price.
140This treatment of the interest rate in securities markets is 
provided in several intermediate theory textbook treatments. Some exam­
ples are; Kenneth E. Boulding, Economic Analysis (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1955), Third Edition, pp. 93-98; James M. Henderson and Richard 
E. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory; A Mathematical Approach (New York; 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1958), pp. 250-251; W. J. L. Ryan, Price Theory
120
Before attempting to illustrate various types of bill market be­
havior in this framework, some mechanical technicalities must be examined.
Problems of Measurement
When graphically illustrating demand and supply schedules, it is 
customary to indicate the price of the commodity on the vertical axis and 
the quantity of the commodity demanded or supplied on the horizontal axis. 
The price of a Treasury bill has traditionally been in terms of the price 
per $100 maturity value, discounting the interest for the time to maturity. 
If this price is measured on the vertical axis for demand and supply sched­
ules, the quantity axis therefore, will measure the number of $100 worth 
of bills at their maturity— which is certainly not a very convenient meas­
ure. Bills are issued in various denominations, the smallest being $1,000, 
and consequently it is not feasible to speak of the number of bills out­
standing. Since the price is tied to the quantity through a scale factor 
($99.00 for $100.00 maturity value meaning the same as $990.00 for 
$1,000.00 maturity value), a convenient way to measure the price and 
quantity of bills is the price per one dollar maturity value, while allow­
ing the quantity axis to measure the quantity of bills in dollar value at 
maturity. This approach is illustrated in Chart 7.
Nevertheless, using the price of bills on the vertical axis has 
several disadvantages that restrict the interpretation of graphical illus­
trations of demand and supply schedules, especially if it is desired to
(London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1960), pp. 209-240; and Erich Schneider,
Pricing and Equilibrium: An Introduction to Static and Dvnamic Analysis
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), Sixth German Edition translated
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(dollars of maturity value)
Chart 7.— The relationship between the price and the discount 
rate of Treasury bills with 91-day maturities.
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present anything resembling a realistic situation. First, the extremely 
short maturity of the Treasury bill necessitates the bunching of the rele­
vant prices at the extreme upper end of the vertical axis near the price 
of par, yielding a demand schedule with almost imperceptible slope.
Unless the vertical axis is broken, excluding the irrelevant prices, it 
would be difficult to distinguish between the demand schedule and the 
supply schedule.
A more important objection to using price on the vertical axis, 
even if the scale is broken, is that the demand and supply schedules will 
shift as the time to maturity changes. Consider, for example, the case 
when the bill rate remains constant and the demand and supply preferences 
are unchanged. Then, if the daily average of closing bid prices of all 
13 issues of original 91-day bills is the specific price used, the sched­
ules would move daily for a week as the average maturity became shorter, 
then jump back to the original position when the shortést bill matured 
and was replaced by a new issue with exactly 91-days until maturity. In 
addition, it seems that the rate of interest is a more relevant measure 
for the vertical axis since it has greater generality, and is more directly 
comparable with longer-term security prices.
In the presentation of the demand and supply schedules for bills, 
the bill rate is measured from zero at the point of origin, increasing up
141In the case of prices measured per one dollar maturity value, 
the price would be near one dollar. Prices below $.985 for a bill having 
less than a 91-day maturity correspond to bill rates of six per cent or 
greater.
142Direct comparability can be obtained only if the bank discount 
rate is converted to the corresponding coupon rate.
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the vertical scale, and the quantity of bills is measured on the horizontal 
axis in dollars of maturity value. Now, however, the demand schedule is 
upward sloping and the supply schedule downward sloping. This is illus­
trated in Chart 8.
This approach brings about no particular difficulties, except that, 
normally, demand curves are pictured as downward sloping, supply curves are 
pictured as upward sloping, and some reorientation is required when this 
normal situation is reversed. There is no difference as far as the mean­
ing of the schedules as a representation of market behavior. Neither is 
there any difference in the meaning or the measure of elasticity in the 
technical sense, except that the usually ignored algebraic sign of the 
value of the elasticity is reversed.
The simple framework of Chart 8 illustrates the quantities of bills 
that will be demanded at various interest rates, the quantities to be sup­
plied at various rates, and the equilibrium rate set at the intersection 
of the demand and supply schedules. The quantity indicated at the inter­
section of the schedules is the quantity of bills, measured in terms of 
their maturity value, which will be traded per unit of time. Ceteris 
paribus, an increase in demand (a shift in the demand schedule to the 
right), or a decrease in supply (a shift in the supply schedule to the 
left) will cause the equilibrium rate to decrease. Ceteris paribus, in­
creases in the rate will be brought about by a decrease in demand or by 
an increase in supply.
Nevertheless, when these schedules are viewed in the behavioral 
sense, they become clumsy. It is difficult to divide the market partici­











(dollars of maturity value)
dd' - demand schedule ss' - supply schedule
Chart 8.--Demand and supply schedules for Treasury bills measuring 
the discount rate on the vertical axis, with the rate increasing up the 
scale from the origin.
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market may be willing to buy at some rates, but willing to sell at other 
rates, causing a single economic unit to be counted in both the demand and 
supply schedules.
Reserve Demand
It is more relevant to view the quantity of bills that individual 
participants desire to hold at various interest rates. Viewed in this 
manner, there is no need to dichotomize the market into demanders and 
suppliers. There are several other advantages in using this approach;
(a) it is possible to separate the effects of the primary market from 
those of the secondary market, (b) there is no need in the empirical formu­
lations to have data on the quantity of bills traded per unit of time, and
(c) the explanations of movements to and from equilibrium rates are simpli­
fied.
If the total supply of Treasury bills available in the market can
be viewed as a s t o c k , t h e  concept of "reservation” price as developed
144by Wicksteed is useable. Wicksteed argued that present holders of a
143Thé stock concept will be discussed in greater detail in
Chapter VI.
144Philip H. Wicksteed, The Common Sense of Political Economy.
Vol. II, Revised Edition (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd.,
1933), Chapter IV, and p. 785. An explanation of Wicksteed's concept with 
a discussion of excess demand and supply functions Is given In: M. Blaug,
Economic Theory In Retrospect (Homewood, 111,: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1962), pp. 439-440. Wicksteed*s demand schedule Is utilized in regard to 
securities markets In Schneider, cit., pp. 271-280, and Erich Schneider, 
Money. Income and Employment. Translated from the fifth German edition by 
Kurt Klappholz (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), pp. 69-76. For
further discussion. Including a criticism of Wicksteed for neglecting the 
wealth-effect, see: Samuel B. Chase, Jr., Asset Prices in Economic Anal­
ysis (Berkley: University of California Press, 1963), p. 39, and pp. 94-
95.
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commodity have reservation prices, prices below which they will demand to 
retain the commodity rather than sell it in the market. Applying this con­
cept to the Treasury bill market, present bill-holders have reservation 
rates above which they demand to hold the quantity of bills in their posf 
session. The reserve demand schedule (total demand schedule) is the sum, 
at each rate, of the quantities that present holders wish to retain, and 
the quantities that holders and non-holders wish to buy (new demand).
This concept is illustrated in Table 16 and Chart 9. Given the 
stock of bills available to the market, 25 units in this case, at a rate 
of 3.5 per cent suppliers will desire to hold 15.0 units (25.0 units minus 
10.0 units), while new demand exists for 12.5 units. At a rate of 3.5 per 
cent, 27.5 units of bills are desired while the stock totals only 25 units. 
Therefore, excess demand exists and equilibrium cannot be established at 
this rate. At a rate of 2.5 per cent, new demand plus reserve demand 
(6.25 units plus 11.0 units respectively) totals 17.25 units, illustrating 
an excess supply (or negative excess demand) of bills at this rate. In 
this example, the equilibrium rate stands at 3.256 per cent. At this level
new demand plus reserve demand is equal to the stock, or the excess demand
145and the excess supply equal zero.
If the reserve demand schedule is used, there is no need to be 
concerned about the quantity of bills that change hands during each time 
period. The relevant schedule is the quantity of bills that the economy 
desires to hold at various interest rates.
145"Wicksteed's total demand curve is also the excess demand curve 
with the axis transposed." Blaug, o£. cit.. p. 440.
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TABLE 16.— Hypothetical demand and supply schedules for Treasury bills and 
the derivation of the total demand schedule*
r Qd Qs V - Qg D
0.0 ■ 1“ 25.000 0.000 0.000
0.5 22.000 3.000 3;ooo
1.0 20.000 5.000 5.000
1.5 0.000 18.000 7.000 7.000
2.0 3.125 16.000 9.000 12.125
2.5 6.250 14.000 11.000 17.250
3.0 9.375 12.000 13.000 22.375
3.5 12.500 10.000 15.000 27.500
4.0 15.625 8.000 17.000 32.625
4.5 18.750 6.000 19.000 37.750
5.0 21.875 4.000 21.000 42.875
5.5 25.000 2.000 23.000 48.000
6.0 28.125 0.000 25.000 53.125
The symbols used in this table are as follows:
r = bill rate; Qj = quantity demanded; Qg = quantity supplied; 
V ” Qg = quantity that holders wish to retain, and D = total demand is 
equal to + V - Q^.
Demand schedule —  r = 1.5 + .16Q 
Supply schedule —  r = 6.0 - .25Q 
Stock of bills (V) -- 25 units
The equilibrium rate for the above equations is 3.256.
Behaviorally, this concept is more convenient than the Marshallian
framework of Chart 8.
As Wicksteed has argued, a division of the group into buyers and 
sellers for the purpose of drawing the demand schedules of the 
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Chart 9.-“Total demand schedule from Table 16.
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the fÿg^amental forces Involved In the determination of equllib-
Movements in the Equilibrium Rate 
Treasury bills are traded in the secondary market through Govern­
ment securities dealers. Trading also occurs in the primary market once 
each week as the Treasury sells directly through the auction. Â flow 
diagram of primary and secondary market transactions is illustrated in 
Chart 10. This Chart pictures the Federal participants at the top of the 
diagram (the Treasury, Federal agencies and trust fund accounts, and the 
Federal Reserve System account), and the private sectors below (Govern­
ment securities dealers, commercial banks, nonfinancial corporations, 
foreign governments and banks, state and local governments, and others). 
Arrows indicate the direction of movement of the bills.
Assuming that the stock of bills is defined as the total quantity 
of bills made available by the Treasury, less that quantity held by Federal 
agencies and trust funds and the Federal Reserve System; (ceteris paribus)
the equilibrium rate will be increased as the stock is increased, and the
147equilibrium rate decreased as the stock is decreased. Debt management 
and Federal Reserve open-market transactions therefore have a direct 
effect on the bill rate.
Assuming the stock is unchanging, (ceteris paribus) a "net" in­
crease in demand for bills will decrease the equilibrium rate, while a
146Chase, og. cit.. p. 39.
147It should be pointed out that a change in the stock by a certain 















primary market transactions State and Local 
Governments 4secondary market transactions
Individuals, Others
Note: Arrows indicate the direction of the transactions. At maturity,
all bills are redeemed from the Treasury.
Chart 10.— Diagram of the trading of United States Treasury 
bills in the primary and the secondary market.
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"net" decrease in demand will increase the equilibrium rate. By "net" 
change, it is intended that between two static periods, the quantity that 
all private sectors taken together desire to hold at various rates, in­
creases or decreases.
Given the stock of Treasury bills available to the market, the 
total stock must be held by commercial banks, non-financial corporations, 
foreign governments and banks, state and local governments, or Others.
The equilibrium rate must adjust to the change in the total demand sched­
ule.
The Nature of the Market
The validity of this simple model depends on a purely competitive
market for bills, as well as the usual assumption of a large number of
holders and traders of bills who behave as if they cannot influence the
bill rate;^^® freedom of entry and exit of the market participants
homogeneous p r o d u c t a n d  perfect information on the part of buyers and 
151sellers.
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have the resources 
to influence the market, directly and indirectly. The above outline of the 
theoretical model assumed these participants to be operating on the stock 
of bills. Even though the rate can be shifted by trading activities, the 
quantities required to have any appreciable effect would be very large, 
the exact quantities for a particular change in the rate being dependent 
on the elasticity of the total demand schedule. For a discussion of the 
Treasury acting as a discriminating monopolist in the primary market, see; 
Andrew F. Brimmer, "Price Determination in the United States Treasury Bill 
Market," The Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol. XLIV (May, 1962),
No. 2, pp. 178-183.
149Most participants are free to buy and sell bills at their fancy. 
Dealers, however, are faced with some problems of entry if it is their 
desire to become dealers recognized by the Federal Reserve Open Market 
Committee. The Open Market Committee only makes transactions through 
dealers which are recognized by the Committee. Since trading by the Federal
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There is, however, a fair amount of disagreement as to how compet­
itive the bill market actually is. R. S. Sayers has interpreted the United 
States market in Treasury bills as being a competitive one. In comparing 
the London bill market with the New York bill market, he stated; "The 
whole business is more complex than in London, and the greater heteroge­
neity of the New York market almost certainly makes for conditions closer
152to Marshall's perfect market."
Conversely, Milton Friedman suspects that collusion exists among
dealers in their bidding in the primary market.
If you pay the price that you bid, then it really makes a great 
deal of difference that you should bid very close to the final 
price at which the auction is going to be settled.
The only way to assure that you do so is to get together 
with other people and arrange your bids. As you may know, a 
similar method to the one we now use has been used in the 
British bill market and there you have explicit collusion. My 
understanding is that a single syndicate is formed which gets 
together and puts in a single bid.
Open Market Committee constitutes a large percentage of total transactions, 
being recognized is important to the financial success of a dealer. For a 
discussion of these points, see: "The Government's Management of its Mone­
tary, Fiscal, and Debt Operations," Part 6B of Employment. Growth, and 
Price Levels. Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress 
of the United States, August 5-7, 1959, Washington, 1959, pp. 1512-1517.
150Bills are not perfectly homogeneous in the sense that they do 
not have identical maturities. Bills of different maturities, from one to 
52 weeks, are aggregated together. From the degree of association of their 
rate movements described in Chapter IV, it was assumed that they were simi­
lar enpugh to be treated as homogeneous.
^^^This requirement is probably as well satisfied as it could be. 
The participants in the bill market are probably as knowledgeable of the 
state of the market, movements of the rate, activity of other participants, 
and expected developments as any participants in any market.
152R. S. Sayers, Central Banking After Baeehot (Oxford; Oxford 
University Press, 1957), pp. 134-135. Also see; "The Government's Manage­
ment of its Monetary, Fiscal, and Debt Management Operations," Part 6B, 
op. cit., pp. 1541-1545.
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I have no direct evidence on collusion in the United States, 
but I have examined the figures reported in the newspapers week 
by week on the minimum and maximum accepted bids under the auc­
tions and I find it literally incredible that those bids are the 
result of wholly independent bidding by independent p u r c h a s e r s . ^53
If the dealers were simply providing a brokerage type service, 
that is arranging transactions between traders and taking a percentage of 
the transaction for their services, it seems that the assumptions of per­
fect competition would be more nearly satisfied. An example of this type 
of market is provided by Jaff4:
The London silver market offers perhaps a clearer example than 
the stock exchange of a real market in which price determination 
most closely approximates the theoretical establishment of 
static equilibrium prices under competitive conditions. The 
functioning of this market has been described in the following 
terms: 'The London price is fixed once a day by four bullion
firms which have for many years constituted the market. Rep­
resentatives of these four firms meet at about 2 p.m. on week­
days and at 11 a.m. on Saturdays. All orders to sell or buy 
are placed with these brokers. They compare the orders, and 
the price is then fixed where it will move the greatest 
amount of "at market" orders. In short, the price is deter­
mined according to demand and supply. This is called "fixing" 
the price. As presumably the only interest of the brokers is 
the one-eighth of 1 per cent commission they make on purchases 
(there is no commission for selling silver) they have no inter­
est in fixing the price at any but its economic level. Once 
determined, the price is immediately cabled to the banking 
centres of the world.'^54
153Testimony by Milton Friedman, "Constructive Suggestions for Re­
conciling and Simultaneously Obtaining the Three Objectives of Maximum 
Employment, An Adequate Rate of Growth, and Substantial Stability of the 
Price Level," Part 9A, Employment. Growth, and Price Levels. Hearings be­
fore the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States 
October 26-30, 1959, p. 3025. Also see: Milton Friedman, A Program for
Monetary Stability (New York: Fordham University Press, 1959), pp. 64-65.
^"^William Jaf-fe, in translators notes of Leon Walrus, Elements 
of Economics (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1954), Lesson 6,
Note 13, pp. 501-502. Jaff& is quoting from H. M. Bratter, "Silver--Some 
Fundamentals," Journal of Political Economy. Vol. XXXIX, No. 3 (June, 
1931), pp. 362-363.
A similar situation prevails in the "daily fixing" of price in the 
London gold market. See: "The London Gold Market," Bank of England's
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Since Government securities dealers are buying for their own account
and selling out of their portfolios. It could be to their advantage to
manipulate the market If they were able, either singly or as a group. No
direct evidence Is available that collusion exists In the primary market;
and In fact, the criticism of Friedman's argument has been quite convlnq- 
155Ing. Therefore, In the absence of evidence to the contrary. It Is as­
sumed In this study that the bill market Is competitive enough that the 
model of pure competition can be usefully employed In analyzing changes In 
the bill rate.
The Nature of Equilibrium 
In a market of this type, It would seem that the movement of the 
rate toward the equilibrium rate would be rapid. The shorter Is the re­
action time of the market participants to changes In the price of bills, 
the more rapid Is the rate of adjustment toward a new equilibrium level.
Given the large volume of dally trading; the high degree of knowledge of 
the market by the participants; and the ease, speed, and low cost of making 
transactions due to the organization of the market; It would seem justifiable
Quarterly Bulletin, March, 1964. An excerpt of this article appeared as a 
special supplement to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Monthly Review. 
March, 1964.
155For an argument directed against the Friedman position regarding 
collusion, see; Henry N. Goldstein, "The Friedman Proposal for Auctioning 
Treasury Bills," The Journal of Political Economy. Vol. LXX, No. 4 (August, 
1962), pp. 368-392. Also, see: William Rleber, "Collusion In the Auction 
Market for Treasury Bills," pp. 502-512; Friedman, "Comment," pp. 513-514, 
and Rleber, "Rejoinder,"-p. 515; The Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 
LXXII, No. 5 (October, 1964). Also Rleber's unpublished dissertation 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1963) The Primary Market for United 
States Treasury Bills.
^^^Schnelder, Pricing and Equilibrium, op. clt.. pp. 247-250.
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to assume that reaction by all dealers, most large banks, and many non­
financial corporations would be almost Instantaneous. On the basis of the 
description In Chapter II, of the market behavior of economic sectors. It 
will be assumed that the reaction time of the market participants would be 
rapid relative to other types of markets. In addition, the existence of a 
periodic weekly seasonal factor. Indicates that the adjustment period Is 
short. Given the volatility of the bill rate, one of two alternative sep­
arate conclusions could be reached; (a) the adjustment toward equilibrium 
Is Instantaneous with each and every transaction taking place at an equi­
librium level, or (b), the bill rate never reaches a true equilibrium po­
sition due to the rapidity with which changes In market conditions are 
taking place. Since a choice between these relatively "pure" alternatives 
would be conjectural, a "middle" position would be more consistent with the 
above discussion. Considering the nature of the market and the conclusions 
and assumptions that have been considered. It will be sufficient to assume 
that the participants' reactions to changes In market data cause the bill 
rate to move Instantaneously toward a new equilibrium level, but the actual 
changes In market data occur so rapidly and consistently that even If the 
bill rate achieved an equilibrium level. It will not remain fixed for any 
significant period of tlme.^^^
Although time has not been specifically discussed. It has been 
Implicitly an Important consideration throughout the discussion of equi­
librium. Schneider has pointed out the shortcomings of an analysis based 
purely on comparative-static hypothesis.
157"Stable" In the sense Is assumed to mean absolutely rigid and
unchanging.
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The answer to the question as to how the equilibrium values vary 
with changes in data is of fundamental Importance. To find out 
that a particular set of data corresponds to a particular equi­
librium position Is by Itself quite Inadequate. Equilibrium 
analysis only achieves real value by studying how changes In 
data Influence the equilibrium values.
Paul Samuelson has stressed the Importance of the dynamic view In equi­
librium analysis.
It Is the task of comparative statics to show the determination 
of the equilibrium values of given variables (unknowns) under 
postulated conditions (functional relationships) with various 
data (parameters) being specified. Thus, In the simplest case 
of a partlal-equlllbrlum market for a single commodity, the two 
Independent relations of supply and demand, each drawn up with 
other prices and Institutional data being taken as given, 
determine by their Intersection the equilibrium quantities of 
the unknown price and quantity sold. If no more than this could 
be said, the economist would be truly vulnerable to the gibe that 
he Is only a parrot taught to say 'supply and demand'. Simply to 
know that there are efficacious 'laws' determining equilibrium 
tells us nothing of the character of these laws. In order for 
the analysis to be useful It must provide Information concerning 
the way In which our equilibrium quantities will change as a re­
sult of changes In the parameters taken In Independent data.^^^
Since this study of the bill rate Is really a study In the move­
ment of the series over time, some hypothesis of the way the relevant 
variables and parameters Interact over time Is necessary.
Dvnamlc Considerations 
Samuelson has defined a system as dynamical "If Its behavior over 
time Is determined by functional equations In which 'variables at different 
points of time' are Involved In an 'essential' way."^^^ Any attempt to
158Schneider, Pricing and Equilibrium, op. cit., p. 243.
159Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1947), p. 257.
^^°Ibld.. p. 314.
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explain the movement of the bill rate must be concerned with hypotheses in
addition to those derived from the comparative-static framework. Indeed,
it has been pointed out that even with a comparative-static model of market
behavior, there are implicit dynamic considerations.
A large part of the empirical literature— demand analysis, in 
particular--has as its object the estimation of functions given 
by comparative static economic theory. Such analysis has its 
conceptual difficulties, however. Even the functions of static 
theory must have, in reality if not in abstraction, a time 
dimension. It is, after all, not permissible to speak of an 
estimated demand reaction without some specification, at least 
implicit, of the time period in which that reaction is supposed 
to take place. A time series estimate of a static function is 
a snapshot taken of the dependent variable in a dynamic reaction 
at a given moment in time. If that snapshot is taken ten minutes 
after a change in an independent variable, we are likely to get 
quite a different picture from the snapshot taken a year later or 
from the final photograph in the series taken at the time (if it 
ever comes) when all reaction has ceased and equilibrium has been 
finally re-established.
It is thus of some importance in any empirical investigation
of this type to consider which of such a series of snapshots one
wishes to develop. Such consideration has important consequences 
for the kind of data chosen and for the way in which those data 
are utilized. Carelessness here can be fatal, for it may lead to 
mixing of two reactions, to a sort of double exposure.
Put somewhat more generally: the specification and estimation
of any static economic reaction always involves the construction
of an implicit dynamic model.
In a comparative-static theoretical framework, the actual values 
of .fhe variables are important, while in a dynamic theoretical framework, 
concentration is centered on the changes in the values of the variables 
from one time period to the next, once the appropriate lags in the rele­
vant independent variables have been taken into account. For instance, a 
sale of bills by the Federal Reserve Open Market Account should have the
Franklin M. Fisher, A Priori Information and Time Series Anal­
ysis: Essays in Economic Theory and Measurement (Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 21-22.
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Instantaneous effect (ceteris paribus*) of increasing the bill rate. Never­
theless, it is evident that the ceteris paribus assumption will not be 
satisfied if one of the basic tenants of monetary policy, namely, that 
there are lagged responses to open market operations, is valid. A sale 
by the Federal Reserve System is assumed to initiate changes in bank re­
serves and the money supply that in turn bring about changes in the plans 
of other sectors to hold bills in subsequent time periods. Therefore, if 
the Federal Reserve System sells, there will be a decrease in the bill 
rate in the current period, plus additional effects on the level of the 
rate in subsequent periods brought about by resulting lagged changes in 
other relevant independent variables.
The time period that has been chosen for observing changes in the 
variables is one month. The change in the bill rate, for instance, will 
be measured as the difference between the level of the rate at the end of
the current month and the level of the rate at the end of the month imme­
diately preceding. The same measurement will apply for the other independ­
ent variables.
Using first differences also yields some important dividends from 
the statistical point of view. It was pointed out at the beginning of 
this study that observations of the values of these variables taken at 
such short intervals would probably yield a high degree cf autocorrelation 
and/or multicollinearity. Some advantages of working with first differ­
ences when faced with these problems are discussed by Fisher.
The primary devise for the estimation of short-run re­
action is the use of first differences of the data. Aside 
from the fact that such use often (but by no means always) 
has the convenience of reducing or eliminating autocorrela­
tion in the residuals, or reducing multicollinearity, it
seems analytically the correct form for the estimation of
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short-run functions. The use of absolutes for estimation 
purposes must necessarily involve a complete specification 
of the time structure of the model, and of the variables 
thereof, including long-run as well as short-run elements.
The use of first differences, however, enables us approxi­
mately to isolate the short-run elements since we may 
assume the long-run components of the reaction to be rela­
tively constant during the interval over which first dif­
ferences, are taken. This is frequently of considerable 
advantage since we need not specify the precise form that 
the long-run elements take. It is thus often possible to 
use first differences to obtain estimates of short-run in­
fluences that are not dependent on the precise form of our 
long-run assumptions.
The choice of the appropriate time period for the empirical anal­
ysis is crucial. In a study of the short-run determinants of the Treasury 
bill rate, the average yearly rate relative to the independent variables, 
measured on a yearly basis, would simply average out short-run movements. 
The bill rate fluctuates daily (or even hourly), but it would not be 
meaningful to explain these movements, even if it were possible to do so.
In a short-run analysis of the bill market, a logical choice of the time 
period would be either weekly, monthly, or quarterly. Fisher provides some 
considerations that are important in choosing the time period.
...it is important to realize that these interpretations of 
the first difference procedure implicitly assume that the 
interval over which the differences are taken is long enough 
so that the reaction over the interval is of interest. This 
is not so trival as it may appear. The prevailing practive 
of automatically removing ttends by first differences or 
other means may often lead to the estimation of reaction that 
are so short-run as to be of little or no concequence. (Of
162Ibid., pp. 22-23. Also see: D. Cochrane and 6. K. Orcutt,
"Application of Least Squares Regression to Relationships Containing Auto- 
Correlated Error Terms," Journal of the American Statistical Association 
(March, 1949), Vol. 44, No. 245, pp. 32-61; and Daniel B. Suits, "The 
Determinants of Consumer Expenditure: A Review of Present Knowledge,"




course, the failure so to remove trends to any extent may lead 
to the estimation of reactions that are so long-run as to be 
also of little interest.) If data are gathered weekly, say, first 
differencing in the ordinary way will have meaning only if one 
thinks the reaction in question takes place fast enough so that 
the dependent variable responds visibly to week-to-week changes 
in the independent variables. Clearly, if data were gathered 
often enough, there would be no point in first differencing, 
since the absolute data themselves would reflect short-run 
perturbations. Moreover, many economic reactions take place 
relatively slowly, so that, even if data were gathered only on 
a yearly basis, first differences would involve only a short- 
run part of a long-run reaction.163
In the preceding discussion of the speed of movement toward equilibrium, 
it was contended that reactions by the market participants to changes in 
market data were virtually instantaneous, and that the use of very short 
time periods should yield valid, interesting results. This contention may 
be shown to be invalid by the empirical estimations of Chapter VIII. 
Nevertheless, since evidence has been shown that a definite monthly sea­
sonal pattern exists in bill rate movements (and strong indications were 
shown of a weekly pattern), the shortest possible time period should be 
used. Given the data available for explanatory variables, the monthly 
time period, partially by default, becomes the time period for analysis.
It is further hypothesized that the causes of the monthly seasonal, cycli­
cal, and irregular movements in the bill rate can be determined within a 
simply dynamical supply and demand framework.
A Discussion of Statistical Techniques 
It was argued above that, on a priori grounds, the use of first 
differences of the variables, instead of levels, might be more meaningful 
in the economic sense. It was also suggested that the use of first dif­
ferences might be more satisfactory in the statistical sense.
163Fisher, 0£* Çi±., p. 24.
141
The level of the Treasury bill rate, as the dependent variable, 
will be correlated initially with levels of various independent variables. 
Also, initially, no lags will b e . a s s u m e d , S i n c e  time series with obser­
vations taken at relatively short intervals make up the data, it should be 
suspected that autocorrelation of residuals may result. In the simple 
linear model
(1) = a + bX^ + u^
(where is the dependent variable, X^ is the independent variable, u^ is 
the disturbance term in time period ̂  and Ug is the disturbance term in 
time period t-n; with ̂  = 1, 2, ....n) independence of the u^ requires 
that:
(2) E(UgU^) = 0, for all s ^ t; 
where E denotes the expected value. If
B("s"t) Of
then the u^'s are not serially independent, and autocorrelation exists. 
Autocorrelation does not bias the estimation of the regression coefficients, 
but results in a bias of the variance of the regression coefficients and 
the residual variance.
A test for the serial independence of the residuals is available 
in the Durbin-Watson statistic (d):^^^
164Although using the bill rate in the form of the "monthly average 
of daily closing rates," while the independent variables are in the form of 
levels at the end of the month implies some short lag.
Johnston, Econometric Methods (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 9, 177-192; Arthur S. Goldberger, Econometric Theory, 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), pp. 231-238; and Lawrence Ïl. Klein,
A Textbook of Econometrics (Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1953),
pp. 80-92.
^^^J. Durbin and G. S. Watson, "Testing for Serial Correlation in 
Least Squares Regression. II," Biometrika. Vol. 38, Parts 1 and 2 (June, 
1951), pp. 159-178.
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2E (ut - Ufi)
(3) d = ^ ------------- .g
t=l
The calculated values for d, and (4 - are then compared with upper and 
lower bounds (d^ and dĵ ) in a one-sided test for positive autocorrelation 
of the residuals.
If it is not possible to accept the hypothesis of random disturb­
ances, that is, if the residuals appear to be positively correlated, as­
sumptions may be made regarding the form of the autocorrelation of the 
residuals; the simplest case being the first-order autoregressive structure 
where:
(4) u^ = (P)u^_i + e
167p may be estimated by r in the equation:
A
<5) ' = — — ;—  '
and this estimate cf P is used to transform the dependent variable and the 
independent variable(s) by:
167Johnston, o£. cit.. pp. 195-199. It has also been shown that r 
is closely approximated by the formula
T^fl-.5d') + 
t 2 -
where T is the number of observations, V the number of variables (or 
constants), and d' the calculated Durbin-Watson statistic: see H. Theil
and A. L. Nagar, "Testing the Independence of Regression Disturbances," 
Journal of the American Statistical Association. Vol. 56, No. 296 (Decem­
ber, 1961), pp. 793-806.
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(6) \  - TŶ .i =
and X̂ j. - r X ^ ^ = X^^, (1 denotes the number of the Independent
variable, 1 = 1 ,  2, ....n) and regressing on X|^ in order to estimate
the regression coefficients (bp. In order to state the relationship in
the fora of original variables, the constant aj_ is equal to the original
168constant a, multiplied by (1-f), therefore;
(7) = a + b[xit
(8) Yj. = a(l-r) +
(9) Yt = a' + b^Xit.
Now if p is equal to unity, the transformation of the original 
variables is:
(10) y ; = Yt - P Y^.i or, Yj - Y^.i
~ ^It "p %ic-l ^It ■ %it-l
indicating that a proper method for estimating the regression coefficients
would be to fit linear relationships in the fora of first differences. 
Therefore, the Durbin-Watson statistic and the autocorrelation coefficient 
are calculated and reported in most of the following regression calcula­
tions.
When p is equal to, or near, the value 1, all variance estimates--
and therefore all ̂  tests and F tests--when levels of the variables arle
used are meaningless. Standard errors and coefficients of determination 
for the estimates using levels are reported solely for the subjective 
evaluation of the "goodness" of fit. Variance estimates using transformed 
variables will be nearer to true variance estimates and are more meaningful;
168Johnston, 0£. cit.. pp. 195-199.
144
however, it must be remembered that p is only estimated by jc, and the true 
variances are unknown.
When P is unity, the regression coefficient from the first dif­
ference equations is an estimate of the parameter in the same sense as the 
regression coefficient calculated using l e v e l s . T h e  correspondence be­
tween the regression equation using levels of the variables and the equa­
tion using first differences— when P is unity may be illustrated by substi­
tution into equation (1):
(11) - P?t_i = a(l-p) + b(Xt -p Xt_i) + (Ut ~P 
and using equation (10), siqce p is equal to 1:
(12) Yt - Yt_i = b(Xt - Xt_i) + (u^ - Ut_i),
and (13) Y = bX + v
where the dot over the variable indicates successive differences and v is 
a new disturbance term approximating (u^ - u^_^).
However, if a first difference linear regression equation is esti­
mated and the constant is not zero, how should the constant be interpreted? 
In a recent empirical study. Suits has commented that; "...the constant 
term...in a first difference equation measures the t r e n d . A l s o  in
169Another procedure is to assume different values for p and by 
iterative procedures deduce the r that comes nearest causing the summation 
of the UtUt_i to equal zero, and use this value to transform the original 
variables. This approach is used in Clifford Hildreth and John Y. Lu, 
Demand Relations with Autocorrelated Disturbances. Technical Bulletin 276, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University (November, 
1960). I wish to thank T. D. Wallace for pointing this out, and for dis­
cussion on this point.
^^^"Although the estimate of the regression coefficient from levels 
of variables will be unbiased if autocorrelation exists, the estimates will 
be inefficient because of the needlessly large sampling variances." John­
ston, o£. cit., p. 179.
^^^Daniel B. Suits, "The Determinants of Consumer Expenditure: A
Review of Present Knowledge," Impacts of Monetary Policv (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 34.
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an empirical context, Karaken and Solow have said; "As is well known, a
negative constant in a first-difference regression corresponds to a nega-
172tive linear trend in the absolute variables." It is not easy to recon­
cile these two statements, and it is argued below that neither statement 
is generally true. Using a linear relationship as above, but including 
time as a variable,
(14) Yj. = a + bXj. + ct + u%.
If p is equal to one, then transformation, from equation (10), would yield
(15) Yt - Yt_i = b(Xt - Xt_i) + ct + V, 
and since t = 1 in a first-order scheme,
(16) Ÿ = c + bX + V.
Therefore, the regression coefficient _ç measures "trend," but onlv when 
p = 1. The trend measured here is the trend in the dependent variable—  
but this is true onlv if there is no trend in X. Use of the first equation 
of the two normal equations for the two-variable case, where the variables 
are first differences, (X):
(17) SŸ = na + bSX
and division by the number of observations yields,
(18) Ÿ  = a + bX.
If there is no trend in the level of a variable, the expected value of the 
first differences is:
E(2Y) = 0, E(SX) = 0 and
(19) z  J.
E(Y) = 0, E(X) = 0.
172John Karaken and Robert M. Solow, "Lags in Monetary Policy," 
Stabilization Policies (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1963), p. 50.
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If there Is a positive trend, the above expected values will be positive;
If there Is a negative trend, there will be negative expected values. Â 
few special cases are discussed for purposes of Illustration.
Consider first a positive (or negative) trend In the level of the 
dependent variable and no trend In the Independent variable: E(SY) 4 0,
E(£X) = 0. Substitution Into equation (17) yields, since ZX = 0,
ZY = na, and, therefore
Y = a.
This, Indeed, does measure the trend In the dependent variable, which could
be described verbally as the average change per time period In the absolute
level of the dependent variable.
Second, consider the case of no trend In the dependent variable, 
but a positive (or negative) trend In the Independent variable; E(ZY) = 0, 
E(ZX) 4 0, Again, substitution Into equation (17) yields, since EY = 0, 
na = bZX,
a = b ^  , and 
a = bX,
the value of which depends on the trend In X and the b value, the slope of 
the relationship between Ÿ and X.
Finally, with a trend In both Y and X, substitution Into equation
(17) yields:
na = ZY - bZX, and 
a = Ÿ  - bX.
The meaning of a In this situation depends on the relative trend of %, and 
the trend of jg times b. As a single value, the a value In this situation 
Is nebulous. If the b value were zero. It would measure the trend of
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and If ̂  were 1 It would measure the difference in the average monthly
• •trend between X and %)(?- x). However, unless the trend of these vari­
ables is already known, the computed constant in a first difference equa­
tion provides few insights, even in simple linear regression. The problem 
in interpreting the meaning of the constant when using first differences 
in a multiple regression situation is obvious. If p were 1, the value of 
the constant should be zero. But if the calculated constant is not zero, 
what meaning should be attached to the constant? In those situations where 
it is felt, on a priori grounds that the value of the constant should be 




173which forces the regression line through the origin.
In addition to fitting regression equations using levels and their 
successive differences, some, equations are calculated using logarithmic 
(natural) transformations of the levels of the variables. The regressions 
using logarithmic transformation of the levels provides information on the 
form of the functional relationships. Also if it seems appropriate on 
theoretical grounds, some variables may be included with a one period lag.
Finally, most of the actual calculations are done on an electronic 
computer utilizing programs written specifically for this analysis. The 
principal program is patterned on the calculation procedures of Joan 
Friedman and Richard J. Foote, who utilize a modified forward Doolittle
'"ibid.
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t e c h n i q u e , The derivation of the Durbin-Watson statistic, the auto­
correlation coefficient, and the residuals are carried out in a separate 
series of calculations. In all cases, the programs have been thoroughly 
checked and tested to minimize any computational errors— especially round­
off errors which can cause significant loss of accuracy in the inversion 
of the matrices,
Summarv and Conclusions 
It has been argued in this Chaptef that a comparative-static 
partial-equilibrium analysis, the assumption of pure competition, and the 
use of Wicksteed's total demand concept with the total supply of bills 
considered as a stock provide an appropriate tentative framework for an 
explanation of the determinants of the Treasury bill rate.
According to the discussion thus far, monthly changes in the bill 
rate will be brought about by either a change in the stock of bills (due 
to Treasury or Federal Reserve System debt management decisions) available 
in the economy, or by changes in the demand for bills by bill-holders. In 
Chapter VI, the factors determining the stock of bills as determined by 
Treasury debt management and Federal Reserve System monetary policy will 
be examined in greater detail.
The time period for viewing the relationships between the bill 
rate and "independent" variables is taken as one month. The reasons for 
this decision are: (1) bill rate movements over monthly periods show
some regularity and seemingly are important, and (2) although rate
Joan Friedman and Richard J, Foote, Computational Methods for 
Handling Svstema of Simultaneous Equations. Agriculture Handbook No, 94, 
(United States Department of Agriculture, November, 1955),
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movements over shorter periods may be interesting, sufficient data for the 
independent variables is unavailable. Whether the observations should be 
taken as levels or successive differences should not be decided on a priori 
grounds and both will be experimented with.
The statistical problem of positive autocorrelation of the resi­
duals was investigated relative to whether levels or successive differences 
are used as variables, and the method of attempting to eliminate biases 
from autocorrelation by transformation has been explained.
CHAPTER VI
DEBT MANAGEMENT, OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS, AND 
‘ THE SUPPLY OF TREASURY BILLS
Introduction
In the simple theoretical framework just discussed, the quantity 
of bills outstanding was viewed as a stock, and bill rate equilibrium was 
indicated by the intersection of the total demand schedule with this stock. 
The stock of bills was defined as the total quantity made available by the 
Treasury less holdings by Federal agencies and trust funds and the Federal 
Reserve System. The purpose of this Chapter is to examine the movements 
in the stock of bills due to Treasury and Federal Reserve System operations, 
These policy operations could be classified generally as "debt 
management,combining the debt activities of the Treasury and the Fed­
eral Reserve System. The definition of debt management used in this study
Smith, o£. cit., p. 2, has formulated a widely quoted definition 
as: "...define debt management to include all actions of the Government,
including both the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, which affect the com­
position of the publicly held debt. When defined in this way, debt manage­
ment includes: (1) decisions by the Treasury concerning the types of debt
to be issued to raise new money, (2) decisions by the Treasury concerning 
the types of debt to be issued in connection with the refunding of maturing 
securities, (3) decisions by the Federal Reserve concerning the types of 
debt to be purchased and sold in the conduct of open market operations."
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include: (1) Treasury decisions concerning the maturity structure and
types of debt instruments constituting the existing Federal debt, (2) 
Treasury decisions concerning the types of Federal debt instruments held 
in the portfolios of the various Federal agencies and trust funds, and (3) 
Federal Reserve System decisions concerning the types and quantities of 
Government securities traded in the open market. This definition does not 
include fiscal policy decisions concerning the size of the Federal debt, 
or monetary policy decisions relating to required reserve ratios and re­
discount r a t e s . D e b t  management, thus defined, includes the policy 
operations of: Treasury debt management. Treasury open market transac­
tions, and Federal Reserve System open market transactions. These
Smith has also provided an alternate definition as: "...it in­
cludes all measures that affect the size and composition of the stock of 
outstanding claims against the Federal Government (including the Federal 
Reserve System). On this definition, debt management would encompass all 
cash borrowing, debt retirement, and refunding operations of the Treasury, 
and all open market operations of the Federal Reserve System...the only 
measures left under the heading of monetary policy would be changes in 
member bank reserve requirements and in the discount rate." Changes in 
the stock of bills under the definition in the text fall midway between 
these two definitions by Smith. Ibid., p. 27.
For some other definitions of debt management, see: Thomas R.
Beard, "Debt Management: Its Relationship to Monetary Policy, 1951-1962,"
The National Banking Review. Vol. 2, No. 1 (September, 1964), pp. 61-76; 
Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill,
Book Co., Inc., 1959), pp. 581-611; Earl R. Rolph, "Principles of Debt 
Management," The American Economic Review. Vol. XLVII, No. 3 (June, 1957), 
pp. 302-320; James Tobin, "An Essay on Principles of Debt Management," 
Fiscal and Debt Management Policies (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 143-218; and 0. H. Brownlee and I. 0. Scott, 
"Utility, Liquidity, and Debt Management," Econometrica. Vol. 31, No. 3 
(July, 1963), pp. 349-362.
^^^For the details of the Treasury conduct of transactions for 
Government agencies and trust funds, see: W. Nelson Peach, "Treasury In­
vestment Funds and Open-Market Operations," The Journal of Finance, Vol.
VI, No. 1 (March, 1951), pp. 46-53; and Deane Carson, "Treasury Open Market 
Operations," The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. XLI, No. 4 
(November, 1959), pp. 438-442.
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policy operations determine the stock of Treasury bills available for the 
178public to hold.
However, it is not absolutely necessary to include Federal Reserve
179System open market transactions as changing the stock of bills. The 
System could be viewed as easily as entering the market as a demander and 
aggregated into the total demand schedule, allowing all bill stock changes 
to be determined by Treasury debt management operations. This procedure 
would allow separation of Treasury and Federal Reserve operations in the 
bill market in graphical illustrations, but would help little conceptually.
If the bill rate were an important variable in determining the 
quantity of bills the System desired to hold, it would be appropriate to 
include the Federal Reserve System as acting through the total demand 
schedule instead of through stock changes. It seems, however, that the 
principal purpose of Federal Reserve System open market operations is aimed 
at affecting the level of member bank reserves. The Federal Reserve System 
does not enter the market for the purpose of attempting to earn any inter­
est return, and does not behave, therefore, in the same fashion as other 
holders of bills.
178For an example of the meaning of publicly held debt, see:
Thomas R. Beard, "Money, Liquidity, and the National Debt," Nebraska Jour­
nal of Economics and Business. Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring, 1964), p. 48. "It 
has become customary in recent years to compute the 'publicly held' nation­
al debt. This measure excludes Treasury debt held by U. S. Government 
agencies and trust funds and by Federal Reserve Banks. 'Publicly held' 
national debt provides a better measure of assets to the non-Federal gov­
ernment sector, but includes holdings by state and local governments and 
foreign and international accounts."
179Schneider, Monev. Income, and Employment, op. cit., p. 74. 
Schneider illustrates purchases on the total demand schedule and sales as 
stock movements.
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For the great majority of Federal Reserve System open market bill 
transactions, the bill rate is not an influential determinant of the 
quantities of bills to be bought or sold. It seems logical to make the 
assumption that the behavior of the Federal Reserve System, like that of 
the Treasury, is basically exogenous to the bill market. The advantage of 
including Federal Reserve System transactions with Treasury debt manage­
ment operations is that the behavior of the non-governmental market par­
ticipants is represented by the total demand schedule.
Up to this point, the stock of bills has provided a useful and 
simple conceptual framework for examining the bill rate and the quantity 
of bills. Now, however, it is necessary to examine, in some detail, 
whether the use of the stock concept is appropriate for this analysis.
More specifically, is it accurate to state bill market behavioral rela­
tionships in terms of stocks, or should these relationships be stated in 
terms of flows?
Stocks Versus Flows
Very generally, a stock is considered to be a relatively fixed 
quantity at a given time, while a flow is thought of as a quantity stead­
ily changing over time. Generally, wealth is considered a stock, income 
a flow; capital a stock and investment a: flow. Money is usually consid­
ered to be an existing stock, and when the flow of transactions out of this
180stock are considered, the concept of velocity becomes relevent. For
180For some analogies of stocks and flows, see: Conard, cit.,
p. 218; and G. L. S. Shackle, "Recent Theories Concerning the Nature and 
Role of Interest," The Economic Journal. Vol. LXXI, No. 282 (June, 1961), 
pp. 209-254.
154
most purposes It seems that the supply of U. S. Treasury bills fits this 
general concept of a stock, being generally like wealth, capital, or the 
stock of money.
A simple comparative-static theoretical framework has been de­
scribed using the stock of Treasury bills available to the public as the 
supply. Most of the available statistical data relate to quantities out­
standing, or quantities held by economic sectors, at the end of the month. 
Intuitively, it seems reasonable to view these values as stocks.
In the majority of the months in this period, the changes in the
stock by the Treasury and Federal Reserve System are small relative to
181the total quantity of bills. But again, this is a relative matter—
the addition to the stocks of automobiles is small relative to the exist­
ing stock, but automobile production seems better described as a flow.
The problem here is the attempt to formulate an operationally useful frame­
work that is as consistent as possible with conceptual theoretical argu­
ments. For many of the bill market participants, the only data available
are end-of-month holdings, with little knowledge of the movement of these
182holdings within the month. Taking the Federal Reserve System Account
as an example, the difference in bill holdings between two consecutive 
end-of-month periods is simply the net change in holdings in that particu­
lar month. For Federal Reserve System holdings, data are available for
181There are some extreme movements which should be noted. Within 
the one-month period, the stock of bills has changed, due to Treasury 
action, by as much as ten per cent of the total quantity. Also, within a 
month, the Federal Reserve System, has changed their net holdings by as 
much as five per cent of the total Treasury stock.
182See Chapter II above for the discussion of the statistical data 
relating to holdings by various groups.
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the total purchases and total sales of bills for the month— but even this 
provides no information regarding the time during the month that any of 
these transactions took place.
In order to make use of the available statistical data, it is 
necessary to view the level of bills issued by the Treasury, the level of 
Federal Reserve System holdings, and the level of bills held by each sec­
tor, as of the end-of-month periods. Since it was decided in Chapter V 
that monthly changes in the levels of the variables could be appropriate 
for statistical purposes, it might be argued that this would cast all re­
lationships as flows--but first differences do not necessarily measure 
flows. The nature of the statistical data necessitates using these end- 
of-month quantities and monthly changes in quantities, whether or not the 
stock concept and the total demand schedule are theoretically justified.
By including the Federal Reserve System holdings in the stock of bills, 
monetary policy through bill transactions and debt management through 
issues of bills can be separated from the demand by public holders and 
changes in demand brought about through changes in the stock.
Nevertheless, on the macroeconomic level, the stock versus flow 
problem is important in the theory of interest rate determination. The 
demand and supply of money versus the demand and supply of securities, and
the loanable-funds versus the liquidity-preference controversies have re-
183volved around whether variables should be treated as stocks or flows.
183The literature on this problem is voluminous, and there is 
little indication that the controversy is settled. For surveys of the 
problem, see: Shackle, og. cit.. and Harry G. Johnson, "Monetary Theory
and Policy," The American Economic Review. Vol. LIT, No. 3 (June, 1962), 
pp. 335-384.
156
No attempt will be made here to go into very much detail regarding the 
macroeconomic aspects of the problem, but it seems necessary to investigate 
the relevance, at the microeconomic level, of the stock-flow discussion to 
the quantity of bills.
At any particular point in time, the quantity of U. S. Treasury 
bills or the quantity of Federal debt is a fixed amount, a stock. The 
gross marketable debt of the Treasury as of December 31, 1961 was approxi­
mately $196 billion, and the quantity of U. S. Treasury bills issued by 
the Treasury was approximately $43.4 billion. But, it can be argued that 
the quantity of any commodity at a particular point of time is a fixed 
amount. The Marshallian "market period? is defined as a period so short 
that supply is fixed and can be treated as a stock. However, in this study 
of the bill market, a time period of one month is too long to be considered 
a "market period" since the total quantity of bills available to the public 
can, and does, change. Open market transactions take place almost continu­
ously, and the Treasury has the opportunity to change the quantity of bills 
at each weekly auction. The quantity of bills available to the public is 
not absolutely fixed, but then neither is the quantity of capital or money.
In a discussion of whether a stock or flow theory is appropriate
to the market for "securities," Shackle has commented that:
The contrast, we may interpolate, is between a market such as 
that for electricity or fresh milk, where what is demanded 
from moment to moment or from day to day, and a market such 
as that for antique furniture, where supply is an existing 
and non-augmental quantity existing at all times. The mar­
ket for securities is evidently nearer to the antique furni­
ture than the electricity end of the s c a l e . 184
184Shackle, 0£. cit., p. 222.
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Although Shackle is referring to the securities market in a macro- 
economic sense, the analogy seems relevant to the market for Treasury 
bills— except that, unlike antique furniture, the supply of bills is an 
augmentable quantity under our stock definition. As Shackle points out, 
this classification of the securities market is relative, and he feels 
this market is more adequately described in stock terms than flow terms.
Conard has pointed out that in attempting to classify a market as
described by stock or flow variables, concepts are not nearly as important
as the theoretical considerations.
Brunner and Klein would say that one does not create a flow theory 
merely by using flow concepts. A flow theory would have to assume 
that ultimate behavioral patterns are defined in terms of flows.^^5
185Conard, ôp. cit., p. 219. In order to provide some indication 
of the extent of agreement on this point in practice, the following exam­
ples are cited.
James S. Duesenberry has formulated an argument in terms of flows 
to explain equilibrium rate movements in the securities market, and James 
Tobin has commented that: "The supply and demand functions for financial
assets, which occupy the central place in Duesenberry's model, should be 
stated in terms of stocks as well as flows. The basic behavior behind the 
flow of funds is the adjustment of the balance sheets, or portfolios, of 
individuals, business firms, and financial enterprises toward a desired 
allocation of wealth among holdings of various nssets and debts. In this 
adjustment, the basic decision variables are stocks; and flows will be 
dominated by attempts to adjust stocks to changes in total wealth, interest 
rates, and other determinants." (James S. Duesenberry, "A Process Approach 
of Flow-of-Funds Analysis," pp. 173-189, and James Tobin, "Comment," pp. 
190-193; in The Flow-of-Funds Approach to Social Accounting. National 
Bureau of Economic Research Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 26, Prince­
ton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1962). A similar criticism is
made by John H. Kareken in a review of Gaines' Techniques of Treasury Debt 
Management (op. cit.), in The Quarterly Review of Economics and Business. 
Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring, 1963), pp. 103-105. On the other hand, Brian Tew 
in a review of Turvey's Interest Rates and Asset Prices (op. cit.), crit­
icizes Turvey for formulating his model of the market for U. S. Government 
securities in terms of stocks instead of flows. Economica. Vol. XXVII, No. 
112 (November, 1961), pp. 427-431. These comments illustrate that dif­
ferences of opinion still exist in the stock-flow definitions. These prob­
lems as related to this study, are not crucial for statistical estimation, 
but may necessarily qualify the interpretation of some of the results.
158
Although It Is difficult to attribute behavioral patterns to the Treasury 
In Its debt management operations or to the Federal Reserve System In Its 
open market operations without some extensive discussion of their objec­
tives, some preliminary observations may be briefly stated. The behavior 
of the Treasury In managing the debt seems to be clearly stock oriented. 
Fiscal policy decisions cause the size of the debt to change and the Treas­
ury simply takes the accumulated debt as a given stock. Within the limita­
tions of the existing maturity structure of the debt, the Treasury makes 
decisions regarding the particular type of securities to Issue when exist­
ing debt matures, or when new debt Is Incurred. It does not seem possible 
for the Treasury to behave In such a way as to create flows of debt over 
time periods. The Issue of bills by the Treasury Is oriented toward the 
establishment of a stock of this security relative to desired stock of 
other types and maturities of securities making up the total Federal debt.
The behavior of the Federal Reserve Open Market Account Is not so 
easy to classify. Monetary policy market transactions take place more 
frequently than Treasury Issues. The goal of these actions Is to change 
the level of member bank reserves (which constitute a stock?). To obtain 
the required effect, a certain quantity of bills must be bought and sold.
It seems that the size of the transaction Is clearly more Important than 
the quantity held by the System Accoupt after the transaction. Although 
the Federal Reserve System may not be attempting to maintain a particular 
stock of bills In Its portfolio, the decisions regarding the quantities 
to buy or sell In the open market are not necessarily flow goals. The 
quantity of securities to be traded depends (along with other considera­
tions) upon the desired quantitative effect on member bank reserves. The
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quantity decided upon will probably not be traded on a single day, but 
over a period of time. The question Is whether open market trading consti­
tutes behavior aimed at the establishment of a stock or the creation of a 
flow (of securities, reserves, or the money supply?).
The objectives of open market operations and Treasury debt manage­
ment will be Investigated In greater detail In the subsequent sections.
Conflicting Objectives of Treasury Debt Management 
The quantity of U. S. Treasury bills In existence Is determined by 
the Treasury's management of the Federal debt. Given the size of the debt, 
the Treasury can make decisions as to: (1) the maturity of new Issues and
replacement of maturing Issues, and (2) the types of securities to Issue 
(marketable or non-marketable, restricted or non-restrlcted, bill, Certif­
icate of Indebtedness, note, bond, or special Issue). These categories 
are somewhat overlapping since If a maturity of three months Is to be 
Issued, It must be a Treasury bill.
In making these decisions the Treasury may attempt to "optimize"
(1) the distribution of holdings of the debt, (2) the stabilization effect 
on the economy, (3) the length of the average maturity of the debt or the 
structure of the maturity, and (4) the Interest cost to the Treasury. In 
many cases more than one goal may be attainable, but the Treasury Is seldom 
able to meet all goals simultaneously with any particular debt management 
operation. Suppose that stabilization effects require lengthening the 
average maturity of the debt by selling bonds with more than ten years to 
maturity. If the long-term Interest rate were above the short-term rate 
(which Is the normal situation), then the Interest cost on this new Issue 
or replacement could not be minimized. The behavior of the Treasury In
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attempting to meet these goals will be discussed briefly, in the order 
they are listed above.
(1) The ability of the Treasury to affect the distribution of 
holdings of the debt lies partially in issuing restricted or non-marketable 
debt instruments. The use of restricted debt has not been of great impor­
tance ovër the period 1952-1964, and non-marketable debt consists mainly
of U. S. Savings Bonds, Investment Bonds, and special issues for trust
186accounts, international funds, and similar purposes. Since Savings 
Bonds and special issues are not close substitutes for bills in holders' 
portfolios, the relevant area of debt management for this study is the 
marketable portion of the Federal debt. Within the limits of the market­
able debt, the principal issue regarding distribution of debt ownership 
has been bank holding of short-term debt instruments and the resulting
"liquidity" effects and "monetization" of the short-term debt with result-
187ing inflationary consequences. These problems became most acute
immediately preceding the Treasury-Federal Reserve System Accord, when the
debt was made almost perfectly liquid through the rigid support of the
188rate structure through pegging. These liquidity aspects of debt manage­
ment are related to the stabilization effects of the debt.
186For the totals of debt in these categories for any year, see the 
relevant Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasurv on the State of the 
Finances.
187A theoretical discussion of Treasury behavior emphasizing the 
liquidity aspects of debt management in relation to bank holdings of Fed­
eral debt may be found in: Jacob Cohen, "A Theoretical Framework for
Treasury Debt Management," The American Economic Review. Vol. XLV, No. 3 
(June, 1955), pp. 320-344.
188For a discussion, see Gaines, 0£. cit.. pp. 64-65.
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(2) Generally, contracyclical debt management requires shortening
the average maturity of the marketable debt in periods of recession and
lengthening the average maturity in periods of prosperity. Shortening the
maturity length in the recession is brought about by financing the fiscal
deficits, and refinancing maturing securities, in the form of short-term
debt instruments. In periods of prosperity, fiscal surpluses can be used
to retire long-term debt, or refinancing can follow a pattern of retiring
"shorts" and issuing "longs." Selling short-term securities increases
general liquidity, and, in periods of recession, allows the Treasury to
borrow without competing in the capital market with potential investment
funds. On the other hand, in periods having inflationary pressures, the
Treasury is lengthening the average maturity, reducing liquidity and com-
189peting for private investment funds. Contracyclical debt management 
generally would mean increases in the relative quantity of marketable debt 
in the form of bills in periods of recession, and decreases in the quantity 
of bills relative to total marketable debt in periods of prosperity.
(3) Clearly the average maturity and the structure of the market­
able debt are necessary considerations in the concept of contracyclical
189Rolph, og. cit.. Musgrave, 0£. cit.. and Tobin, _02. cit., sup­
port the proposition, by theoretical arguments, that appropriate debt 
management policy would attempt to attain the desired effect on the level 
of aggregate demand at the lowest interest cost. Brownlee and Scott, op. 
cit., argue that any interest cost reduction will be very small and that 
the stabilization effect alone is a relevant goal. These theoretical argu­
ments take various routes to their common conclusions. A good theoretical 
discussion of this view is provided in; Thomas A. Beard, "Counter-Cyclical 
Debt Management-A Suggested Interpretation," The Southern Economic Journal. 
Vol. XXX, No. 3 (January, 1964), pp. 244-252; plus Robert J. Lawrence, 
"Counter-Cyclical Debt Management: Comment," and Beard's, "Reply," The
Southern Economic Journal. Vol. XXXI, No. 3 (January, 1965), pp. 251-256.
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debt management. Several economists have indicated that some "optimum"
structure of the debt should be a more Important goal In debt management
190than any attempts to use the debt for contracyclical purposes. There­
fore, the average maturity (or the structure of the debt) Is viewed as an 
Independent objective. The arguments advanced In support of a "neutral" 
or "stable" maturity structure are based on the supposition that financing 
such a debt, (a) would not create disturbing effects on securities markets 
with large Irregular refundings, (b) would not Interfere with monetary 
policy operations of the Federal Reserve System, and (c) would be routine-- 
eliminating any uncertainty regarding the type and timing of Treasury debt 
management.
The maturity structure of the debt Is also related to the ownersh
191distribution of the debt and the fear of monetization. The traditional
192view Is simply that the desirable debt structure should be long-term.
As a result, one of the basic goals of the Treasury has been to lengthen
190Gaines, cit., pp. 272-276, feels that a debt management goal 
of a "neutral" maturity distribution Is more desirable than attempts at , 
contracyclical management because the Treasury does not have the ability, 
at this time, to be very effective In using debt management for stabiliza­
tion purposes, whereas a "neutral" maturity distribution Is an attainable 
goal. Also, Friedman (A Program for Monetarv Stabllltv. on. cit., pp. 52- 
65) argues the desirability for a "stable" maturity structure (any struc­
ture seems all right so long as It Is stable) and only two types of debt 
Instruments (very short and quite long).
191For arguments that the problem of monetization Is unfounded, see 
Gaines, 0£. cit., pp. 249-252; Friedman, A Program for Monetarv Stabllltv, 
op. cit., pp. 53-57; and Beard, "Debt Management: Its Relationship to
Monetary Policy, 1951-1962," og. cit., p. 67.
192Richard A. Musgrave, "Credit Controls, Interest Rates, and 
Management of Public Debt," Income, Emnlovment, and Public Pollcv: Essays
In Honor of Alvin Hansen (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1948), pp.
241-246.
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193the average maturity of the debt whenever ]^osslble. Unfortunately, as 
far as success is concerned, Treasury attempts,Vto lengthen the debt matu­
rity have been frustrated by the other basic objectives, especially inter­
est minimization.
(4) The total interest cost per year on the U. S. Government debt 
is an item which must be appropriated each year b^T^ongress in the admin- 
istrative budget. With the large debt, and higher interest rates than in 
the immediate postwar period, this cost has increased to around $101 bilr
lion per year. It is understandable, therefore, that the Treasury is con-
194cerned with keeping this annual cost as low as possible. Generally,
interest minimization requires selling short-term securities in periods
of prosperity (when rates are high— allowing these securities to mature
relatively soon) and selling long-term securities in periods of recession
(when rates are low— allowing these securities to yield low rates after
the general level of rates increase). This is, of course, exactly the
195opposite of contracyclical debt management policy just discussed.
193This view is apparent in "The Government^ s Management of Its 
Monetary, Fiscal, and Debt Operations," Part 60— Answers to Questions of 
Monetary Policy and Debt Management, Employment. Growth, and Price Levels, 
Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United 
States, 1959, especially pp. 1721-1728.
194For an example, see the testimony by Secretary of the Treasury 
Snyder, Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public Debt, Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on General Credit Control and Debt Management of 
the Joint Economic Committee on the Economic Report, 82nd Congress, 2nd 
Session, March, 1952, pp. 7-70.
195This policy has been classified as "pro-cyclical" by William 
E. Laird, "The Changing Views on Debt Management," The Quarterly Review 
of Economics and Business, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn, 1963), pp. 7-17. For a 
criticism of this policy, see John M. Culberson, "A Positive Debt Manage­
ment Proposal," The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. XLI, No. 2 
(August, 1959), pp. 89-98. For a defense, see Herbert Stein, "Managing 
the Federal Debt," Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 1 (October, 1958), 
pp. 97-104; and Smith, cit., Smith shares this action for interest 
minimization with the goal of an "optimum" structure.
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The goal of Interest minimization Is probably more subject to 
analysis with simple theoretical economic tools than any one of the other 
three g o a l s . G i v e n  the demand schedules for various types of Instru­
ments, for Interest minimization the Treasury should Issue various quanti­
ties of securities to equate the marginal Interest outlays for these 
securities. For any particular new Issue or reissue, there Is a least 
cost combination of securities. Interest minimization does not neces­
sarily Imply Issuing or reissuing a required quantity of debt In the se­
curity which Is currently yielding the lowest rate of Interest, or In 
attempting to equate the average yield of all types of securities. Equat­
ing marginal yields Is compatible with any shape yield to maturity pattern-- 
dependlng on the demand schedule of the various securities. The problem 
which complicates this type of simple analysis Is the fact that debt Inf 
struments, once Issued, normally exist until they mature, and the minimi­
zation of Interest of a particular sale may not be minimization over the 
life of the Issued securities. For Instance, If a quantity of ten year 
bonds are sold at four per cent and three months later the market rate had 
fallen to three per cent. It Is evident that the Interest cost would not 
be minimized over the period. However, If a year later the yield were to 
have risen to five per cent (and remained at that level over the remainder 
of the life of these securities) Interest minimization might have been 
approached over the complete period.
True Interest minimization would require the Treasury not only to 
know the position, elasticities, and cross elasticities of all the demand
Jacob Cohen, "On the Theory and Measurement of Treasury Interest 
Saving," The Southern Economic Journal. Vol. XVII, No. 3 (January, 1951), 
^p$ 257-269.
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schedules at the time of an, issue, but that it also be able to predict all
197changes in these relationships to infinity. Actually, the perspective 
of debt management is a relatively short period. Moreover, the conflict­
ing objectives of debt management are continually being evaluated in re­
sponse to rapidly changing economic conditions. Finally, as Musgrave has 
pointed out, debt management is made even more complex by the fact that
198"debt policy deals with stocks, whereas fiscal policy deals with flows.?
It is obvious that there is no such thing as an "optimum" debt management
policy, especially under conditions of continuing economic change.
The preceding discussion has emphasized the conflicts between
alternative goals of debt management, primarily as seen by the economic
theorist. Now, however, it would be instructive to review; (1) the
stated policy objectives of Treasury debt management, and (2) the success
in achieving these objectives. In the bpief period covered by this study,
the objectives of the Secretary of the Treasury in managing the debt have
199undergone some gradual reordering and some rather sudden shifts.
A Review of Policy Statements 
This review of stated debt policy begins with John W. Snyder 
(Truman--June, 1946-January, 1953) who was Secretary of the Treasury in 
the period of pegging of rates on Federal securities and through the 
Treasury-Federal Reserve System Accord (March, 1951). After the Accord,
197Musgrave, The Theorv of Public Finance, op. cit.. p. 590.
198Ibid.. Underlining added.
199For a detailed review of debt management in the period, see 
Gaines, op. cit.. and Smith, o^. cit.
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the principal goals were strongly influenced by the fear that the interest 
rates on Government securities would increase in a free market situation.
The debt management objectives under Snyder, after the Accord, were listed
as:
...maintenance of the confidence in the credit of the Government;
(2) maintenance of a sound market for the securities of the United 
States Government; (3) restraint during much of the period, of 
overall credit expansion; (4) increase in the ownership of Govern­
ment securities by nonbank investors and reduction in the holdings
of the banking system; (5) adjustment from time to time in the
wartime pattern of interest rates, as this becomes appropriate.^00
The period between the Accord and the change of administration yas
relatively short. Snyder was followed by George M. Humphrey (Eisenhower—
January, 1953-July, 1957). The goals of debt management policy under this
administration were stated as:
The specific objectives are to reduce the volume and maturities 
of bank financing to manageable size and form and to get more 
of the debt into the hands of long-term investors. These objec­
tives will in themselves aid economic stability, and will at the 
same time provide greater freedom of action for the Federal Re­
serve System to perform its necessary public functions in the 
mone^g^y credit field without interference from the Treas-
Humphrey was succeeded by Robert B. Anderson (Eisenhower--July,
1957-January, 1961), who, for all practical purposes, continued the debt
management policies then underway.
As in other years, the Treasury's major debt management objec­
tives were to contribute to the growth and stability of the 
economy and to improve the structure of the debt. Within the 
limits prescribed by these two overriding objectives the Treas­
ury sought to borrow as cheaply as possible.
^^^Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of 
the Finances for 1952. p. 12.
201Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of 
the Finances for 1953. p. 4. Note that Humphrey excludes interest minimi­
zation as a goal.
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Progress toward these debt management objectives requires 
that the Treasury seek funds as largely as possible from non­
bank investors, rather than from commercial banks, in order to 
reduce the inflationary potential of Treasury financing during 
a period of high economic activity. Within the nonbank investor 
grouping the preference is to borrow from true long-term savers 
rather than from short term investors.20%
It should be pointed out that debt management contributing "to the growth
and stability of the economy" evidently does not mean managing the debt
contracyclically because Anderson publicly argued that such a policy "has
203some serious shortcomings."
Douglas Dillon (Kennedy-Johnson— January, 1960 until the end of 
this period of analysis) succeeded Anderson as Secretary of the Treasury 
and the debt management goals were largely unchanged. Dillon listed Treas­
ury debt management goals as:
Despite continuous shifts in the economic environment both at 
home and around the globe, debt management decisions must be 
made in the light of certain fundamental and sometimes con­
flicting objectives.
First, to raise the money required to meet the Government's 
obligations.
Second, to borrow as cheaply as possible, consistent with 
meeting other debt management objectives.
Third, to make sure that the Government carries out its 
borrowing in a way that fosters, rather than inhibits, economic 
stability and sustained growth of the economy.
Fourth, to conduct debt operations in such a way as to try 
to avoid significant international interest rate differentials, 
which can lead to large and disruptive flows of short-term 
funds.
Fifth, to work toward a balanced debt maturity structure, 
in order to facilitate the orderly managing of the debt in
202Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of 
the Finances for I960, p. 27. See, however, footnote 205.
203Honorable Robert B. Anderson, "Financial Policies for Sustain­
able Growth," The Journal of Finance. Vol. XV, No. 2 (May, 1960), pp. 127- 
139. Also see the Treasury answers in: The Federal Reserve and the Trees-
urv; Answers to Questions from the Commission on Money and Credit (Engle­
wood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963).
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future years. This requires maintenance of both a reasonable 
volume of long-term securities and a sufficient supply of 
short-term securities to meet the needs of the economy.
The essential difference between these goals and those of Humphrey and
Anderson Is the fourth polnt--uslng debt management to Influence the
structure of Interest rates. Before the Accord, Snyder had relied on the
Federal Reserve System to maintain the desired rate structure through open
market operations In the Government securities market.
The attempt to Influence the rate structure by putting upward 
pressure on the short-term Interest rate for Government securities Is an 
Important Innovation In debt management. This objective has been referred 
to as "Operation Nudge" or "Operation Twist." This operation Is particu­
larly relevant to the study of the bill rate movement since the procedure 
followed by the Treasury for putting upward pressure on the rate for bills 
has been through Increasing the quantity of bills outstanding.
This new objective for debt management Illustrates the need for 
the Treasury to change the relative Importance of various goals. In the 
period since the Accord, those charged with managing the debt seem to have 
become a bit more aware that the desired objectives are conflicting, and 
changing economic /Conditions will bring about changes In emphasis or 
direction In attempting to properly manage the debt.
This recognition suggests an additional goal of Treasury debt man­
agement that has not been stated explicitly, although It seems Implicit In 
Dillon's fifth point, namely the objective of "flexibility." Flexibility 
means simply the ability to change from the pursuit of one objective to
204Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of 
the Finances for 1961. pp. 13-14.
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some other if changing economic conditions dictate the need. Since the
Treasury does not make a practice of retiring issues by buying their own 
205outstanding debt, flexibility requires that some portion of the debt 
be near maturity--the larger the portion, the greater the flexibility. 
Treasury bills and short-term debt play an important role in providing 
this flexibility. On maturity, bills may be reissued or securities of 
longer term to maturity may be issued in replacement. If there were no 
debt near maturity, and if fiscal policy were not changing the size of the 
debt, there would be nothing to manage.
The concepts and objectives of "appropriate" debt management by 
the Treasury have been discussed. Now it is necessary to examine which 
goals were pursued and the resulting effect of these operations on the 
structure and maturity of the marketable debt, especially the short-term 
and bill portion. ^
Debt Management and the Quantitv of Bills Outstanding 
Generally, the Secretaries of the Treasury have not been very 
successful in attaining their stated goals. A recent evaluation of Treas­
ury debt manàgement by John M. Culbertson is quite typical of economists' 
views.
Debt management policy is in an unhappy state: The Treasury's
bunching of sales of longer-term issues during recession is 
patently procyclical in effect. The term to maturity of the 
government debt moves shorter— except when recession invites 
the Treasury to dump bonds on the market. Cash borrowing
205Advance refunding, a practice initiated in 1959'under Anderson, 
comes near to purchasing outstanding debt in the operational sense, since 
long-term or intermediate length securities are reissued before the exist­
ing security actually matures. Also see the Appendix of The Federal Re­
serve and the Treasury; Answers...» op. cit.
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needs seemingly cannot be met in any way except by issuing 
liquidity instruments. A mountain of bonds approaches matu­
rity and apparently will be replaced by short-term securities.
The debt management policy which economists had hoped to make 
an important force for economic stabilization stands forth as 
worse^^^an impotent; it is procyclical with an inflationary
Many of the criticisms of debt management policy have not been directed at 
the Treasury for pursing the wrong goals, but in pursuing no goals at all. 
The first point of Dillon's debt management policy was "to raise the money 
required to meet the Government's obligations." Although this goal was 
not stated explicitly by the other Secretaries, it is obviously an over­
riding objective and must be attained regardless of the other goals. In 
attempting to meet this objective, the Treasury has done a great deal of 
"tailoring," or selling those securities for which various sectors of the 
economy have illustrated rather strong demand. This policy of expediency 
has resulted in a great variety of types and maturities of Federal debt 
instruments and generally a shortening of the maturity structure of the 
marketable debt. It also indicates that the Treasury has been reluctant 
to make any serious attempts at contracyclical debt management.
Very generally, over the period 1952-1963, the total marketable
Federal debt has increased 45.4 per cent, from $142.7 billion in January,
2071952 to $207.5 billion in December, 1963. In the same period, the
206Culbertson, "A Positive Debt Management Proposal," og. cit., p, 
89. For other critical views of the general success, see; Gaines, op. 
cit.; Friedman, A Program for Monetarv Stability, op. cit.: Smith, o p . 
cit.; and Burton C. Hallowell and Kossuth M. Williamson, "Federal Debt 
Management, 1953-1958," The Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol. XLV, 
No. 1 (February, 1963), pp. 47-54.
207Total marketable debt in 1952 was down from the postwar high 
of $189.6 billion of December, 1946. The quantities of debt in each of 
these classifications, and the percentage calculations are based on end- 
of-month values.
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quantity of U. S. Treasury bills Increased by 184.5 per cent from $18.1 
billion to $51.5 billion; and the portion of marketable debt maturing 
within one year increased by 92.7 per cent from $46.4 billion to $89.4 
billion. Very simply, the quantity of marketable debt within one year 
of maturity increased relative to the total marketable debt, and the 
quantity of Treasury bills increased relative to the portion of debt with­
in one year to maturity. The quantities of debt classified as: total
marketable. Treasury bills, and debt maturing within one year are shown 
as of June 30 each year in Table 17.
Until 1959 the increase in the quantity of Treasury bills was 
closely related to the general increase in the total marketable debt.
The quantity of debt within one year to maturity increased slightly rel­
ative to the total marketable debt, but showed a great deal more vola­
tility than either of the other two classifications. This may be seen 
more clearly in Table 18, with the quantities of bills and the quantities 
of marketable debt maturing within one year expressed as a percentage of 
total marketable debt.
From 1959 the quantity of bills as a percentage of the total 
marketable debt became larger as six-month, nine-month, one-year, and tax
anticipation bills were initiated to replace Certificated of Indebted**
208ness. In late 1959, Treasury bills moved to more than 50 per cent of
208At the end of February, 1959, approximately $38 billion of 
Certificates of Indebtedness were outstanding. This quantity declined to 
$5.5 billion by the end of August, 1961, and has moved rather erraticly 
between $10 billion and $20 billion until the end of 1963. There have 




TABLE 17.--U. S. Government total marketable debt. Treasury bills, and 
marketable debt maturing within one year, June 30, 1952pl964&







1952 140,407 17,219 46,367
1953 147,335 19,707 65,270
1954 150,354 19,515 62,734
1955 155,206 19,514 49,703
1956 154,953 20,808 58,714
1957 155,705 23,420 71,952
1958 166,675 22,406 67,782
1959 178,027 32,017 72,958
1960 183,845 33,415 70,467
1961 187,148 36,723 81,120
1962 196,072 42,036 88,442
1963 203,508 47,230 85,294
1964 206,489 50,740 81,424
^Issues are classified to final maturity except partially tax-
exempt bonds, which are classified to earliest call date.
Sources; Total marketable debt and marketable debt due within
one year are from Table 31, Annual Report of the Secretatv of the Treas­
ury on the State of the Finances for 1963. p. 504, and the 1964 data
from the Treasury Bulletin. Treasury bill data are from various monthly 
issues of thé- Treasury Bulletin.
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TABLE 18.--U. S. Treasury bills as a percentage of total Federal market­
able debt, and as a percentage of marketable debt due within one year,
June 30, 1952-1964»
Year



















^otal marketable debt and marketable debt within one year to 
maturity are classified to final maturity except partially tax-exempt 
bonds, which are classified to earliest call date.
^Percentages are rounded to nearest one-tenth of one percent.
Sources: Calculated--total marketable debt and marketable debt
within one year data were taken from Annual Report of the Secreatrv of 
the Treasury on the State of the Finances, 1963, Table 31, p. 504; bill 
data are from various issues of the Treasury Bulletin.
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the marketable debt within one year of maturity and fluctuated around this 
percentage until early 1963 when bills moved to almost 60 per cent of 
witbin-one-year marketable debt. This increase in bills, along with the 
general increase in the short-term category, was occasioned by the attempt 
by the Treasury to raise short-term rates relative to international short­
term rates and domestic longer-term rates.
The increase in the quantity of bills and in the quantity of 
marketable debt within one year to maturity relative to the total market­
able debt contributed to a general decline in the average length of matu!- 
rity. This shortening occurred even though lengthening was a stated 
objective of the Treasury throughout^ the period. Since the majority of 
bills are in the three-month category, an increase in bills as a percentage 
of the total marketable debt would require relatively large increases in 
quantities of longer-term debt if the average maturity were to remain con­
stant or lengthen.
The maturity distribution of the marketable debt as a percentage
fi
of the total marketable debt at yearly intervals is shown in Table 19.
From these data it is apparent that the erratic downward movement of the 
5 to 10 year category up to June 30, 1958, coupled with the large attri­
tion in the 10 to 20 year category since 1958, has contributed to the de­
crease in the average maturity length. Increases in the average maturity 
have been brought about in the most recent months by some important in­
creases in the portion of the marketable debt having more than 20 years 
before maturity.
The average time to maturity of the marketable debt as of the 
yearly June 30 dates is illustrated in Table 20. The average maturity of
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TABLE 19.— Maturity distribution of U. S. Government marketable debt by 
maturity classes as a percentage of total marketable debt, as of June 30,
1952-1964®
Year




1-5 5-10 10-20° Over 20
1952 . 33.0 34.1 9.9 18.3 4.7
1953 44.3 24.5 10.6 19.5 1.1
1954 41.7 19.9 18.3 19.0 1.1
1955 32.0 25.2 22.1 18.4 2.3
1956 37.9 22.2 18.7 18.4 2.8
1957 46.2 26.1 7.9 17.0 2.8
1958 40.7 25.5 12.9 16.6 4.3
1959 41.0 32.8 9.6 12.1 4.5
1960 38.3 39.6 11.0 6.9 4.2
1961 43.3 31.2 14.1 5.5 5.9
1962 45.1 29.1 13.3 4.8 7.8
1963 41.9 28.5 18.4 4.1 7.1
1964 39.4 31.7 16.9 4.0 7.9
®Due to rounding of the raw data and rounding of the calculations, 
details may not sum to lOO percent.
^TWO classifications of debt, 10 to 15 years to maturity and 15 
to 20 years to maturity, were summed to obtain the category 10 to 20 
years-to maturity.
Sources: Total marketable debt and marketable debt due within
one year are from Table 31, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treas­
ury on the State of the Finances for 1963. p. 504, and the 1964 data 
from the Treasury Bulletin. Treasury bill data are from various monthly 
issues of the Treasury Bulletin.
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TABLE 20.— Average length to maturity of the marketable Federal debt, and 
changes in the average length to maturity from the preceding year, in
months, as of June 30, 1952-1964*




1953 63.8 - 4.6
1954 66.0 + 2.2
' 1955 69.6 + 3.6
1956 64.5 - 5.1
1957 57.3 - 7.2
1958 62.9 + 5.6
1959 55.3 - 7.6
1960 52.3 - 3.0
1961 53.6 + 1.3
1962 58.5 + 4.9
1963 60.9 + 2.4
1964 60.5 - 0.4
^Zsvuas are 
exempt bonds, which
classified to final maturity except partially tax- 
are classified to earliest call date.
Source: Mimeographed by Office of the Secretary of the Treasury, 
Office of Debt Analysis, July, 1965.
the marketable Federal debt declined from 72.1 months in January, 1952,
to 50.4 months (the post-war low) in January, 1960 and again in September.
1960; then lengthened to 60.6 months by December, 1963. From Table 20,
it appears that debt lengthening occurred in periods of recession. From
177
viewing the average length of maturity on a monthly basis relative to 
reference cycle peaks and troughs, the average length increased in each 
"peak to trough" time period. The change in the length of the average 
maturity in the reference cycle periods are shown in Table 21. The aver­
age length to maturity lengthened in each cyclical movement from peak to 
trough and shortened in two of three movements from troughs. This indi­
cates that debt management in these periods was procyclical instead of
1 209 contracyclical.
It is interesting that the only instance of lengthening the average 
maturity of the marketable debt in a period of expansion occurred in the 
period February, 1961 through December, 1963, while the Treasury was 
simultaneously increasing the quantities of Treasury bills and short-term 
securities. This lengthening was possible largely through the expansion 
in the 5 to 10 year and over 20 year time to maturities. It should be 
pointed out, however, that this economic recovery was rather weak and 
characterized by considerable slack.
The average maturity of the marketable debt outstanding from the 
Treasury is shown in Chart 11 for the period January, 1953 through Sep­
tember, 1964. The cyclical changes in the average maturity do not occur 
smoothly, but the general pattern of shortening between troughs is apparent.
A change in the quantities of bills or other short-term securities 
relative to the total marketable debt directly affects the average time to
209For a more detailed argument regarding the procyclical character 
of debt management in the period 1953-1958, see Hallowell and Williamson, 
op. cit. Also, see John M. Culbertson, Full Employment or Stagnation (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1964), pp. 95-100.
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TABLE 2I.--Movement8 of the average maturity of the marketable Federal 
debt, and changes in the average length, as measured from National Bureau 
reference cycle peaks and troughs, 1952-1964. (Maturities and changes in




A. Movements in Average Maturity from Peak to Trough
July, 1953 (peak) 60.6 >
August, 1954 (trough) 65.0 +4.9
July, 1957 (peak) 55.5
April, 1958 (trough) 59.4 +3.9
May, 1960 (peak) 51.3
February, 1961 (trough) 53.7 +2.4
B. Movements in Average Maturity from Trough to Peak
August, 1954 (trough) 65.0
July, 1957 (peak) 55.5 -8.5
April, 1958 (trough) 59.4
May, 1960 (peak) 51.3 -8.1
February, 1961 (trough) 53.7
through December, 1964 60.1 +6.6
Source: For reference cycle peaks and troughs. Appendix A,
Business Cvcle Developments. U. S. Department of Commerce (March, 1964), 
p. 61; for average maturities, see Source of Table 20, and note 1.
month
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Source: Unpublished release from the Office of Debt Analysis, and the Treasury Bulletin,
various monthly issues 1963-1964.
Chart 11.--Average time to maturity of the U. S. Government marketable debt in months, 
1953-1964.
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maturity. However, it does not appear that the cyclical variations In the 
average time to maturity have been caused solely by Increases and decreases 
In the quantity of securities within one year to maturity. The quantity 
of total marketable debt maturing within one year and the quantity of 
Treasury bills outstanding are Illustrated In Ch'rt 12.
Only some very general statements may be made regarding the direct 
effects of short-term financing on the average time to maturity. It 
appears that the Increase In the quantity of within one year marketable 
debt In the 1955-1957 period Is associated with the corresponding decrease 
In the average time to maturity. Also, In the late 1958 through 1959 
period, the large Increase In the quantity of bills appears closely related 
to the decline In the average maturity. Other related movements between 
the average time to maturity and these two classifications of short-term 
debt are obscured by changes In the quantities of other longer-term secu­
rities and the passage of time. Generally, however, the cyclical movements 
In the average time to maturity are not directly associated with changes In 
the quantities of short-term debt since any cyclical movements In these 
quantities are not pronounced, and are much too Irregular for any general 
conclusions.
The quantity of debt within one year to maturity has shown a 
general Increase over the period 1953-1964, but has moved rather errati­
cally within rather narrow llml'ts. The quantity of bills has also shown 
an Increase over the period, but since 1958 the Increase In bill quantities 
has been larger than the Increase In the total quantity of marketable debt 
within one year to maturity. The difference between total debt within one 
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Source: Calculated from information in various monthly issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Chart 12.--Total marketable Federal debt within one year to maturity, and the total quantity 
of Treasury bills outstanding, monthly, 1953-1964.
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difference (marketable debt within one year— excluding Treasury bills) de­
creased from $45.4 billion in June, 1958 to $30.7 billion in June, 1964; 
or from 67.0 per cent to 37.7 per cent of total marketable debt within one 
year to maturity. The pattern of change may be ascertained from Table 18 
and Chart 11. Increases in the quantity of bills should exert upward 
pressure on the bill rate, and in addition, decreases in the quantities 
or bill substitutes should tend to cause the bill rate to rise— assuming 
demand preferences are constant.
However, the quantities of securities issued by the Treasury are 
not necessarily the quantities available to the public to hold because of 
the holdings of Government agencies and trust funds and the Federal Reserve 
System. For short-term marketable securities, holdings by agencies and 
trust funds are not as important as Federal Reserve System holdings. 
Therefore, the holdings of agencies and trust funds will be reviewed very 
briefly, while the holdings of the Federal Reserve System will be examined 
in greater detail.
Government agency and trust fund holdings of bills and other with­
in one year to maturity holdings have shown some volatility over the period 
1952-1963, with a general increase in the quantity held. , Agency and trust 
fund holdings of total marketable debt, within-one-year-to-maturity market­
able debt, and Treasury bills are shown in Table 22 for June 30 dates. 
Government agencies and trust funds also hold large quantities of special 
issues from the Treasury and a smaller quantity of U. S. Governfmht con­
vertible bonds. Total holdings of marketable debt by this sector have in­
creased steadily over the period; and although there has been considerable 
fluctuation in the shorter maturities, the slight increase is apparent.
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TABLE 22.--Government agency and trust fund holdings of United States 
Government marketable debt as: total, within one year to maturity, and






1952 3,030 101 41
1953 3,460 163 106
1954 3,546 107 106
1955 3,723 74 40
1956 4,891 927 273
1957 5,491 1,138 130
1958 6,644 899 173
1959 7,001 930 86
1960 7,776 1,070 371
1961 8, 503 1,671 801
1962 8,991 1, 687 799
1963 11,120 1,849 1,142
1964 12,119 1,822 1,459
Source: Various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Changes in bill holdings by Government agencies and trust funds 
affect the stock of bills available to the public, and therefore the bill 
rate. Assuming a high cross elasticity with respect to interest between 
bills and other Federal securities within one year to maturity, changes in 
short-term holdings of securities other than bills also should affect the 
bill rate. However> as is evident from Table 22, Treasury open market 
operations are small relative to the total quantity of bills outstanding 
and total Federal debt due within one year, therefore the resulting effect 
on the bill rate should not be great.
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On the other hand. Federal Reserve System holdings of short-term 
debt are large relative to total Treasury issues; and furthermore. Treas­
ury bill holdings have fluctuated widely due to the open market activities 
of the System.
Federal Reserve System Open Market Operations and 
the Ouantitv of Bills______ _
The Federal Reserve System maintains a portfolio of U. S. Govern­
ment securities. Through the Federal Reserve System Open Market Account, 
the System executes open market purchases and sales of Government securi­
ties in order to adjust member bank reserves to desired levels. Ceteris 
paribus, open market purchases increase member bank reserves, and open 
market sales reduce the level of reserves, with the money supply changing 
in the same direction as member bank reserves.
In addition to affecting the reserve position of member banks and
the supply of money, open market transactions affect the quantity and the
maturity distribution of U. S. Government securities available for the 
210public to hold. In this sense, open market operations are also debt 
management operations. In the period between March, 1953 and February, 
1961, the System followed the policy of "bills only" in its open market
operations, and even since 1961, the bulk of trading has been in bills.
Open market operations really have a dual effect on the Treasury bill
rate, (1) an immediate change in the rate due to the change in the stock
210Warren L. Smith, "The Instruments of General Monetary Control," 
The National Banking Review. Vol. 1, No. 1 (September, 1963), p. 48. For 
an analysis of the relevance of member bank reserves as the goal of mone­
tary policy, see: Meigs, o^. cit.
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of bills available to the public, and (2) a lagged effect on the bill rate 
due to the change in demand for bills by commercial banks and other holders 
resulting from the change in the money supply. These effects are illus­
trated in Chart 13 for an open market purchase. In the initial time peri­
od, the stock of bills is S^, with the total demand schedule Dq, and the 
equilibrium bill rate at i^. The open market purchases of reduces the
stock of bills available for the public to hold, with the equilibrium bill
211rate falling from i^ to iĵ  due to the stock changes. Then, due to the 
change in the level of member bank reserves— given reserve requirements, 
the level of "free reserves," and the total change in the money supply due 
to the multiple expansion of this transaction after "n" periods— the demand 
to hold Treasury bills should increase. The increase in the total demand 
schedule from to D^, due to the increase in reserves and the money 
supply, causes the equilibrium rate to decline to i^. An open market sale 
would increase the stock immediately and, with a lagged effect, decrease 
the total demand causing the bill rate to increase. In either case, the 
more elastic is the demand schedule, the less change in the bill rate from 
a given change in the bill stock. The degree of the change in demand aris­
ing from an open market operation is probably more influential in causing 
the rate change than the change in the stock.
The change in the stock of bills due to open market operations in 
any monthly period is known, but the change in demand, and the length of
211James Tobin, "Commercial Banks as Creators of Money," Banking 
and Monetarv Studies. Ed, Deane Carson (Homewood, 111.; Richard D. Irwin, 
Inc., 1963), p. 417: "The open-market operations which bring about the 
increased supply of reserves tend to lower interest rates. So do the 






Chart 13.— Effect of an open market purchase by the Federal Open 
Market Committee on the Treasury bill rate.
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time required for the initial change in the money supply to "work itself 
out" through the commercial banking system introduce significant problems 
in attempting to measure empirically either the singular or the combined 
effect on the bill rate. It was argued in Chapter V that changes in demand 
or supply conditions produce instantaneous changes in the bill rate. In 
this case, however, the bill rate is probably influenced by lagged changes 
in demand, the length, of the lag depending on commercial bank reaction to 
changes in their reserve position. Given a Federal Reserve System pur­
chase of bills, the level of free reserves will be immediately increased. 
The effect on the demand for bills then depends on the reaction of the 
member commercial banks to the increase in reserves. Member banks may 
decide to hold the additional reserves idle, pay off indebtedness to the 
Federal Reserve System, buy bills, buy longer term Government securities, 
or make private loans or investments. The distance of the shift in the 
demand to hold Treasury bills depends, therefore, on the increased demand 
to hold bills by commercial banks, and the increased demand for bills by 
other institutional sectors which depends partially on the portion of the 
additional reserves that commercial banks desire to hold idle. Given an 
increase in the money supply the demand for all interest bearing assets 
shifts to the right, but it is obvious that the relative change in the 
demand for different assets depends on a multitude of variables, for in­
stance the phase of the business cycle. The ratio of Government security 
holdings of commercial banks to their adjusted demand deposits tends to 
increase in recessions and to decrease near the peak of a cycle. Other 
sectors, of course, behave differently in their asset preferences over 
the cycle; shifting between long-term and short-term Government securities.
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some shifting between bonds and equities, and some sectors not shifting 
between assets but bolding greater or lesser quantities of preferred 
assets. The demand effects are discussed in the following Chapter. Here 
the effect on the bill rate is being viewed from the supply side--or 
changes in the stock of bills, as the Federal Reserve Open Market Commit­
tee buy and sell bills in the open market.
The Federal Reserve System holdings of total marketable Federal 
debt, marketable debt within one year to maturity, and Treasury bills are 
provided in Table 23 as of June 30, 1952-1964. Holdings of total market­
able debt remains quite constant at between $23 billion and $27 billion 
until 1962 when it began to increase, reaching nearly $35 billion in 1964. 
A very large portion of total holdings of marketable debt is within one 
year of maturity, with the quantity fluctuating between $11 billion and 
$23 billion, showing considerably more volatility than total holdings.
Bill holdings by the Federal Reserve System are not large relative to 
total holdings, and although volatile, show a slight increase, especially 
in the last four or five years.
Table 24 shows Federal Reserve System holdings as a percentage of 
the total marketable debt outstanding for each of the three categories; 
total, within one year, and bills. The relative constancy of total Fed­
eral Reserve System holdings as a percentage of total marketable debt 
outstanding is evident with the values varying between 14.4 per cent and 
16.9 per cent. It is also obvious that the System holds a larger per­
centage of within one year securities than percentages of total marketable 
debt or Treasury bills. Since the quantity of bills is included in both 
of the other categories, it seems that System holdings of marketable debt 
within one year of maturity, other than bills is very large indeed.
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TABLE 23.--Federal Reserve System holdings of United States Government 
marketable debt as: total, within one year to maturity, and bills, as






1952 22,906 11,488 381
1953 24,746 15,505 1,455
1954 25,037 16,280 1,455
1955 23,607 17,405 886
1956 23,758 20,242 885
1957 23,035 20,246 287
1958 25,438 23,010 2,703
1959 26,044 20,687 2,032
1960 26,523 19,385 2,513
1961 27,253 14,677 2,840
1962 29,663 17,197 2,961
1963 32,027 21,490 3,364
1964 34,794 18,029 5,171
Source: Various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
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TABLE 24.““Federal Reserve System holdings of United States Government debt 
as a percentage of that classification issued by the Treasury: total,
within one year, and bills as of June 30, 1952“1964
Percentage that Federal Reserve System holdings are
XCCti.
Total Less than one vear Bills
1952 16.3 24.6 2.2
1953 16.8 23.8 7.4
1954 16.7 26.0 7.5
1955 15.2 35.0 4.5
1956 15.3 34.5 4.3
1957 14.8 28.1 1.2
1958 15.3 33.9 12.1
1959 14.6 28.4 6.3
1960 14.4 27.5 7.5
1961 14.6 18.1 7.7
1962 15.1 19.4 7.0
1963 15.7 25.2 7.1
1964 16.9 22.1 10.2
Source: Tables 17 and 23.
In order to estimate the relative holdings of quantities of within 
one year debt. Treasury bills have been subtracted from total marketable 
debt due in less than one year, and from Federal Reserve System holdings 
of debt due within one year. The results are provided in Table 25. Both 
the total debt within one year excluding bills and Federal Reserve System 
holdings show considerable volatility over the period. Federal Reserve 
System holdings as a percentage of the total also vary, but it is evident 
that System holdings of other“than“bill marketable debt within a year of 
maturity are quite large. The Federal Reserve System held over 50 per
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TABLE 25.— Marketable Federal securities within one year to maturity, 
other than Treasury bills, outstanding from the Treasury and held by the 
Federal Reserve System; and Federal Reserve System holdings of these 
securities as a percentage of total outstanding, June 30, 1952-1964
(in millions of dollars)
Year
Total Marketable Securities 
Within One Year of Maturity, 
Other than Treasurv Bills
Percentage 
of Total 
Held by the 
Federal ReserveOutstanding* Held by t)ie System
1952 28,423 11,107 39.1
1953 44,882 14,053 31.3
1954 40,608 14,825 36.5
1955 30,189 16,519 54.7
1956 37,906 19,387 51.1
1957 47,613 19,959 41.9
1958 45,376 21,307 47.0
1959 40,941 18,655 45.6
1960 35,567 16,872 47.4
1961 42,912 11,937 27.6
1962 44,921 14,236 31.7
1963 38,064 18,126 47.6
1964 30,648 12,858 41.9
Since the Federal Reserve Bulletin data has U. S. Government 
guaranteed marketable debt subtracted out of the totals published in the 
Treasurv Bulletin, the quantities in this category are not directly com­
parable with the values which could be derived from the data in Table 17.
Source: Various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
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cent of this debt in 1955 and 1956, held over 40 per cent from 1957 through 
1960 and again in 1963 and 1964, and has dropped below 30 per cent only 
once over the entire period. In 1961 when the Federal Reserve System 
abandoned the "bills only" policy, holdings declined to 28 per cent of 
the total one year debt (excluding bills) outstanding.
The large System holdings of within one year debt— excluding bills—  
is important in that the System has held a large portion of bill substi­
tutes continuously over the period 1952-1964, Treasury bills in the hands 
of the public, therefore, are considerably more important as a percentage 
of total marketable Federal debt held by the public and marketable debt 
within one year of maturity in the hands of the public than was indicated 
in Table 18, where bills outstanding were viewed as a percentage of total 
and one year debt outstanding.
In Table 26, bills in the hands of the public are compared with 
total "under one year" marketable debt in the hands of the public. The 
percentage of bills in the hands of the public has been below 50 per cent 
on only four out of the 12 June 30 dates over the period, and is in the 
vicinity of 70 per cent in 1963 and 1964. When the percentages in Table 
26 are compared with the corresponding percentages in Table 18, it is 
found that the differences range between seven and 21 points higher for 
the "in hands of the public" percentages. The higher relative importance 
of bills to marketable debt within one year to maturity when viewed as 
quantities in the hands of the public is due to the fact that the Federal 
Reserve System holds such a large portion of non-bill short-term debt.
Not only are Federal Reserve System holdings of non-bill short-term 
debt quantitatively important. System bill holdings occasionally surpass
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TABLE 26.— Marketable debt within one year to maturity and Treasury bills 
in the hands of the public, June 30, 1953-1964. (in millions of dollars)
Year
Marketable debt in the 
hands of the oublie Bills a percentage of 







1953 48,921 18,146 37.1
1954 45,273 17,954 39.7
1955 32,224 18,588 57.7
1956 37,545 19,680 52.4
1957 49,619 23,003 46.4
1958 43,873 19,530 44.5
1959 51,341 29,899 58.2
1960 49,452 30,531 61.7
1961 63,287 33,082 52.3
1962 68,073 38,276 56.2
1963 61,955 42,724 69.0
1964 61,573 44,110 71.6
From the total marketable debt within one year to maturity out­
standing from the Treasury, subtract holdings of Government agencies and 
trust funds and of the Federal Reserve System.
^Bill holdings of agencies and funds and the Federal Reserve System 
are subtracted from total bills outstanding from the Treasury.
Source: Calculated from data in various monthly issues of the
Federal Reserve Bulletin.
212ten per cent of total bills outstanding. However, changes in Federal 
Reserve System bill holdings are probably more important than the actual
212See Table 24.
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levels. The Federal Reserve Open Market Account trades large quantities
of bills contracyclically, and also exercise open market transactions to
adjust for very short-term fluctuations in member bank reserves. These
activities are described by Smith:
In addition to their use to control credit in the interest of 
economic stability and growth, open market operations are carried 
on continuously for the purpose of offsetting the short-run 
effects on member bank reserves resulting from factors outside 
the control of the Federal Reserve--changes in float, currency 
in circulation, gold stock. Treasury and foreign deposits at 
the Reserve Banks, and so on.^13
The Federal Reserve Open Market Account can initiate short-term 
reserve adjustments through direct bill transactions in the open market, 
through execution of repurchase agreements, or by not turning over maturing 
securities. Assuming equivalent quantities, these three methods have equal
t 'impact on the level of member bank reserves, although the effect of the re­
purchase agreement will be reversed upon termination of the agreement. The 
repurchase agreement would probably be used only for day to day changes, 
while direct transactions of run-offs would provide for longer-term or more 
permanent effects. However, run-offs are one-directional; ceteris paribus. 
if the System allows securities to run-off, the effect would be to in­
crease the stock of securities available to the public. Assuming these 
operations were in the form of Treasury bills, the resulting increase in 
the stock of bills available to the public is identical for equivalent 
quantities of open market sales, sales of repurchase agreements, or the 
failure to renew maturing securities. Conversly, equivalent decreases in 
the stock of bills available to the public may be accomplished by an equal 
amount of open market bill purchases, or purchases of repurchase agreements.
213Smith, "The Instruments of General Monetary Control," ogi. cit..
p. 48.
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The quantity of Federal Reserve System bill holdings on a monthly
basis are available for the complete period in the Federal Reserve Bulletin
214presentation of the Treasury Department "Survey of Ownership." Reported 
holdings of bills are inclusive of repurchase agreements, therefore the 
monthly first differences would measure net changes in bill holdings 
brought about by total monthly outright purchases and sales of bills, net 
repurchase agreements of bills, and bill redemptions. Federal Reserve 
System monthly bill holdings are shown in Table 27 for the period 1953- 
1964.'»
The cyclical movements of System bill holdings are apparent as the 
quantities held in recessions are relatively high, while in periods of 
prosperity holdings are relatively low. Some upward trend is apparent, 
especially in the last few years.
However, it should be stressed that the monthly changes in System 
holdings do not occur smoothly during the month, but fluctuate both in 
direction of change and in magnitude over very short time periods. Clearly 
it would be desirable to know more about the timing and the magnitude of 
System transactions, but data on a within-month basis are not available.
It is also evident that problems of specification occur when an attempt is
214The Treasurv Bulletin combines the holdings of the System with 
Federal agencies and trust funds, whereas the Federal Reserve Bulletin 
reports the holdings separately.
215These data are not directly comparable with the reported changes 
in holdings of bills in the "Transactions of the System. Open Market 
Account" included in the Federal Reserve System Annual Report. Calculated 
changes in bill holdings from the two sources would differ by repurchase 
agreements in bills. Repurchase agreements are listed as a separate 
category in the Annual Report of the System, but are not subdivided by 
type of security.
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TABLE 27.— Federal Reserve System holdings of Treasury bills, monthly
1953-1964. (in millions of dollars)
Month 1953 1954 1955 1956
January 652 1,918 1,160 578
February 584 1,788 883 543
March 515 1,911 891 734
April 589 1,911 886 403
May 830 2,091 941 538
June 1,455 1,455 886 855
July 1,672 2,993 1,261 550
August 1,772 1,302 1,039 947
September 1,943 1, 549 1,104 742
October 2,056 1, 660 1,303 850
November 2,319 2,167 1,278 1,415
December 2,993 2, 204 1,722 1,918
Month 1957 1958 1959 1960
January 532 595 1,661 1,463
February 143 504 1,323 1,199
March 319 893 1,496 1,263
April 434 946 1,670 1,557
May 353 1,426 1,904 2,019
June 287 2,703 2,032 2,513
July 344 1,569 2,475 2,879
August 801 1,345 2,666 2,753
September 577 985 2,562 2,978
October 574 1,401 2,601 3,212
November 814 2,095 2,894 3,172
December 1,220 2,248 2,626 3,217
Month 1961 1962 1963 1964
January 2,524 3,032 2,262 3,312
February 2,596 2,830 2,542 3,728
March 2,327 3,105 2,583 4,295
April 2,483 3,152 2,664 3,626
May 2,652 3,167 2,721 4,642
June 2,840 2,961 3,364 5,171
July 2,443 2,834 3,600 5,388
August 2,659 3,079 3,175 5,112
September 2,970 2,373 3,320 5,067
October 3,242 2,516 3,504 5,353
November 3,742 2,445 4,199 " - 6,419
December 3,349 2,723 4,146 6,487
Source; Various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
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made to correlate the average monthly bill rate with the stock of bills 
available to the public at the end of a monthly period. The timing of 
quantity changes during the period could be such as to indicate no change 
between two month-end periods when significant trading took place between 
month-ends. Whether or not very short-term fluctuations in bill holdings 
by the System indicate flow or stock goals is still questionable.
Subtracting end-of-month System bill holdings and Federal agency 
and trust fund holdings from the total quantity outstanding from the Treas­
ury provides the quantity of bills available to the public to hold.
The Quantity of Bills Available to the Public 
The quantity of bills available to the public is the result of the 
decisions of the Treasury in managing the Federal debt, and of the Treas­
ury "and Federal Reserve System in carrying out their respective open market
operations. Table 28 presents the stock of bills in the hands of the
216public, monthly, 1953-1964. These values will be used in the regression 
equation estimates in the following Chapter.
The movement in the quantity of bills in the hands of the public 
over the cycle is illustrated in Chart 14, with the quantities for the 
three cycles centered at the National Bureau of Economic Research cyclical 
troughs, covering the 18 months preceding and following the trough. This 
has been done in order to compare bill quantity movements with the bill 
rate movements shown above in Chart 2. Generally the rate movements over
216These bill quantities have been published in this form since 
1962 in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Prior data have been calculated by 
subtraction from total bills.
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TABLE 28.— Treasury bills in the hands of the public, monthly, 1953-1964
(in millions of dollars)
Month 1953 1954 1955 1956
January 2p,851 17,421 18,243 21,210
February 20,959 17,573 18,559 22,279
March 18,509 19,013 18,561 19,713
April 18,593 20,015 18,556 20,104
May 18,927 19, 589 18,538 19,965
June 18,146 17,954 18,588 19,680
July 18,451 16,417 18,649 20,020
August 18,380 18,170 19,242 19,682
September 17,481 17,918 19,667 19,889
October 17,360 17,787 19,397 21,328
November 17,089 17,279 19,215 22,937
December 16,416 17,251 20,253 23,119
Month 1957 1958 1959 1960
January 24,449 26,335 28,591 39,167
February 25,425 25,402 30,304 39,597
March 24,758 21,887 30,540 35,451
April 24,703 21,148 32,472 35,284
May 26,299 20,654 32,962 34,962
June 23,003 19,530 29,899 30,531
July 25,973 20,653 34,368 32,974
August 27,265 20,932 35,807 33,047
September 25,934 21,564 34,445 32,958
October 25,874 24,404 36,380 35,563
November 25,709 26,959 35,930 35,602
December 25,507 27,378 36,757 35,638
Month 1961 1962 1963 1964
January 36,572 39,988 45,642 47,686
February 36,672 40,550 46,232 48,352
March 33,856 38,848 44,718 46,974
April 34,885 39,318 45,718 46,443
May 34,954 39,661 45,817 46,318
June 33,082 38,276 42,724 44,110
July 37,663 39,001 42,676 44,569
August 37,629 39,863 43,074 45,722
September 38,338 39,258 43,975 47,058
October 38,645 42,700 45,252 48,607
November 38,935 44,348 45,074 48,803
December 39,512 44,662 46,027 48,682












-6 Trough +6-18 -12 +12 +18
months preceding months following
Chart 14.--Quantity of bills in the hands of the public in three 
cycles with the troughs centered, and quantities measured 18 months pre­
ceding and following.
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the cycle are in the same direction as the quantity movements--the direc­
tion indicated by the simple model of Chapter V. In the following Chapter 
the bill rate will be regressed on the quantity of bills in the hands of 
the public.
For some of the multiple regressions in the following Chapter, the 
quantity of marketable Federal debt, other than Treasury bills, in the 
hands of the public and within one year of maturity will be used as an 
independent variable. Table 29 provides the monthly quantities of non­
bill marketable securities having less than one year to maturity. These 
securities have been considered close substitutes for bills, and possibly 
changes in the quantities of non-bill debt within one year to maturity 
affect the bill rate. The values in Table 29 are available only from 1953, 
whereas the bill quantities were available from 1952. Prior to 1953, 
within-one-year securities were classified to first call instead of final 
maturity. Changes in these monthly values are seen to be more volatile 
than monthly changes in Treasury bills, and there appears to be some sea­
sonality to the movement. Since August, 1962, the quantity of non-bill 
marketable debt due within one year in the hands of the public has de­
clined by $20 billion, whereas over the same period the quantity of bills 
in the hands of the public increased by approximately $10 billion.
Summary
The quantity of Treasury bills available to the public is depend­
ent on Treasury debt management decisions, and Treasury and Federal Re­
serve System open market operations. Over the period 1952-1964, the 
quantity of bills in the hands of the public has increased markedly while 
the quantity of non-bill debt due within one year showed no strong trend 
until a rather sharp decline in the period since mid 1962.
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TABLE 29.— Federal marketable securities, other than bills, having less 
than one year to maturity, monthly, 1953-1964. (in millions of dollars)
Month 1953 1954 1955 1956
January 21,680 39,812 26,054 19,330
February 20,928 30,253 15,852 18,189
March 25,355 29,379 15,838 17,616
April 25,356  ̂ 29,964 19,047 17,562
May 25,217 27,368 16,848 22,591
June 30,775 27,319 13,636 17,865
July 36,666 28,065 15,622 13,885
August 36,554 17,020 19,675 23,935
September 33,254 26,911 19,668 22,925
October 33,276 26,929 22,681 23,038
November 33,297 29,524 22,440 22,534
December 39,672 26,091 19,214 22,397
Month 1957 1958 1959 1960
January 22,500 26,401 23,567 22,017
February 20,959 27,782 20,098 18,929
March 20,969 28,158 16,628 19,260
April 21,456 27,856 16,678 19,376
May 19,715 31,721 21,420 17,976
June 26,616 24,343 21,442 17,996
July 27,291 24,238 21,324 18,004
August 23,544 25,853 19,710 18,191
September 24,461 24,020 19,749 20,339
October 24,203 24,003 19,922 20,267
November 24,071 24,961 21,977 21,308
December 26,198 23,522 22,008 21,487
Month 1961 1962 1963 1964
January 21,609 26,089 23,290 17,114
February 24,127 29,058 23,208 16,213
March 23,847 28,995 17,338 16,201
April 25,441 29,445 17,203 16,195
May 26,784 30,335 19,232 17,462
June 30,205 29,797 19,231 17,463
July 30,028 29,688 19, 201 12,913
August 26,935 34,331 22,087 13,997
September 26,813 26,789 18,321 13,997
October 27,315 26,580 18,304 13,826
November 24,178 23,512 18,954 16,685
December 26,014 23,290 18,952 16,650
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, various monthly issues.
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The Treasury has followed no consistent debt management policy 
over this period, and due to the pressures of financing new debt and re­
financing maturing debt, has been guided by the Important objective of 
raising the money to meet the needs of the Government at low Interest 
cost, while slighting other objectives such as an "optimum" maturity struc­
ture or contracycllcal management. However, the recent goal of raising
short-term Interest rates on Federal securities, or Operation Twist, seems
216to have been rather successful.
The Federal Reserve System, through open market operations. Is 
Important on two separate accounts. First, the policy of "bllls-only" In 
the period 1953-1961 has caused cyclical movements In the quantity of bills 
available to the public, and even since 1961 open market transactions In 
bills have remained relatively large. Second, the System is a very large 
holder of Federal marketable short-term debt other than bills, and has 
acted to reduce the quantity of blll-substltutes available to the public.
Whether or not the behavioral goals of the Treasury and the System 
are framed In terms of stocks or flows Is uncertain. However, since the 
available data are end-of-month values, and since expressing the variables 
as successive differences does not necessarily measure flows, the stock 
relations are those which will be estimated In Chapter VII.
The determination of the stock of bills has been discussed at some 
length. Now the stock of bills, the stock of other wlthln-one-year market­
able debt, and the transactions of the Federal Reserve System presented In 
this Chapter will be used as Independent variables In attempting to measure 
the movements of the bill rate discussed In relation to the simple demand 
model of Chapter V.
216Harry G. Johnson, "Major Issues In Monetary and Fiscal Policies,"
op. cit., pp. 1409-1410,
CHAPTER VII
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE BILL RATE 
AND THE STOCK OF BILLS
Introduction
The last several chapters have described the dependence of the 
Treasury bill rate on the stock of bills and the reserve (or total) demand 
schedule. At this point it is necessary to state more specifically the 
relationships already discussed in order to attempt to make some meaning­
ful empirical estimates of the slope and position of the total demand 
schedule. Since the stock of bills has been defined as perfectly interest 
inelastic, movements in the stock of bills over successive time periods 
would trace out the demand schedule, if there were no change in demand 
(or any other relevant variable).
A stable demand schedule with changing stocks is illustrated in 
217Chart 15-A. The observed bill rates and the corresponding stock values 
identify the demand schedule. The B portion of Chart 15 illustrates the
217This figure simply restates the problems discussed in: E. J.
Working, "What Do Statistical Demand Curves Show?" Reprinted in American 
Economic Association Readings in Price Theory (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 1952), pp. 97-115. Also see: Lloyd A. Metzler, "The Assumptions
Implied in Least Squares Demand Techniques," The Review of Economic Sta­




(A) stable demand schedule and changing stocks
0
(B) stable stock and shifting demand schedule
2,3
0
(C) changing stock and shifting demand schedule
Chart 15»"■‘Hypothetical reserve demands schedules and stocks.
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situation of a constant stock of bills and changing demand, with the Inter­
sections of the demand schedules with the constant stock providing rate 
observations along the stock. This approach, however, does not provide 
any Information regarding the shape of the demand schedule. The C part of 
the Illustration Indicates the most likely situation, that Is, when there 
are changes In both the stock and the demand schedule. In correlating the 
bill rate with the stock, the degree of success In measuring the demand 
schedule depends. In part, on the stability of the schedule. The stability 
of the demand schedule, of course. Is dependent on the reactions of a
diverse group of holders (or potential holders) to changes In all other
218relevant economic variables. A change In a particular variable probably
will not be equally Important to each sector— or even to Individual units
making up a single sector— or to the same sector at different points In
time. However, since It has been argued that It Is reasonable to think In
terms of "the demand for Treasury bills," It seems reasonable also to
219attempt to measure the total demand schedule.
There are both statistical and economic difficulties Involved In
measuring the demand schedule, and these should be stated as specifically
as possible at the outset.
(1) Changes In the stock of bills do not occur randomly In direc­
tion and magnitude as Indicated In Chart 15-A. Instead, as pointed out 
earlier, when a decision Is made to Increase the quantity of bills
218Demand by the most Important economic sectors Is discussed In 
the following Chapter.
219Disaggregation may Indeed offer Important Insights relative to 
the demand schedule, but too much disaggregation may reduce the problem to 
an uninteresting maze. >
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outstanding from the Treasury, small weekly increases are usually stretched 
out over a period of 13 or 26 weeks. Also, Federal Open Market Committee 
contracycllcal transactions are generally in the same direction for a 
period of several months. During the period 1952-1964, a significant up­
ward trend in the quantity of bills is apparent. The definite upward 
trend on the quantity of bills indicates that autocorrelation of residuals 
may present a problem if the quantity is used as an independent variable 
in explaining the bill rate.
(2) The bill rate is sensitive to many macroeconomic variables,
which are not measured on a monthly basis (gross national product, flow
of funds, etc.). Although many different variables affect the bill rate,
the position taken here is one provided by Fellner and Somers, that:
...in a multidimensional system there are a great many factors 
that affect the interest rate. However, in anv system, these 
factors can affect the market rate of interest only through 
their effect on the demand and supply of interest-bearing 
securities.220
Therefore, even with a permanent bill stock, changes in the bill rate would 
be expected to occur frequently due to demand shifts. Since the demand 
schedule does change, a problem arises as to the period over which it 
should be measured. The complete period 1952-1964 is surely too long.
On the other hand, a period of 12 months may be too short (or too long).
The statistical problem of degrees of freedom enters if multiple regression 
is attempted for a period as short as 12 months. Also, the bill rate is 
closely related to other interest rates and all rates move in the same 
direction cyclically, along with many other macroeconomic variables.
220William Fellner and Harold M. Somers, "Stock and Flow Analysis: 
Comment," Econometrics. Vol. 18, No. 2 (April, 1950), p. 244.
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Moreover, even if the relevant variables remained constant, changing ex-
221pectations could cause movements in the bill rate. Generally, the sta­
tistical problems here are those of specification (the inclusion of all 
relevant variables in the proper functional form), and multicollinearitv 
(the high degree of interrelationship among the "independent" variables).
(3) A priori information regarding the form of the relationships 
(linear, logarithmic, etc.) between the bill rate and other variables is 
generally not available. Therefore, attempts to determine the proper 
form of the relationships will be conducted on a trial and error basis.
This requires subjectively evaluating various forms of regression equations 
on the basis of both economic and statistical criteria. A considerable 
amount of a priori information of a qualitative sort was developed in the 
earlier chapters in the description of the market, its participants, and 
the cyclical and seasonal movements of the rate. This information will 
be used in considering the observations for certain time periods for ex­
clusion from the regression estimates. Of course, the subjective elimina­
tion of data makes much of the statistical inference from regression 
analysis meaningless; but as Fisher points out:
Faced with choosing between a procedure which yields, at best, 
precise results of little or no meaning and one which yields 
meaningful results of little or no precision, it seems clear 
that the latter alternative represents the more hopeful course.
Additional extraneous information is available from some recent empirical
estimates which have included the bill rate as a dependent variable. A
few of the more relevant studies are reviewed below.
221See the discussion of the term structure of interest rates above
in Chapter IV. 
222Franklin M. Fisher, op. cit.. pp. 21-22,
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(4) Although It is expected that autocorrelation of residuals 
may violate the statistical assumptions of the classical regression model, 
a thorough analysis can be made only after the regression equations are 
calculated. Analysis of the residuals Is necessary for evaluating the 
bias and efficiency of the estimates of the regression coefficients, the 
standard errors, and the coefficients of partial and multiple determina­
tion. Knowledge of the behavior of the residuals In the various empirical 
equations also provide additional extraneous Information that Is helpful 
In fitting further regression equations.
(5) Finally, evaluating the results of the fitted regression 
equations In meaningful economic terms requires blending the Information 
gathered In the descriptive, theoretical, and statistical discussions.
This Chapter considers the above problems In greater detail, 
beginning with a survey of some recent empirical relationships. This Is 
followed by a statement of the theoretically expected results. Finally, 
there Is presented a discussion of the results and an evaluation of the 
fitted regression equations.
A Survey of Some Recent Empirical Estimates
Recently there have been several regression analysis studies using 
the Treasury bill rate, an Index of rates on Federal securities, or some
other short-term United States government marketable security rate as the
223 224dependent variable. The studies by Brown, Robert Haney Scott,
223William H. Brown, Jr., "Seasonal Variations In Interest Rates," 
Tested Knowledge of Business Cycles. 42nd Annual Report of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 1962, p. 82; and "Seasonal Variations In 
Interest Rates," The Uses of Economic Research. 43rd Annual Report of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, pp. 79-81, 1963.
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225 226Turvey, and Okun are particularly interesting and relevant, and
therefore, will be briefly discussed.
Brown's results have not been published in full, but preliminary
reports on his investigation of seasonal variations in interest rates
have indicated that "the primary cause of the seasonal in the short-term
227market is the seasonal imbalance in Treasury receipts," which is, pre­
sumably, brought about by the variations in the short-term debt outstand­
ing from the Treasury. Brown's list of possible explanatory variables 
indicates that probably both the demand for, as well as the supply of 
bills are being investigated.
Scott, in his empirical study, attempts to explain the bill rate, 
the rate on Federal marketable securities maturing in ten or more years, 
and debits to demand deposits, monthly from 1952 through 1959. His 
attempts to explain the bill rate utilize the following independent vari­
ables: debits to demand deposits at 337 reporting centers; change in net
free reserves; currency outside of banks and demand deposits; time deposits; 
total Federal securities in the hands of the public; and average maturity 
of the marketable debt. Scott's multiple linear regressions, using levels 
of the variables, provide coefficients of multiple determination of
224Robert Haney Scott, "An Empirical Look at Debt Management," 1961 
Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section of the American 
Statistical Association, pp. 130-137, and "Liquidity and the Term Structure 
of Interest Rates," The QuarterIv Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXIX, No. 1 
(February, 1965), pp. 135-145.
225Ralph Turvey, Interest Rates and Asset Prices, op. cit.
226Arthur M. Okun, "Monetary Policy, Debt Management and Interest 
Rates," 0£. cit., pp. 331-380.
227Brown, 43rd Annual Report, op. cit., p. 80.
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between'.70 to .83, with the theoretically expected signs. Another inter­
esting series of regressions were calculated using the difference between 
the bill rate and the "over 10 year rate" (r^g - r^) as the dependent 
variable. Scott's principal concern was in measuring the effect on the 
dependent variables relative to changes in the average time to maturity 
of the marketable debt. An important conclusion, supported by his 
empirical estimates, is that Treasury debt management policies are re­
sponsive to changes in the levels of the macroeconomic variables, and in 
a footnote he states, "no longer can the behavior of those in charge of
policy be treated as an exogenous force since they pursue certain policies
228on the basis of other relevant economic magnitudes." If this conclusion
is correct, the "exogenously" determined stock of bills in Chart 10 of the
analysis above may. not be perfectly inelastic relative to the bill rate.
Although Scott cautions readers that classical least squares probably will
229yield biased estimates, he provides no analysis of residuals.
Turvey uses as a dependent variable a weighted mean of interest
rates on the following Federal marketable securities; Treasury bill, 9-12
month, 3-5 year, and long-term issues, with weights roughly comparable to
230the maturity structure of public holdings. His independent variables 
comprise: total Federal obligations and guaranteed debt; money and savings
228Scott, "An Empirical Look at Debt Management," og. cit., p. 133.
229However, he does fit one small system of simultaneous equations 
in an attempt to obtain an unbiased explanation of the average time to 
maturity.
230Turvey, op. cit.: these comments and those following are de­
tailed in his Chapter VI, pp. 60-78.
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bonds less bank loans; the monetary sector's holdings of long-term debt;
a rate on time deposits; national Income; the Implicit price Index; and
turnover of bank deposits. Year-end quarterly values from 1945-1951, and
all quarterly values from 1952-1957 were the basis of the observations.
The general hypotheses, later supported by regression equations having
high coefficients of multiple determination, were listed as:
...the average yield of Federal obligations...ceteris paribus «
...will be: (a) lowered by an Increase In the sum of the
quantity of money and the amount of savings bonds less the amount 
of bank loans outstanding; (b) raised by an Increase In the 
quantity of Federal obligations outstanding; (c) lowered by an 
Increase In the monetary sector's holding of long-term debt, 
since such an Increase would lower Interest rates on long-term 
debts and these are substitutes for Federal obligations; (d) 
raised by an Increase In the Interest rates paid on time 
deposits, postal savings deposits and savings bonds and charged 
on bank loans; (e) either raised or lowered by an Increase In 
the Income from real assets, the assumptions made do not enable 
us to say which; (f) raised by an Increase In the national In­
come, given the Income from real assets.^31
Turvey then lists four possible cuases for shifts In demand: (1) change
In expectations, (2) development of new forms of debt, (3) alternation of
the maturity structure of the Federal debt or other changes In the quality
232of Federal obligations, and (4) change In the tax structure.
His regression equations, using various combinations of the Inde­
pendent variables expressed as levels or as ratios, have the proper 
algebraic signs In almost every case, with coefficients of multiple deter­
mination between .92 and .96. Turvey has presented these results as an 
example of his theoretical propositions. There Is no statistical analysis 
of residuals or multlcolllnearlty, which makes an evaluation of the results 
difficult.




Okun's study, like that of Turvey, uses a quarterly time period
233and similar independent variables. Okun uses alternatively the bill 
rate and a long-term Government bond rate as dependent variables. Without 
describing the independent variables in detail, they include, generally; 
various measures of the money supply; the quantity of marketable debt in 
the hands of the public divided into within one year, one to five years, 
and more than five years maturity categories; the average time to maturity 
of these instruments (which was excluded from most of his bill rate esti­
mates due to poor fits); modified gross national product; and net private 
wealth. Okun's estimates also make use of quarterly dummy seasonal vari­
ables which indicated the presence of quarterly seasonality in the bill 
rate. The coefficients of multiple determination range from .80 to over 
.90. Although he presents no extensive statistical analysis of his results, 
he does point out that there is a high degree of autocorrelation of resi­
duals, and specifically qualifies his empirical results. The results of 
his multiple regression equations are refined by the introduction of his 
estimated "potential" gross national product. The application of his re­
sults to monetary and debt management policy in the period 1946-1959 
illustrate the importance and need for even the roughest type of empirical 
estimation.
All four of these studies include some type of variable measuring 
the stock of debt, with Turvey using the most inclusive measure— Federal 
obligations outstanding including guaranteed debt. Scott, on the other 
hand, uses total Federal debt held by the public; Okun divides the market­
able debt in the hands of the public into three maturity categories; and
(D£. cit.
233Okun, "Monetary Policy, Debt Management and Interest Rates,"
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Brown apparently is utilizing short-term marketable debt and Treasury 
bills (both outstanding and in the hands of the public). Also, the money 
supply, in one form or another, is a common variable. In addition. Brown 
evidently is experimenting with ownership data for the Federal Reserve 
System and commercial banks. Okun and Turvey, using quarterly time periods, 
include a measure of gross national product in their lists of independent 
variables. .- -
The use of monthly time periods prohibits the employment of gross 
national product since it is only estimated quarterly. Because of this
problem, several important studies have been excluded from this brief re-
I 23^ 233 236view. The studies by Latane, Bronfenbrenner and Mayer, Stedry,
237Christ, and others who have measured forms of the liquidity preference 
function using the money supply, gross national product, or a combination 
of these variables forming income velocity, are therefore not discussed.
234 , ..Henry A. Latane, "Cash Balances and the Interest Rate— A
Pragmatic Result," Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol. XXXVI, No. 4
(November, 1954), pp. 456-460.
235Martin Bronfenbrenner and Thomas Mayer, "Liquidity Functions 
in the American Economy," Econometrica. Vol. XXVIII, No. 4 (October, 1960), 
pp. 810-834.
236Andrew C. Stedry, "A Note on Interest Rates and the Demand for 
Money," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. XLI, No. 3 (August, 1959), 
pp. 303-307.
237Carl F. Christ, "Interest Rates and 'Portfolio' Selection Among
Liquid Assets in the U. S.," (Ed.) Christ, Measurement in Economics,
Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics in Memorv of Yehuda 
Grunfeld (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), pp. 201-218.
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A Discussion of Independent Variables and 
Their Expected Effect on the Bill Rate
The monthly average of daily closing rates on Treasury bills is 
the dependent variable throughout the following regression calculations.
It has been argued that the bill rate is dependent on the demand for bills 
to hold and the bill stock. In this Chapter, emphasis is placed on the 
relationship between the bill rate and the stock of bills; therefore, 
those factors causing the demand schedule to shift will be treated rather 
lightly. The principal reason for proceeding in this fashion is to gain 
some insight into the degree of flexibility of the reserve demand schedule 
(the schedule defined above in Chapter V). If the demand schedule is rela­
tively stable, a large portion of the variation in the bill rate should be
r
explained by changes in the stock of bills. Conversely, if the relation­
ship between the bill rate and the stock of bills is of a low degree, then 
it is necessary to seek the causes of bill rate movements on the demand 
side.
It would be naive indeed, to postulate the determinants of the 
bill rate as a single variable, for instance the stock of bills. It has 
been shown that the bill rate is closely related to the interest rate 
yielded on most other securities in the economy. In fact, it may be 
found that an attempt to explain the movements in the bill rate on a 
monthly basis with simple demand and stock variables is not possible, and 
the explanation should be explored on a higher (or lower) level of aggre­
gation.
In order to avoid spurious relationships between the bill rate and 
the stock of bills, other independent variables will be included in the 
regression estimates in order to view the relationship between the bill
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rate and the bill stock when the other variables are "held constant" in 
the multiple regression sense (which corresponds roughly with the assump­
tion, in theoretical propositions, of ceteris paribus).
According to the framework of Chapter V, the bill rate should be 
positively related to the stock of bills; or, ceteris paribus, changes in 
the bill rate should be in the same direction as changes in the quantity 
of bills. Assuming the demand schedule remains constant, other debt 
variables also are expected to influence the bill rate. In Table 30, debt 
variables are listed with the expected direction of effect on the bill 
rate, positive (increase in the variable increases the rate, decreases in 
the variable decreases the rate), or negatively (increases in the variable 
decreases the rate, decreases in the variable increases the rate).
Symbpls, which will be utilized in reporting the regression results, are 
indicated with the independent variables.
Independent variables which are expected to cause the bill rate 
to change in the same direction include: the quantity of bills and the
quantity of non-bill Federal marketable debt within one year to maturity 
(whether or not agency and trust fund holdings and Federal Reserve System 
holdings are included), and the average maturity of the marketable Fed­
eral debt outstanding. Since non-bill marketable debt within one year to 
maturity is viewed as a close, although not a perfect, substitute for 
bills, an increase in the quantity of non-bill debt due within one year is 
expected to cause the bill rate to increase— assuming the bill stock re­
mains constant. However, if the Treasury debt management operation is in 
the form of a "swap," an equal amount of non-bill debt within one year of 
maturity for bills (or vice-versa), the reaction of the bill rate would be
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TABLE 30.--Independent debt variables and the expected direction of asso­
ciation with the bill rate
Direction of effect on
Symbol Variable bill rate. (+) positive.
(-) negative
Qb quantity of bills Issued by the Treas­ury less agency and trust fund holdings +
Qi quantity of non-bill Federal marketable debt within one year to maturity Issued 
by the Treasury +
Q total quantity of Federal marketable 
debt within one year to maturity (Q^ 
+ Qi) +
S Federal agency and trust fund holdings of bills -
Sb Federal Reserve System holdings of bills -
% quantity of bills In the hands of the public (Qj, - Ab - Sy) +
qi quantity of non-bill Federal marketable debt within one year to maturity In the 
hands of the public (Q^ - A^ - S^) +
m average time to maturity of the market­
able Federal debt Issued by the Treasury —
expected to; (a) Increase slightly If the swap Increases the quantity of 
bills, or (b) decrease slightly If the swap decreases the bill stock. The 
average maturity of the Federal marketable debt Is not truly an Independ­
ent variable since Its value depends on the relative quantities of securi­
ties In each maturity category and the passage of time. Holding other 
quantities of Federal debt constant, an Increase In the quantity of bills 
would reduce the average maturity value. If no Treasury debt management 
operations took place within a one-month period, the average maturity
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would decrease by one month. Okun, above, utilized the average maturity 
of Federal marketable debt to smooth out the effect of blocs of securities 
falling into shorter-term maturity categories due to the passage of time.
A more appropriate variable for purposes here would be the average maturity 
of the "over one year to maturity" Federal marketable debt in the hands of 
the public. Such a variâble, however, would be difficult to construct.
Variables whose direction of change would cause the bill rate to 
move in the opposite direction are; Federal Reserve System holdings of 
bills and Federal agency and trust fund holdings. Increases in these vari­
ables are viewed as decreasing the stock of bills available to the public. 
Therefore, an increase in bill holdings by either of these sectors is 
expected to cause the bill rate to decrease (a decrease in bill holdings 
by the sectors--increase in the bill rate). Regression equations are fit 
using System holdings as a separate independent variable, and using the 
quantity of bills issued by the Treasury less System and trust fund hold­
ings. Federal agency and trust fund holdings are not included in any of 
the regressions as an independent variable, but are always subtracted from 
the quantity of bills issued by the Treasury. The estimated value of the 
regression coefficient for quantity changes in the stock of bills should 
be relatively small, but it should be expected that the regression coef­
ficient for the quantity of bills will be near in value to the regression 
coefficient for the bill holdings by the Federal Reserve System. If 
changes in System holdings operate to change the demand for bills within 
the monthly time period, the coefficient for System holdings may be 
slightly larger than the coefficient for the bill stock.
In addition to the debt variables on the supply side, some aggre­
gate measures from the demand side are included in some of the regression
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estimates. Federal Reserve System bill holdings lagged one period are 
included with current System holdings, on the assumption that System 
transactions in the last monthly period would affect demand for bills in 
the current period. Decreased holdings last period would be expected to 
increase the private sector's demand for bills in the current period 
causing a downward effect on the-bill. rate. Decreases in demand are ex­
pected to have an upward effect on the bill rate. In addition to System 
holdings lagged one period, the selected demand variables and the expected 
positive or negative association with the bill rate are included in 
Table 31.
TABLE 31.— Selected independent aggregate demand variables and the expected 
direction of association -with the bill rate
Symbol Variable
Direction of effect on 
bill rate, (+) positive, 
(-) negative
R free reserves of member commercial 
banks (R^ + R^) -
^1 free reserves of New York, Chicago, and Reserve City banks -
^c free reserves of country banks -
D demand deposits -
DT time deposits -
T Treasury deposits in commercial h*iks + or -
Free reserves of member commercial banks (required reserves less 
borrowing from the Federal Reserve System) provide an indication of the 
ability of the commercial banking sector to increase holdings of bills, 
and reflect general monetary policy and macroeconomic conditions. However,
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free reserves are automatically reduced, ceteris paribus, with bill pur­
chases by commercial banks. The bill rate and the level of free reserves 
are inversely related, but the directness (and direction) of causation is 
not clear. Meigs, for example, states:
The evidence considered here indicates that the desired free- 
reserve ratio of the member banks is functionally related to mar­
ket interest rates. The scatter diagrams with annual data and 
all of the regressions with monthly data suggest that market 
interest rates— the Treasury bill rate in particular— have a 
strong influence upon the free-reserve ratio....
An alternative hypothesis...would attribute the observed 
correlations not to be influence of interest rates upon the 
desired free reserve ratios of banks but instead to the in­
fluence of free-reserve ratios upon interest rates.238
It is expected that the relationship between changes in free reserves and
changes in System bill holdings would be inversely related. Free reserves,
as an independent variable, will be viewed in greater detail in the next
Chapter in relation to commercial bank holdings of bills.
Free reserves are expected to be positively related with the money 
supply, and therefore the bill rate is expected to be negatively related 
to the money supply. Increases in the supply of demand deposits (or time 
deposits, ceteris paribus, would be indicative of increased demand for 
bills, therefore, a lower bill rate. Okun's results (above) in explaining 
the bill rate with "money" variables on a quarterly basis generally were 
not satisfactory, and it is probable that monthly estimates will yield 
even worse results.
238Meigs, oji. cit.. p. 82. Also, Eugene M. Lerner in "A Criticism 
of Free Reserves," The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. XLIV, No. 2 
(May, 1962), pp. 225-228; brings the discount rate into the relationship: 
"Free reserves move countercyclically because of the lagged relationship 
between the discount rate and the Treasury bill rate." Also relevant is: 
William H. White, "Regulation of Short-Term Interest Rates Through Monetary 
Action," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. X, No. 2 (July, 
1963), pp. 299-320.
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Treasury demand deposits are Included here on an experimental
basis. Brown's results (above— and as yet unpublished) have indicated
that seasonal imbalance in the receipts of the Treasury are responsible
for the seasonality of the bill rate. If the seasonality in receipts is
reflected in seasonality in the quantity of bills issued by the Treasury,
then the effect on the bill rate should be measured by movements in the
quantity of bills. On the other hand. Treasury deposits may affect the
demand for bills by commercial banks. If the commercial banks holding
Treasury deposits view these deposits as volatile and temporary, and hold
bills to cover the deposits, bill holdings of commercial banks will fluctu-
239ate with Treasury deposits. If Treasury receipts are low relative to 
expenditures and the stock of bills increases, the bill rate would tend to 
rise. But if receipts from additional bill sales are deposited in commer­
cial banks, free reserves increase, allowing banks to increase the demand 
for bills which would put downward pressure on the rate.
It is apparent from the discussion that there are significant 
interrelationships among the independent variables, and a system of 
structural equations would probably come nearer providing unbiased esti­
mates of the effect of these variables on the bill rate. A system of be­
havioral equations, however, would necessitate a general-equilibrium 
approach to explain the behavior of variables which are considered exo­
genous in the partial-equilibrium approach. Only ordinary least squares 
techniques are utilized in the calculation of the relationships of these 
variables with the bill rate. The results of these attempts follow.
239For a detailed description of Treasury deposit balances and the 
influence on bank reserves, see: Ernest Block, "The Treasury's Deposit
Balances and the Banking System," Essays in Money and Credit, Federal Re­
serve Bank of New York, 1964, pp. 19-24.
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Regression Results Emphasizing Supply Variables 
The first group of independent variables used in "explaining" the 
average monthly market bill rate are: the quantity of Treasury bills in
the hands of the public (q̂ )̂, the quantity of marketable Federal debt with­
in one year of maturity in the hands of the public (q^), the average time 
to maturity of the marketable debt (m), and time (t) in months. The time 
period of the regressions in this Chapter cover 142 months, beginning 
January, 1953, and ending with October, f964.
The results of the regressions utilizing the variables described 
above are summarized in Table 32. The Table includes the constant, the 
regression coefficients, standard errors of the regression coefficients
(in parenthesis below the coefficient), the coefficient of determination
2 2 (R ), the residual variance (a ), the Durbin-Watson statistic (d'), andu
the first-order coefficient of autocorrelation of the calculated residuals 
240(r'). In addition, a matrix of simple correlation is shown.
The bill rate is measured in per cent (2.57), the average maturity 
in months (72.0), and time in months also. The debt quantity variables 
are measured in billions of dollars (20.562). Measuring dollar variables 
in billions of dollars is kept consistent throughout the regression re­
sults presented in this Chapter and the next (free reserves, demand de­
posits, and non-financial corporation holdings of bills are examples).
The computer program used for these calculations (discussed 
above on pages 147-148) has been carefully checked for accuracy and the re­
sults presented are accurate to the place rounded. Some of the calcula­
tions reported below were performed with a different program and have a 
degree of computational error. The calculations performed on this other 
program are so indicated.
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TABLE 32.--Results of regressions of the Treasury bill rate on combina­
tions of: the quantity of bills in the hands of the public (qy), the
quantity of marketable Federal debt within one year to maturity in the 
hands of the public (q^), the average time to maturity of the marketable 
debt (m). and time (t) in months-*-January, 1953-October, 1964
Equation
(number)
Regression coefficients and 









































% 4l m t
% .680 1.000
Qi -.439 -.340 1.000
m -.508 -.442 -.113 1.000
t .623 .958 -.348 -.428 1.000
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The regression coefficients In Table 32 Indicate that an Increase 
of one billion dollars In the quantity of bills In the hands of the public 
will Increase the Treasury bill rate by between .03 and .08 per cent points. 
The algebraic sign Is positive, as expected, but the standard error of the 
regression coefficients are underestimated because of the high degree of 
positive autocorrelation of the calculated residuals Indicated by the rela­
tively small value of the Durbln-Watson statistic (d'), and the relatively 
large value of the calculated first-order correlation coefficient (r').
There Is a very strong positive relationship between the quantity of bills 
and time as shown by the simple correlation coefficient between the two 
variables of .958, In equation number (5'), when the bill rate Is regressed 
on the quantity of bills In the hands of the public and time, the partial 
regression coefficient with time becomes negative. Equation (S') was cal­
culated experimentally to see If the relationship between the bill rate and 
the quantity of bills would be lessened by the Inclusion of time as a spe­
cific variable. Simple linear relationships were calculated on a twelve 
month basis between the bill rate and the quantity of bills In the hands of 
the public, but the results were not very encouraging. The regression co­
efficients were generally positive, but the values showed little conslstr 
ency.
The algebraic sign for the quantity of Federal marketable debt 
within one year to maturity (other than bills) In the hands of the public 
was negative, whereas the expected sign was positive due to the assumed 
high degree of substitutability between bills and other short-term Govern­
ment debt In holders' portfolios. The negative sign Is brought about by 
the negative trend over time of the quantity of less than one year (non- 
bill) marketable debt, while the bill rate maintained a positive trend.
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Linear regression of the bill rate on the quantity of bills and the quan­
tity of other marketable debt maturing within one year for 24 month periods 
were calculated. The results were not very meaningful, with the algebraic 
signs of the partial regression coefficients for the quantity of non-bill 
debt maturing within one year mixed— half positive and half negative.
The algebraic sign of the regression coefficient for the average 
maturity of the marketable debt was negative, as expected. The simple 
correlation coefficients between the average maturity variable and bill 
quantity was negative, as was the sign of the average maturity with the 
within-one-year debt quantity relationship— indicating that the average 
maturity tends to vary inversely with the quantity of short-term debt.
Probably the most significant results of the estimates of Table 32 
is the finding of the high degree of autocorrelation of residuals. The 
calculated Durbin-Watson statistic should be in the vicinity of 1.60 in 
order for there to be no indication of positive autocorrelation of resi­
duals at the five per cent level of significance. The calculated r_|_ 
values indicate that first-differencing the monthly values may be appropri­
ate in this case.
Table 33 shows the results of measuring the simple and multiple re­
lationships between monthly changes of the variables and the variables ex­
pressed as natural logarithms. The regressions with monthly changes indi­
cates that a one billion dollar increase in the quantity of bills in the 
hands of the public would result in a bill rate change of slightly more 
than .02 per cent points. The degree of autocorrelation of residuals 
still shows significant positive autocorrelation at the five per cent 
level, with the Durbin-Watson statistic calculated as approximately 1.35. 
The sign of the regression coefficients in equation number (7') shows a
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TABLE 33.--Results of regressions of the Treasury bill rate on the quantity 
of bills in the hands of the public, and the quantity of marketable Federal 
debt within one year to maturity in the hands of the public, with all vari­
ables expressed (a) as first differences, and (b) as natural logarithms:
January, 1953-October, 1964
(Equation number) oRegression coefficients and R^ d' r'
(standard errors)
first differences (x)
(6')r, = .0073 + .0210 q, .02 1.34 .33
^ (.0129) b
.32(7')r, = .0074 + .0231 q, + .0094 q. .03 1.37
(.0130)  ̂ (.0068)
natural logarithms (log^ x expressed as x*)
(8')
r* = -1.9675 + .8418 q^ .48
(.0742) t
(9')
rÿ = -.5869 + .7631 q* - .3585 q* .51
(.0762) (.1148) 1
positive relationship between the bill rate and the quantity of non-bill 
marketable debt within one year of maturity, but the coefficient is small 
relative to the calculated standard error. The coefficients of determi­
nation are .02 and .03 respectively in equations (6') and (7'). Equations
(8') and (9‘) indicate that the logarithmic relationships yield about the
241same results as equations (1') and (2').
241Attempts to use logarithmic first-differences was complicated 
by the extremely small values of changes in the bill rate, as well as 
negative values.
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An attempt was made to correlate, on a quarterly basis, the level 
of the bill rate with the level of the quantity of bills in the hands of 
the public and.dummy variables to measure quarterly seasonality. The re­
sults were not very different from the monthly estimates above. The simple 
relationship of the end of quarter values (March, June, September, and 
December) of the bill rate on the quantity of bills was estimated as;
(10') r, = .8804 + .0561 q.
^ (.0097) ^
with a coefficient of determination of .43, and a ̂  of .48. With dummy 
variables for the second, thjtrd and fourth quarters, the equation esti­
mated as:
(11') r. = .7596 + .0552 q, + .0271 II + .2715 III + .2010 IV
(.0098) (.2758) (.2754) (.2817)
with a coefficient of multiple determination of .45 and a ̂  of .41. The 
constant and the coefficients of the dummy variables provide an estimate 
of the average additive quarterly seasonal factor. The results of equation 
(11') indicate the first quarter as the low with the constant of .7596.
The average amount of addition to the constant for the second quarter would 
be the value of the coefficient .0271. The constant plus the coefficient 
is .7867. For the third and fourth quarter respectively, the constant plus 
the coefficient yields 1.0311 and 1.0606. Nevertheless, the use of 
quarterly values and seasonal dummy variables helps little in the elimina­
tion of the positive autocorrelation of residuals.
In addition to the independent variables being highly autocorre­
lated, the equations estimated thus far indicate that all relevant vari­
ables are not being included. In order to gain further information about 
the relationship of the bill rate and the quantity of bills. Federal Re­
serve System holdings (S), and System holdings lagged one month (S^_^) are
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utilized as independent variables. This necessitates changing the quantify 
of bills in the hands of the public (q^), to the quantity issued by the 
Treasury less Federal Agency and trust fund holdings of bills (Qy). The 
quantity of Federal marketable debt (excluding bills) with less than one 
year to maturity in the hands of the public (q^) is retained as an inde­
pendent variable.
The results of the regressions of the bill rate on the quantity of 
bills issued by the Treasury less agency holdings (Qy), System holdings 
(S), and System holdings lagged one month and the quantity of other
short-term marketable debt (q^) are summarized in Table 34. Equation (12') 
differs little from equation (1'). Equation (13-) yields a negative sign 
for the regression coefficient for System bill holdings, which is the ex­
pected sign. An increase in System holdings of bills reduces the stock of 
bills in the hands of the public, and according to the argument illustrated 
in Chart 14, reduces the bill rate. From these estimates it appears that a 
one billion dollar change in System holdings (with Qy held constant) has a 
greater effect on the bill rate than a one billion dollar change in the 
quantity of bills (with S held constant).
In equation (14') when System holdings in the current period and 
System holdings in the last monthly period are both included, the regression 
coefficient for _S is greatly reduced from the estimate in equation (13').
The matrix of simple correlation coefficients indicates the relationship 
of System holdings in the current period with System holdings lagged one 
month are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of +.924.
The reduction in the value of the regression coefficient for _S between 
equation (13') and (14') may be due to the high degree of multicollinearity 
between the current and lagged value of System holdings, but it could also
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TABLE 34.— Results of regressions of the Treasury bill rate on combinations 
of: the quantity of bills issued by the Treasury less agency and trust 
fund holdings (Q^), Federal Reserve System holdings of bills (S), System 
holdings lagged one month (S^-i); and the quantity of Federal marketable 
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.60 .79 .28 .86




Qb S St-1 91
Qb .656 1.000
s .304 .796 1.000
St-1 ' .306 ..793 .924 1.000
9l -.439 -.326 -.133 -.133 1.000
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be due to the lagged effect of changes in System holdings on bank reserves, 
and the resulting change in the demand for bills by banks. Positive auto­
correlation of the residuals is still a problem in these estimates, and the 
value of indicates that correlations between successive monthly dif­
ferences is warranted. In equation (15') the sign of the regression coef­
ficient for the quantity of non-bill debt within one year to maturity is 
negative— opposite to the expected sign.
In Table 35, monthly changes in the bill rate are regressed on 
monthly changes in: the quantity of bills issued by the Treasury (less
agency and trust fund holdings). System bill holdings in the current 
period. System bill holdings lagged one month, and the quantity of market­
able debt (excluding bills) in the hands of the public. Generally, the re­
sults indicate that positive autocorrelation of the residuals still exists,
the coefficients of determination are very low, and (except for one inr
stance) the sign of the regression coefficients for System holdings are
opposite the expected sign. The high degree of relationship between the 
current and the lagged value of System holdings of bills shown above is 
not apparent using first-differences. The value of the regression coef­
ficient for the quantity of bills (Qy) varies between .023 and .025 per 
cent, essentially the same as those calculated in Table 33 for the quantity 
of bills in the hands of the public (q^).
Due to the strong relationship between System holdings in the 
current period and System holdings lagged one month, a new series of re­
gression equations were estimated using free reserves (R) as an independent 
variable instead of lagged System holdings. The results of these calcula­
tions are shown in equations (19') and (20') in-Table 36. The regression 
coefficients for the free reserve variables indicates that a one billion
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TABLE 35.— Results of regressions of monthly changes in the Treasury bill 
rate on changes in; the quantity of bills issued by the Treasury less 
agency and trust fund holdings (Qy), Federal Reserve System holdings of 
bills (S), System holdings lagged one month (S^.i), and the quantity of 
Federal marketable debt within one year to maturity in the hands of the 
public (q^)— January, 1953-October, 1964
Equation
(number)
Regression coefficients and 
(standard errors) _  r2 - 1
and

























.04 .32. 1.36 .32
Matrix of simple correlation coefficients
fb Q b S S t - 1 9l
1.000
\ .145 1.000
S .017 .087 1.000
S f l .003 -.081 -.160 1.000
%1 .107 -.081 .103 .101 1.000
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TABLE 36.— Results of regressions of the Treasury bill rate on combinations 
of: the quantity of bills issued by the Treasury less agency and trust 
fund holdings (Qy), Federal Reserve System holdings (S), free reserves (R), 
and the quantity of marketable Federal debt within one year to maturity in 
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(.0064) .85 .23 .57 .68




Qb S R 9l
Qb .656 1.000
S .304 .796 1.000
R -.523 .163 .405 1.000
4l -.439 -.326 -.133 .410 1.000
0^
dollar change in free reserves (holding the other variables in the equa- . 
tions constant) will cause approximately a 1.4 per cent point change in 
the bill rate. The relationship between free reserves and the bill rate 
is inverse, as expected. The partial regression coefficients of the bill 
quantity are approximately .07, while the partial coefficients for System 
holdings are slightly larger in value -.10; both sets of coefficients have 
the expected sign. The values of these sets of partial regression coef­
ficients seem reasonable, both on an absolute basis and relative to each
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other. The sign of the partial regression coefficient for less than one- 
year marketable debt is the expected one, positive. However, positive 
autocorrelation of the residuals again is significant at the five per 
cent level.
Table 37 shows the results of the regressions of the first-differ­
ences of the same variables of Table 36. The partial regression coeffi-" 
cient of changes in the quantity of bills issued by the Treasury (less 
agency and trust fund holdings) is approximately the same as calculated 
in the two previous instances of correlations of ^irst-differences; 
approximately .025 per cent points. The sign of the regression coeffi­
cient for changes in System holdings is negative, as expected, but rela­
tively small. The sign of the coefficient for free reserves is negative, 
as expected, and the sign of the coefficient for the quantity of non-bill, 
short-term marketable debt is positive, as expected. The Durbin-Watson 
statistic of 1.61 in equation (22') indicates significant positive auto­
correlation of the residuals at the five per cent level of significance 
since the required value of the statistic in this case is 1.78. The coef­
ficient of multiple determination is only .16 approximately. However, 
relative to the .03 of the earlier first-difference estimates, this result 
is rather encouraging.
The general conclusions from the regression results presented this 
far indicate that: (1) there is a positive relationship between the bill
rate and the quantity of bills; (2) a positive relationship exists between 
the bill rate and the quantity of non-bill marketable debt withi# one year 
to maturity; (3) a negative relationship is apparent between the bill rate 
and the average maturity of the marketable debt; (4) the expected negative
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TABLE 37.““Results of regressions of monthly changes in the Treasury bill 
rate on changes in; the quantity of bills issued by the Treasury less 
agency and trust fund holdings Federal Reserve System holdings of
bills (S), free reserves (R), and the quantity of Federal marketable debt 
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.17 .29 1.61 .19
Matrix of simple correlation coefficients
fb Qb S R 9l
^b 1.000
Qb .145 1.000
S .017 .087 1.000
R -.357 -.008 -.016 1.000
<1 .107 -.081 .102 .108 1.000
relationship between the bill rate and Federal Reserve System holdings is 
indicated in most cases, but the magnitude is less than expected and 
probably not statistically significant; and (R) the free reserves variable 
is of great importance in explaining bill rate movements.
The partial regression coefficients of the bill rate on the quan­
tity of bills (Qy or q^) have ranged from as low as .02 in the first dif­
ference equations to as high as .09 using levels of variables. These 
results compare favorably in sign and magnitude with the results of Okun,
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Turvey, and Scott. Okun, using the quantity of within-five-year marketable 
Federal debt in the hands of the public, obtained partial regression coef­
ficients between the bill rate and the quantity variable ranging from .02 
to .06 in various equations. Turvey, using deflated values of total Fed­
eral obligations outstanding as the independent variable and a weighted 
average of Federal securities rates as the dependent variable, obtained 
partial regression coefficients ranging roughly between .015 and .032. 
Finally Scott's equations, using the bill rate as the dependent variable 
and total Federal debt held by the public as the independent variable, 
estimated partial regression coefficients as .018 and .031 in separate 
equations. Changes in the quantity of bills in the hands of the public, 
holding other things constant, definitely affects the bill rate, but it 
appears that the demand schedule is highly elastic relative to the bill 
rate.
The partial regression coefficients between the bill rate and the
quantity of non-bill Federal marketable debt within one year to maturity
were positive in all cases where successive differences were used, and
generally had a value slightly greater than .01. In equation 20' (Table
24235) the partial regression coefficient was approximately .017. The 
positive partial regression coefficient would indicate that an increase in 
the quantity of non-bill short-term debt would tend to increase the bill 
rate, but by less than an increase in the quantity of bills.
242The positive partial regression coefficient is interesting in 
light of the negative simple regression coefficient between the bill rate 
and the quantity of non-bill marketable debt within one year to maturity. 
The simple regression coefficient between first-differences was also nega­
tive.
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The partial regression coefficient between the bill rate and the 
average maturity of the marketable debt was negative, as expected, indicat­
ing that greater relative quantities of short-term marketable debt, while 
reducing the average maturity, would increase the bill rate. Additional 
information regarding the magnitude of this relationship will be presented 
below.
The partial regression coefficients between the bill rate and Fed­
eral Reserve System holdings were generally negative, but the values were 
smaller than expected. It was argued in Chapter VI that a Federal Reserve 
transaction in the open market should have a greater effect than an equal 
bill quantity change arising from a Treasury debt operation. The relative 
magnitudes in the fitted equations have shown the reverse, with the partial 
regression coefficients between changes in the bill rate and changes in 
System holdings generally near zero values. Several explanations are 
tenable. It may be there is just no relationship between System holdings 
and the bill rate, but on a priori and theoretical grounds, this is diffi­
cult to accept. A more likely explanation may lie in the timing of System 
transactions. Normally, the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee is 
pursuing both very short-run and long-run goals simultaneously. The 
short-run operations may lead to both bill purchases and bill sales within 
a single week (or day), with the net transactions actually in conflict 
with the long-term goal. These short-term operations may be for the pur­
pose of correcting seasonal movements in monetary variables, which if 
uncorrected would lead to bill rate changes on the demand side, but due 
to the open market transaction the result is bill rate stability. On the 
other hand, if the short-run movements in the target variables are consist­
ent with the long-run goals of the System, normal open market operations
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may not be carried out. On the basis of the regression equations using 
both System holdings and free reserves as "independent" variables, the 
free reserves variable was far more important in explaining bill rate 
movements. If the demand schedule for bills is highly elastic, which 
appears probable on the basis of the regression equations, the shift in 
the demand schedule due to a change in free reserves (which may be in part 
due to System transactions) has a much greater impact on the bill rate 
than the change in the stock of bills available to the public.
Due to the volatility in the level and changes in free reserves 
between country banks and non-country banks, the free reserves variable 
was divided into separate independent variables. In the following regres­
sions, various combinations of the free reserves of country banks (R^), 
free reserves of non-country banks (R^), and Treasury deposits in commercial
banks (T) are utilized as independent variables along with some of the pre-
243viously used variables. The regression equations utilizing demand de­
posits and time deposits as independent variables indicated that these 
variables, as they stand, explain practically none of the variation in the 
bill rate. It is believed that these variables, on theoretical grounds, 
are important in the explanation of the bill rate, but they must be ex­
pressed in more sophisticated fashion if the effect on the bill rate is to
243In the regression results presented below, the Durbin-Watson 
statistic has not been calculated. It is highly probable that the degree 
of positive autocorrelation of residuals is significant when using levels 
and not significant when using successive differences. Also the time 
period covers two additional months (November and December, 1964) for 
144 observations from January, 1953 through December, 1964.
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244be measured'. It Is probable that System holdings and free reserves are 
actually serving to measure money supply changes.
Table 38 summarizes some selected multiple regression estimates 
which include combinations of Rg, and T along with a "quantity of 
bills" variable (Qy or q^). The average maturity of the marketable Fed­
eral debt is included in equations 23' through 26'. System holdings are 
included in equations 27' and 28'. The odd numbered equations in Table 38 
measure relationships among levels of variables, and the even numbered 
equations measure first-difference relationships.
The partial regression coefficients for Rg and R^ are large, with 
the partial coefficient for R^ being larger. The standard errors of the 
regression coefficients indicate a very high level of significance for R^, 
with the standard errors for the coefficients for R^ being relatively 
larger.
In equations 23' through 26' the partial regression coefficients 
for the average maturity (m) is negative and of the magnitude .03, both in 
the regressions using levels and differences. This is about one-half the 
values estimated in equations 3' and 4' (Table 32). The partial regression 
coefficients also indicate that this variable is statistically significant.
In equations 24' and 26' (using successive differences) the 
quantity of bills (q^) have regression coefficients slightly smaller than 
the calculated standard error. The constants in the four equations using 
first differences are very near the mean monthly change in the bill rate 
which was calculated as .013. In this case, the constant is a good measure 
of the trend in the level of the bill rate.
244For an example of various measures of "money," see: Okun,
Monetary Policy, Debt Management and Interest Rates: A Quantitative
Appraisal," _o£. cit.
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TABLE 38.— Regression results of the bill rate (ry) on various combinations 
of the quantity of bills (q^ and Qy), the quantity of non-bill marketable 
debt within one year of maturity (q^), the average maturity of the market­
able debt (m). Federal Reserve System holdings of bills (S), free reserves 
of country banks (Rg), free reserves of non-country banks (R^), and Treas­
ury deposits at commercial banks (T)j with variables as levels and as 
successive differences: January, 1953-December, 1964
^number” Equation and (standard error) R%
(23')























































In equations 25', 26', 29', and 30', the partial regression coeffi­
cients for Treasury deposits are negative, as expected. An increase in 
Treasury deposits at commercial banks is associated with bill rate
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'decreases. This reflects increased free reserves (the simple correlation 
coefficient Indicates a much higher association with than with R^)> and 
an Increase In the quantity of bills sold by the Treasury could lead to 
Increases In T causing this variable to measure the same phenomena as Qy: 
the partial regression coefficient for T (f) Is nearly the same magnitude 
as the coefficient for (Qb)• Federal Reserve open market transactions 
may be undertaken to adjust for fluctuations In monetary variables caused 
by fluctuations In Treasury deposits. The partial coefficients In equa­
tions 27' and 28' show mixed signs between the equation using levels of 
variables and the equation using successive differences. The partial re­
gression coefficient o f ^  In equation 27' Is slightly larger than the 
partial coefficient for the quantity of bills as hypothesized, but on the 
basis of the past estimates of this coefficient, little confidence can be 
attached to the magnitude.
An additional equation was estimated using seven Independent vari­
ables Including time. The partial coefficients of determination are 
Included In parentheses above the appropriate partial regression coeffi­
cient, and the standard errors In parentheses below the regression coef­
ficient. The equation was calculated as:
(.141) (.023) (.058) (.387)
(31') r, = 2.349 + .043q, + .013q, - .0205 - 1.340R,
(.009) (.007) (.007) (.145)
(.153) (.060) (.036)
- 1.727R - .074T + .006t R^ = .88
(.348) (.025) (.003)
Although m Is related to q^ and q̂ ,̂ while T Is related to R^ and R^, the 
result Is Interesting. The partial coefficient for q^ (+.043) Is between 
the partial coefficients of levels and successive differences measured up
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to this point. Very subjectively, this seems a reasonable estimate for 
the partial regression coefficient for . The other regression coeffi­
cients seem reasonable in their magnitudes and are all of the sign expected 
from the simple theoretical model. The partial coefficients of determina­
tion, although probably biased upward because of autocorrelation of the 
residuals, indicate that and ("demand" variables) are the most impor­
tant variables in this equation, with q^ third most important. Although 
the remaining partial coefficients of determination are relatively small, 
all of the partial regression coefficients are more than 1.8 times as 
large as their standard errors.
In order to obtain some measure of the seasonality in the bill rate 
movements, equations utilizing "supply" variables along with dummy vari­
ables for each month were estimated. Utilizing dummy variables for each 
month allows the estimation of the seasonality of the dependent variable
as an additive factor. Actually a separate intercept is calculated for
245each month. The dummy seasonal variables are indicated by Roman 
numerals (i— January, ii-February, etc.). Standard errors of these coef­
ficients are omitted, and instead the relative ranks, from one to twelve, 
are indicated below the coefficient and underlined. Equation 20' (Table
36) was re-estimated with the inclusion of dummy seasonal variables, with
246the result:
245Lovell, op. cit.. and Johnson, o p . cit. In these regressions 
the dummy variables are 0 and JL. There are eleven dummy variables, all 
having the value of zero for January, all having zero values for February 
except the first which would have the value _l--and in December the last 
dummy would be and all others would have zero values.
246From this point on in the estimation of empirical equations, 
the relevant time span is from January, 1953 through December, 1964; 
twelve years, 144 observations.
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(32') r, = .0751Q, - .1751S - 1.400R + .0126q, + .36401 + .087211
(.0045) (.0432) (.0896) (.0061) 5 12
+ .1471111 + .14341V + .1314v + .3635vl + .3211vll + .3042vlll
1 10 il 6 7 8
+ .49221% + .4314% + .4520x1 + .6081x11 (R^ = .882 d' = .549)
2 4 3 1
The coefficient of multiple determination was slightly higher than for 
equation 20', but the Durbln-Watson statistic was only slightly changed 
(the required value for a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5 per 
cent level Is 1.65). The seasonal regression coefficients compare favor­
ably In their ranking above and below "normal" with the seasonal factors 
calculated In Chapter III. The most Interesting difference between equa­
tion 20' and equation (32') Is the Increase In the magnitude of the regres­
sion coefficient for System holdings (from -.0967 to -.1751).
To this point In the calculation of regression equations the quan­
tity of non-bill marketable debt within one year to maturity. In order 
to gain some Insight as to whether a single quantity variable, combining 
and q^, might give better results, equation 33' was estimated after 
summing and q^ to form the variable "quantity of Federal marketable 
debt within one-year of maturity" (q). Including Federal Reserve System 
bill holdings (S), which Is considered as a separate variable. The esti­
mation of such an equation yielded:
(33') r = .0557q + .0676S - 1.850R - .37541 - .580011 - .5657111
® (.0051) (.0442) (.0969) 1 9 8
- .58741V - .6797V - .5132vl - .5458vll - .6193vlll - .36651%
10 12 5 7 11 2
- .4462% - .5243x1 - .3879x11 (R^ = .804 d' = .508)
4 6 3
The regression coefficient for the quantity variable (.0557) appears 
reasonable enough, and the standard error of the regression coefficient.
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in absolute terms is only slightly larger than the error for in equa­
tion 32'. The coefficient of multiple determination is comparable, but 
the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates a very high probability of positively 
autocorrelated residuals. However, the regression coefficient for System 
holdings is positive instead of negative which is opposite the expected 
sign. When the results of equation 33' are compared with the results of 
equations utilizing q^ and q^ as separate independent variables measuring 
the quantity of marketable non-bill Federal debt within one year of matu­
rity as a good, although imperfect, substitute for Treasury bills is ten­
able and helpful. Possibly other independent variables measuring the 
quantity of marketable Federal debt in longer maturity categories would be
desirable. However, the only additional debt variable used is the average
time to maturity of the marketable debt.
Equation 31', excluding the time trend variable (t), was re-esti­
mated using dummy variables to measure seasonality. The estimated equation 
was;
(34') rv = .0749q, + .0161q, - .0203m - 1.5612R - .6225R_
(.0036)^ (.0008)^ (.0063) (.0939)^ (.0353)^
r .1463T + 1.4315i + 1.332Ü + 1.477iii + 1.402iv 
(.0319) 10 12 9 11
+ 1.598V + 1.736vi + 1.673vii + 1.683viii + 1.820ix 
8 4 6 5 1
+ 1.753X + 1.671xi + 1.750xii (R^ = .898 d' = .674)
2 7 3
The coefficient of multiple determination is virtually unchanged from that 
of equation 31', and the Durbin-Watson statistic leads again to a rejection 
of the null hypothesis of independently distributed residuals. The regres­
sion coefficients for q^ and T are increased when the dummy seasonal vari­
ables are included, but the most surprising result is the change in the
243
regression coefficient for R^; from -1,727 In equation 31' to -.623 In 
equation 34'. Although the regression coefficient has been changed dras­
tically, the standard error In equation 34' Is smaller relative to the 
coefficient than In equation 31'. f
Since the time variable was eliminated In equation 34', It was 
felt that this may have affected the partial regression coefficient for 
Rg, but recalculations of equation 31' excluding the time variable changed 
the partial coefficient from -1.727 to “1.885. Another possible explana­
tion Is provided by Lovell In a reference to the appropriateness of utiliz­
ing dummy seasonals with seasonally unadjusted variables. He comments 
that;
Although both the dependent and Independent variables may be 
subject to considerable seasonal movement. It Is possible that 
the seasonality In the dependent variable Is entirely the con­
sequence of seasonal Influences acting directly through the 
explanatory variables.247
If the Independent variables In this equation "explain" the seasonality In 
the bill rate, then the dummy seasonal variables are redundant. The reason 
why the relationship between the bill rate and country bank free reserves 
"washes out," while the other relationships remain relatively constant. Is 
not easy to explain. The bill rate--country bank free reserves relation­
ship of equation 31' (and other equations) may have been supurlous. But 
conversely, the seasonal variations In country bank reserves could have 
been the most Important factor In "explaining" the seasonality of the bill 
rate, and when the dummy seasonal variables were Included the relationship 
vanished.
247Lovell, 02» cit., p. 1005•
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In this particular case the dummy seasonal variables may do more 
harm than good, although in equation 32' above and equation 35' below, 
relationships between the bill rate and System holdings of bills, which 
may have been obscured without utilizing dummy seasonal variables, possibly 
become more apparent when seasonal proxies are used. The conclusions are 
highly conjectural, but the problem indicates that since we are attempting 
to explain short-term bill rate movements, with appropriate independent 
variables, the use of dummy seasonal variables may not always be justified.
Another equation of this type is shown below, and is a re-estima<" 
tion of equation 22' with dummy seasonal variables included. The proxy 
variables in the successive differences situation do not measure season­
ality relative to any "normal" month, but instead measure the average 
change between successive months. For example, in the preceding equations 
using dummy seasonal variables, December usually had the greatest addition 
(smallest subtraction) whereas in this situation the November bill rate is 
higher than "normal," therefore the December adjustment will be relatively 
smaller than when levels are used, indicating greater change between 
October and November than between November and December. The re-estimation
of equation 22', adding the dummy seasonal variables, yielded;
(35') r. = .0356q - .0458S - .5686R + .0113q_ - .08921 - .17611
(.0158)0 (.0460) (.1178) (.0063) 11 12
- .006111 + .018iv - .051v + .072vi - .024vii + .094viii 
I 5 10 4 8 3
+ .181ix - .041x + .015x1 + .121x11 (R^ = .336 d' = 1.652) 
1 9  6 2
The regression for q^ in equation 35' (.0356) is higher than in 
equation 22' (.0248); and the regression coefficients for A and q^ are 
nearly the same in the two equations. The regression coefficient for S in
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equation 35' (-.0458) is much larger than the corresponding coefficient in 
equation 22'; and in addition, the coefficient for S in equation 35' is 
larger than the regression coefficient for q^, as hypothesized. However, 
the regression coefficient for S is about the same size as the standard 
error, and the coefficient is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, 
it appears that if factors contributing to seasonality are "held constant," 
the influence of System bill holdings on the bill rate through changes in 
the stock of bills becomes more apparent. If System open market operations 
were taking place to absorb seasonal movements in bank reserves, the effect 
of the transactions may prevent bill rate movements that would have occurred 
in the absence of System action.
The coefficient of multiple determination is approximately .34, 
double the value of equation 22'; but still indicative that the influence 
of major explanatory variables is not included. The Durbin-Watson statis­
tic of 1.65 indicates that biases from autocorrelation of residuals still
exist since the Durbin-Watson statistic required for this many variables
248and observations is 1.96 at the five per cent significance level.
Positive Autocorrelation of Residuals 
Throughout this Chapter the empirical equations have shown biases 
arising from positive autocorrelation of the residuals, in some cases even 
when variables were expressed as successive differences. In an attempt to 
eliminate the positive autocorrelation biases, the p transformation, dis­
cussed in Chapter V, was applied to two equations previously estimated in 
this Chapter--equations 20' and 32'.
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In equation 20' the estimated autocorrelation coefficient (p) was 
.72, and the equation estimated using the dependent variable and the inde­
pendent variables transformed (XJ - pX. ) was:
t-1 ^t-1
(36') r, = .0549 + .0560Q. - .0391S - .9578R + .0096q,
(.0064) (.0394) (.1151) (.0068)
(r 2 = .54 d' = 1.57),
The value of d' to reject the null hypothesis of positive autocorrelation 
of residuals at the five per cent level of significance is, for this prob­
lem, 1.78, Comparing the regression coefficients of equation 36' and the 
coefficients of 20' and 22' indicates generally that the coefficients in 
equation 36' are larger than those in equation 22' but smaller than those 
of 20'. Even though it appears that positive autocorrelation of the resid­
uals is still present, the values of the coefficients of 36', absolutely
and relative to their standard errors, are preferable to those of 20' and 
22'. The Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.61 for equation 22^ is only slightly 
above the value of the statistic of equation ̂ 6J_, There is a possibility 
also that the first-order autocorrelation assumption should be replaced by 
a second-order assumption.
In equation 32' the estimated autocorrelation coefficient was .73,
and the equation estimated using the resulting transformed variables was:
(37') r, = .0624Q. - .0996S - .9956R + .0090q, + .04951 - .014411
(.0069) (.0468) (.1126) (.0065) 9 12
+ .0554111 + .0504iv + ,0401v + .0903vi + .0472vii +:.0658viii 
6 8 11 3 10 5
+ .10731X + .0548% + .0693x1 + .1039x11 (R^ = .63 d' = 1.64) 
1 7  4 2
Again the Durbin-Watson statistic (1.64) is lower than that re­
quired (1.96), and autocorrelation of the residuals has not been eliminated.
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However the Durbin-Watson statistic for these variables when first dlf-
1
ferences were used (equation 35') was only 1.65. In equation 37' the 
regression coefficient for System holdings (-.0996) Is larger Ignoring 
the sign) than for the coefficient for the quantity of bills (.0624); 
and Is more than twice Its standard error. Expect for the regression coef­
ficient for System holdings, the values of the other regression coefficients 
are extremely near their respective values In equation 36'. The signs and 
the values of the regression coefficients appear quite satisfactory rela­
tive to the previous estimates and discussion In this Chapter.
In a final attempt to eliminate positive autocorrelation of the 
residuals, an equation was calculated Including the bill rate lagged one 
month (r^_^) an Independent variable. Taking again the variables used
I
In equation 20', and adding the lagged bill rate as an Independent variable, 
an equation was estimated as:
(38') r, = .1501 + .0149Q, + .0232S - .5117R + .0030q, + .7285r. ,
( . 0 0 4 2 r  (.0239) (.0824) (.0038)^ ( .0453)
(R^ = .95 d' = 1.28)
Although the Durbin-Watson statistic Is much higher In equation 38' 
than In equation 20', positive autocorrelation of the residuals still 
exists. The regression coefficients for S and q̂  ̂are not statistically 
significant. The only purpose of this attempt was to eliminate positive 
autocorrelation, and an economic Interpretation of equation 38' Is diffi­
cult. A possible rationale for Including the lagged bill rate as an Inde­
pendent variable might be sought In viewing bill holders as expecting the 
current rate to equal the rate existing last month.
Another equation was estimated Including dummy variables and the 
results were similar. The multiple coefficient of determination was .96,
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but the Durbin-Watson statistic was less than for equation 38', having a 
value of 1.20. In this additional equation the sign of System holdings 
was negative as expected, differing from the sign of the coefficient in 
equation 38', but still statistically insignificant.
An additional observation on these final estimates refers to the 
decrease in the value of the DurbinrWatson statistic as dummy seasonal 
variables were added. It seems possible that the changing seasonal pattern 
over the time period could cause the dummy seasonal variables, whose coef­
ficients indicate additive seasonality and are simply an average for the 
period, could add to the problem of positive autocorrelation instead of 
reducing it.
Summary and Conclusions 
Very generally, it has been shown that the quantity of bills, and 
the quantity of bill substitutes, affect the level of the Treasury bill 
rate, with increases in quantity being related to increases in the rate.
The evidence is not so clear-cut for Federal Reserve System open market 
operations, but the relationship between System bill holdings and the bill 
rate seems generally to be inverse, as hypothesized on the basis of Chart
14, Chapter VI. The average time to maturity of the Federal marketable
t- •'
debt also is inversely related to the bill rate, as was expected.
Several multiple regression equations were calculated to different 
time periods, and several equations of successive differences of variables 
were estimated excluding periods of extreme fluctuations in the bill rate. 
The results of these attempts were not different, in important respects, 
to the equations presented above.
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The use of free reserves (R, R,, and R ) appeared to be helpful ini c
obtaining, estimates of the effects of debt quantity variables on the bill 
rate. Also, it became apparent through using these variables that shifts 
in the demand schedule seem more important in the determination of the bill 
rate than changes in the quantity of bills.
In the statistical sense, the equations above are not as adequate 
as had been desired. Using levels of variables results in positive auto­
correlation of the residuals; and the use of successive differences, 
although reducing the degree of bias from positive autocorrelation of 
residuals, explained a small proportion of the variance in bill rate < . 
changes. Transformation of variables by the coefficient of autocorrelation 
provides estimates which bridge the gap between high degrees of autocorre­
lation of residuals using levels and low coefficients of multiple determi­
nation when using successive differences.
As expected, the coefficients of multiple determination in the 
transformed variable estimates are smaller than when levels of variables 
are used.
A relevant consideration in the relationship between the bill rate 
and the quantity of bills is the degree of independence of the quantity of 
bills issued by the Treasury. If the Treasury does a considerable amount 
of "tailoring" in its issue of bills, the quantity of bills available is 
partially determined by the requirements of holders. Tax-anticipation 
bills provide an example of bill issues which partially satisfy increased 
demand for short-term debt by non-financial corporations and banks. How­
ever, the use of tax-anticipation bills is useful to the Treasury in equali­
zing volatile cash receipts and in the refinancing of existing debt* The
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net result of "tailoring" by the Treasury would be a reduction in bill rate 
seasonality arising from seasonality in demand.
Variations in the demand for bills appears to have relatively a
greater effect on the bill rate than variations in the bill stock. The
variables included in the regression equations of this Chapter simply do
not explain, to a satisfactory degree, movements in the bill rate. In 
Chapter VIII the demand for Treasury bills by various institutional sectors 
and the effect on the bill rate are discussed.
CHAPTER VIII
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE BILL RATE AND BILL 
HOLDINGS OF INSTITUTIONAL SECTORS
Introduction
In this portion of the analysis the relationships between the bill 
rate and bill holdings of selected institutional sectors are investigated. 
The institutional sectors discussed are: commercial banks, foreign govern­
ments and banks; non-financial corporations, state and local governments, 
and dealers in Government securities. Mutual savings banks, insurance 
companies, and retirement and trust funds, although important holders of 
marketable Federal debt, are excluded from discussion because of their 
concentration of holdings in long-term debt and relatively small holdings 
of bills.
According to the model presented in Chapter V, the stock of bills 
available to the public is determined by Treasury and Federal Reserve 
System debt management decisions. Thus the equilibrium bill rate is 
determined by the willingness of the public to hold the available stock.
If an institutional sector desires to reduce its net holdings of bills, 
either other sectors in the market must be willing to add bills to their 
portfolios at the current bill rate or the bill rate will increase—  
reflecting a shift in the reserve demand schedule to the left.
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The stock of bills, however, has not remained constant over the 
period; rather it has increased greatly. The time series of holdings by 
various institutional sectors reflects the increase in the bill stock.
For those sectors desirous of holding short-term Federal marketable debt, 
sector bill holdings have increased, at least in part, because of the in­
crease in the quantity of bills in proportion to the total short-term 
Federal debt. The relationship between the bill rate and the stock of 
bills available is identical with the relationship between the bill rate 
and the total quantity of bills held by the public. Therefore, multiple 
regressions of the bill rate on levels of holdings of bills by various 
institutional sectors will assuredly contain biases due to autocorrelation 
of residuals. Monthly sector holdings as a per cent of the bill stock 
might eliminate some of these biases.
Ideally, the underlying reasons for changes in bill holdings for 
each sector should be explained. For instance, the theoretical framework 
explaining the levels of bills held by commercial banks, and other rele­
vant sectors should be developed, and, if possible, empirically verified. 
This approach, however, approximates a general equilibrium analysis. The 
approach taken here will be that of partial equilibrium--given a change in 
bill holdings by certain sectors, how is the bill rate affected? It is 
apparent though, that given the stock of bills available to the public to 
hold, a change in one sector's holdings must be reflected in an opposite 
change in the holdings of other sectors.
Relating the bill rate to the quantity of bills held by various 
sectors implies that the demand of an institutional sector is relatively 
inelastic to the level of bill rates, or the difference between the bill
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rkte and the rate on substitutes. The degree of sensitivity of debt
holders to interest rate changes is a debatable point. An illustration
of differences of opinion regarding interest elasticity of the demand for
debt instruments is provided by the following quotations. Robert V. Roosa
has argued that:
...certain institutional changes, marked by the channeling of 
loanable resources into highly specialized investment concerns, 
has made lenders acutely sensitive to slight changes in the 
yield differentials among alternatives, both short and long.
A steadily growing popular insistence on "security"--the 
avoidance of loss, at the expense of accepting lesser yields—  
had favored the growth of conservative intermediary institu­
tions, operating on relatively narrow margins, and alert to 
small changes among the yields on debt instruments that would 
have been considered trivial a few decades e a r l i e r . 249
Assar Lindbeck, addressing himself directly to this argument by Roosa, has
recently pointed out that it is probably true that institutional asset
holders are sensitive to interest rate changes. However, the argument of
"liquidity" oriented holders being sensitive to small changes in the level
of rates, seems to Lindbeck:
...to rest on a fallacy....For, if an asset holder values, on the 
margin, safety and liquidity highly as compared to risk, he re­
quires a relatively great interest rate compensation to switch 
from money balances and government securities to private loans, 
and vice versa. In other words, the higher the value set on 
safety and liquidity relative to yield, on the margin, the 
smaller are the effects on portfolio policy of a given change
in interest r a t e s . 250
Applying Lindbeck's argument more narrowly to Treasury bills, it 
is contended that the choice of holding highly liquid Treasury bills or
249Robert V. Roosa, "Interest Rates and the Central Bank," Monev. 
Trade and Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of John Henry Williams (New 
York: Macmillan Company, 1951), pp. 277-278.
250Lindbeck, A Study in Monetary Analysis, op. cit., p. 225.
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other very short-term Government debt is, for a large portion of bill 
holders, more of a choice between bills and money than a choice between 
bills and other longer-term, higher-risk, higher-yielding assets. For 
instance, a commercial bank satisfies its secondary reserve requirements 
by holding excess reserves or highly marketable or quickly maturing 
assets, and above the minimum desired level of liquidity chooses among 
assets on the basis of relative yield, risk and liquidity. This surely 
does not mean that all bills in the economy have been acquired or main­
tained in portfolios without regard to relative yields on other assets, 
but that a sizeable portion of the total quantity of bills held by insti­
tutions are not responsive to rate changes. Deane Carson, in an article 
critical of the "bills only" policy of the Federal Reserve System, com­
mented that:
Much of the supply of bills outside the Reserve is in the hands 
of holders who are not sensitive to changes in the price of these 
instruments. To these investors (corporations and some banks, 
for example) bills are considered a superior alternative to hold­
ing cash, and riskless in the sense that they mature to par. The 
small gain which a corporation would realize through a sale prior 
to maturity is generally not considered worth the trouble involved. 
Thus, a large segment of the bill supply is frozen; in order to 
dislodge sufficient sales to the System, it may be necessary to 
bid higher prices than would be required otherwise.^51
Approaching this problem from an empirical point of view, how 
does seasonality of the bill rate arise if asset holders are highly sensi­
tive to small rate changes? Apparently longer-term Government securities 
do not exhibit nearly the degree of seasonal movements in rates as do 
bills, and if holders reacted to seasonal movements in bill rates, or
251Deane Carson, "Recent Open Market Committee Policy and Tech­
niques, " _The__2ïSâïl£Êll2L:i2iiESâL.£fJË£222Sïi££2 Vol. LXIX, No. 3 (April, . 
1955), p. 340.
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anticipated these recurrent movements, arbitrage"should smooth out bill 
rate seasonality. No doubt arbitrage exists to a degree in the bill mar­
ket, but the magnitude of bill transactions and bill holdings by institu­
tions satisfying "liquidity" needs--regardless of relative rates--is 
evidently stronger than arbitrage activity because significant seasonality 
does exist in the Treasury bill rate.
According to our simple hypothesis of bill rate determination, 
demand changes affect the bill rate. The seasonality of the bill rate 
measured in Chapter III should be explained by the seasonality in the bill 
stock and seasonality in holdings by principal sectors.
252A principal problem in measuring seasonality in bill holdings
is the complete lack of data in some cases and survey data for only short
time periods for other cases. Only for the Federal Reserve System and
member commercial banks are reliable holdings data available for the com- 
253plete period. Monthly holdings data for Treasury bills and Certificates 
of Indebtedness combined are available for the complete period for the 
international sector--separate bill holding data are unavailable. Non- 
financial corporation holdings of bills are available from a survey cover­
ing approximately 50 per cent of total non-financial corporate holdings 
since January, 1960. State and local government general fund holdings of 
bills are available from survey data which cover approximately 50 per cent
252The data limitations also restricts the meaningfulness of the 
equations measuring the effect on the bill rate of changes in sector hold­
ings.
253Bill holdings of the United States Government agencies and trust 
funds are available, but these values have already been substracted out in 
determining the quantity of bills in the hands of the public. Since these 
holdings are relatively small, no attempt was made to analyze them sepa­
rately.
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of total general fund holdings from September, 1960 to January, 1964, and 
approximately 70 per cent thereafter. Total holdings of Federal securi­
ties for non-financial corporations and state and local governments are 
available monthly for the complete period on the basis of Treasury esti­
mates from benchmark data, but total holdings provide little hfelp in 
measuring short-run changes in bill holdings. Average daily net dealer 
positions and average daily gross transactions in Federal marketable 
securities having less than one year to maturity are available on both a 
monthly and weekly basis in the Federal Reserve Bulletin from a Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York survey for the period since September, 1960.
Weekly dealer data including a separate category of Treasury bills are 
available for the period November, 1957 through December, 1958. In 
addition, unpublished dealer holdings of bills have been provided by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York on a weekly basis for the period September, 
1960 through December, 1961. Unfortunately the thnee series are not di- . 
rectly comparable.
Nevertheless, estimates of seasonality have been made, and the 
effects on the bill rate are discussed on a priori grounds. Because of 
the shortcomings in the data, no attempt has been made to estimate season­
ality by any precise method. The simple ratio-to-moving-average method 
has been employed to derive multiplicative specific seasonal factors. For 
the quantity of bill series and commercial bank holdings, the factors are 
relatively stable. For the Federal Reserve System, and the shorter series, 
the seasonal factors are quite unstable and should be viewed as crude esti­
mates. The time series of holdings of bills by the international sector 
exhibited no significant seasonality.
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Viewing the relative magnitudes of holdings by various sectors, 
and the movement of the series relative to the bill rate, it appears that 
the commercial banking sector may be the most important factor on the 
demand side affecting the Treasury bill rate. In Chapter VII it waô shown 
that free reserves were highly related to the bill rate, and it was asserted 
that this reflected changes in demand by commercial banks. This assertion 
is examined in greater detail in this part of the study.
Due to the lack of adequate bill holding information for important 
sectors, most of the conclusions of this Chapter will be rather tentative.
In light of the conclusions of Chapter VII, that changes in demand for 
bills appear to be much more important than changes in the stock of bills, 
this is an unfortunate circumstance. It is hoped, however, that a few 
interesting possibilities might be encountered with the data available.
The analysis begins with the presentation of bill holding data 
for the most important institutional sectors: commercial banks, foreign
governments and banks, non-financial corporations, state and local govern­
ments, and U. S. Government securities dealers. The determinants of the 
holdings of commercial banks will receive a brief analysis. For the re­
mainder of the sectors, a brief discussion of the determinants of bill 
holdings and a review of some of the more relevant studies will be presented. 
This will be followed by a discussion of the seasonality of the bill stock 
and the seasonality of bill holdings by sectors. Some empirical estimates 
are then made relating bill rate changes to bill holdings by sectors. As 
in the last Chapter, dummy variables will be included for measuring season­
ality.
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Treasury Bill Holdings by Institutional Sectors 
Commercial banks
Commercial banks hold Treasury bills and other short-term Govern­
ment securities in sizeable quantities as secondard reseryes--liquid assets
held in excess of vault cash, deposits with correspondent banks and re- 
254quired reserves. Short-term marketable securities satisfy the liquidity 
needs of commercial banks, bridging the gap between excess cash reserves 
and investment in longer-term securities of relatively low risk, and 
higher-risk, lower-yield loans. The holding of Treasury bills by commer­
cial banks may be viewed as satisfying "transactions," "precautionary," 
and "speculative" motives for commercial banks. If a commercial bank 
begins to feel pressure on its reserve position. Treasury bills may be 
sold in the open market, used as eligible paper in borrowing from the Fed­
eral Reserve System, or held until maturity and redeemed for cash.
The view taken here is that the quantity of bills held by the 
member commercial banks is determined as a part of the complete portfolio 
decision, inclusive of decisions as to the proportion of assets to be held 
in cash, loans, or any other type of security. For commercial banks, these 
decisions have been characterized as "liquidity versus earnings." The 
Treasury bill is ideal in providing some earnings, dependent on the level 
of the bill rate, and liquidity needs.
It was argued in Chapter VI that Federal Reserve System transactions 
in the open market affected commercial bank bill holdings, and in Chapter
254For a discussion of liquidity needs and secondary reserves, see; 
The Commercial Banking Industry. The American Bankers Association (Engle­
wood Cliffs, N. J.: Frentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 272-280.
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VII It was argued that free reserves were an indicator of the demand for 
bills by commercial banks. The arguments provided in the last two Chapters 
were inadequate, and it is necessary to examine more closely the direction 
and magnitude of the effect of these variables, through commercial bank 
holding of bills, on the bill rate. A central assumption of this discus­
sion is provided by Meigs in the explanation of the time lag of the effect 
of open market operations on commercial bank free-reserve ratios.
An interest rate explanation for lags in the response of free re­
serves to open market operations can be based upon the contention 
of this study that market interest rates are not determine^ by 
the free-reserve ratio but that they are influenced by the rates 
per unit of time at which the Federal Reserve System and the
member banks buy and sell assets.255
Revising this hypotheses for the more narrow purposes of bill rate analysis,
the Treasury bill rate is directly affected by changes in holdings of bills
by commercial banks and the Federal Reserve System, with bank holdings
affected by System open market transactions.
The Federal Reserve System through open market purchases and sales, 
or through changes in reserve requirements, can influence member bank re­
serves. The member commercial banks, however, make the final determination 
of the level of free reserves they desire to hold by their reaction to the
attempts of the Federal Reserve System to influence their free reserve
position. If the System, in a one month period, is a net buyer of bills, 
and commercial banks maintain the same portfolio at the end of the period 
as they had at the beginning of the period, free reserves increase. But 
commercial banks may immediately react to the changes in their reserve 
position by increasing their loans and investments, and at the end of the
255Meigs, .cit., p. 85.
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period free reserves possibly may be less than at the beginning of the 
period.
The level of holdings of Treasury bills by member commercial banks
at the end of each month for the period 1953 through 1964 is shown in
256Table 39. Generally, over this period the quantity of bills held by 
commercial banks has shown some increase, but has fluctuated over a wide 
range with changes of one billion dollars or more between successive months 
not uncommon. The range of holdings over the period are from the low of 
$1,875 billion at the end of March, 1956, to a high of $10,969 billion for 
December, 1964. A seasonal pattern in holdings is also apparent.
Early in 1953, bill holdings of member commercial banks began a 
decline, leveling out at roughly three billion dollars. Holdings persisted 
at this level with some important fluctuations until the increase in hold­
ings began in late 1960. Part of the increase in the level of bill hold­
ings by commercial banks may be accounted for by the increasing percentage 
of the short-term marketable debt being issued by the Treasury in the form 
of bills. In 1960 the Treasury began to issue six-month, nine-month, and 
one-year bills in lieu of alternative forms of debt.
Several other relative measures of bank holdings of bills are 
shown in Table 40 for June 30 dates for the period 1953-1964. First, the 
level of member commercial bank holdings of: bills, within-one-year
256Member bank holdings by approximately 6,000 bankq account for 
roughly 90 per cent of total bank holdings of Federal marketable debt. 
Semiannually the Treasury presents a detailed survey of commercial bank 
ownership by type of security for: 6,000 commercial banks, broken down by 
nonmember banks and by member banks with a further breakdown of member 
banks into Hew York City, Chicago, other Reserve city and country banks. 
See, for instance. Section I, p. 75, Treasurv Bulletin. February, 1965.
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TABLE 39.--Member commercial bank holding of bills, monthly, January, 1953- 
December, 1964 (in billions of dollars)
Month 1953 1954 1955 1956
January 6.538 4.723 4.268 2.839
February 5.381 3.920 3.807 2.493
March 4.048 3.858 2.968 1.875
April 3.805 5.024 3.503 2.280
May 3.662 4.145 2.682 2.228
June 4.411 4.411 2.721 2.181
July 5.015 4.368 2.775 1.924
August 4.556 5.068 2.712 2.008
September 4.500 4.962 2.846 2.468
October 4.579 4.890 2.584 3.038
November 4.298 4.357 2.369 3.911
December 4.368 4.399 3.562 4.934
Month 1957 1958 1959 1960
January 4.332 3.892 4.838 4.793
February 3.939 3.999 4.815 3.796
March 2.944 3.322 3.699 2.518
April 3.200 3.817 4.504 3.150
May 3,975 3.522 4.383 2.765
June 2.853 3.796 3.563 2.376
July 3.852 3.886 4.838 4.554
August 4.985 3.261 4.499 4.344
September 3.892 3.509 4.307 5.127
October 3.880 4.496 4.545 7.080
November 3.514 5.511 3.705 6.455
December 4.332 5.194 5.011 6.976
Month 1961 1962 1963 1964
January 7.486 9.886 9.282 8.782
February 6.488 9.029 9.096 8.299
March 4.750 7.095 8.039 7.984
April 6.447 7.480 8.481 7.501
May 5.917 7.340 7.945 7.130
June 6.379 7.090 7.633 7.505
July 9.153 6.931 6.890 6.993
August 8.814 6.610 5.977 7.507
September 10.133 6.850 7.796 9.168
October 9.530 8.352 8.299 9.562
November 9.287 8.404 7.821 10.108
December 9.962 9.838 9.290 10.969
Sources: Federal Reserve Bulletin and Treasury Bulletin. various
monthly issues, 1952-1965.
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TABLE 40.— Commercial bank holdings of selected categories of Federal 
marketable debt, June 30 dates, 1953-1964 (in billions of dollars)
Year
Commercial bank holding of Quantity of bills in the 
hands of the 
public (qy)
(4)
Quantity of Federal 
marketable debt 
within one year of 
maturity in the hands 










1953 4.411 19.580 51.365 18.146 48.921
1954 4.411 17.684 56.199 17.954 45.273
1955 2.721 7.187 55.667 18.588 32.224
1956 2.181 7.433 49.517 19.680 37.545
1957 2.853 12.268 48.590 23.003 49.619
1958 3.796 13.431 57.379 19.530 43.873
1959 3.563 10.045 53.394 29.899 51.341
1960 2.376 6.546 48.004 30.531 49.452
1961 6.379 20.153 55.033 33.082 63.287
1962 7.090 21.511 57.038 38.276 68.073
1963 7.633 15.541 55.439 42.724 61.955
1964 7.505 14.549 51.108 44.110 61.573
Sources: Various monthly issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin
and the Treasury Bulletin.
marketable Federal debt (including bills), and total marketable Federal 
debt are shown along with the quantity of bills in the hands of the public 
(9jj), and the total quantity of Federal marketable debt within one year of 
maturity in the hands of the public. In the second portion of the table, 
member bank holdings of various categories of marketable Federal debt are 
expressed relative to other debt and holding levels. The relative meas­
ures, shown in Table 41, include:
a. member commercial bank bill holdings as a percentage of 
commercial bank holdings of within one year of maturity 
Federal marketable debt.
TABLE 41.--Conmierclal bank holdings of selected Federal debt instruments expressed as ratios to hold­
ings and debt categories, June 30 dates, 1953-1964 (ratios calculated from column numbers from Table 39)



















Commercial bank holdings 
of within one year 
marketable Federal debt 






able debt due 
within one 
year -
Ratio of bill holdings 
to one year holdings as 
a percentage of the 
ratio of the quantity 
of bills to quantity of 
one year marketable
( 1 / 2 )  I (4/5)
1953 22.5 8.6 24.3 38.1 40.0 60.6
1954 24.5 7.8 24.6 31.5 39.1 61.7
1955 37.9 4.9 14.6 12.9 22.3 65.7
1956 29.4 4.4 11.1 15.0 19.8 56.1
1957 23.3 5.9 12.4 25.3 24.7 50.2
1958 28.3 6.6 19.4 23.4 30.6 63.6
1959 35.5 6.7 11.9 18.8 19.6 61.0
1960 36.3 4.9 7.8 13.6 13.2 58.8
1961 31.7 11.6 19.3 36.6 31.8 60.6
1962 33.0 12.4 18.5 37.7 31.6 58.7
1963 49.1 13.8 17.9 28.0 25.1 71.2
1964 51.6 14.7 17.0 28.5 23.6 72.1
Source: Calculated from data in Table 39.
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b. member commercial bank-bill holdings as a percentage of 
total bank holdings of marketable Federal debt,
c. member bank holdings of within one year marketable 
Federal debt as a percentage of total marketable Federal 
debt holdings.
d. bill holdings of commercial banks as a percentage of the 
total quantity of bills available to the public,
e. bank holdings of within-one-year marketable Federal debt 
as a percentage of the total quantity of marketable 
Federal debt within one year of maturity available to 
the public, and finally,
f. the ratio of commercial bank bill holdings to bank hold­
ings of within one year debt as a percentage of the ratio 
of q^ to q.
The results indicate that bill holdings as a percentage of within-one- 
year marketable debt have Increased over most of the period, and although 
the upward trend is not as strong, there has been an increase in bills as 
a percentage of total bank holdings of Federal marketable debt. Bank 
holdings of marketable debt of less than one yfear to maturity as a per­
centage of total marketable debt holdings has shown considerable vola­
tility, with no apparent trend. Also bank bill holdings as a percentage 
of bills in the hands of the public has varied considerably from 24.6 per 
cent in 1954 down to 7.8 per cent in 1960--with a considerable jump in 
1958 when the percentage moved to 19.4— and, since the 1960 low, the per­
centage has remained at approximately 18 per cent. The percentage of 
within-one-year holdings to total holdings of marketable debt again shows' ' r
little if any trend, and significant fluctuation.
Perhaps the most interesting result is the last column of the per­
centages, showing the ratio of commercial bank bill holdings to bank hold­
ings of within-one-year securities as a percentage of the ratio q^/q.
There is some volatility to this percentage with the low value of 50.2 in
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1957 and the high of 72.1 In 1964. Although the movement of the percentage 
»
Is Interesting; the average level of these percentages Indicates a bank 
preference of non-bill short-term debt with the percentage of bank holding 
of bills to total one-year-holdings lower than the percentage of bills 
available to within-one-year available.
These percentages, and their fluctuations, indicates that the 
determinants of commercial bank portfolio policy require a great deal 
more analysis than this study provides. However, since free reserves 
were so important in "explaining" movements in the bill rate in the last 
Chapter, an attempt was made to regress commercial bank bill holdings on 
some of the independent variables used to explain the bill rate. The 
independent variables used were: country bank reserves (R^), non-country
bank reserves (R^), Treasury deposits at commercial banks (T), and the 
level of the bill rate (r^) or as a ratio to the discount rate (r^/r^).
The dependent variable was expressed alternatively in the form of level 
of bill holdings by commercial banks (C^); level of bill holdings as a 
percentage of holdings of marketable debt within one year of maturity 
(Cb/Ci); level of bill holdings as a percentage of total bills available 
to the public Ĉ /q|̂ ; and finally— Cjj/Cĵ  t q^/q. Most of the regression 
equations were estimated both with and without the use of monthly dummy 
seasonal variables. Bill holdings of commercial banks, free reserves, 
and Treasury deposits are expressed in billions of dollars (5.674) and 
the rates are expressed as percentages (3.21).
The estimated equations are summarized in Table 42. The multiple 
coefficients of determination are relatively low, and the Durbin-Watson 
statistics indicate a high probability of autocorrelation of residuals.
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TABLE 42.— Selected regression equations relating member commercial bank 
holdings of Treasury bills to: non-country bank free reserves (R,),
country bank free reserves (R ), Treasury deposits in commercial banks 
(T), and the bill rate (r. or r, /r,), monthly: January, 1953-December,
1964
Equation
number Equation and (standard error) R'
d")
= -4.192 + 3.285R, + 9.656R + 3.263T + 2.110r,
(.516) (1.616)C (.102) (.197)
.63
(2")
Cb + 3.112R + 7.964R + .583Ï + 1.822r, - 3.1941 (.532)1 (1.993)*^ (.122) (.238) 1
- 3.26411 - 4.325111 - 3.627iv - 4.461v - 4.691vi
2 7 4 8 10
- 4.728VÜ - 4.863viii - 4.582ix - 4.113% - 4.124x1
11 12 9 5 6
3.453x11
3 .68 .43
(3”)Ĉ /Ci .274 + .189R, - .386R + .018T + .225r./r.
(.036) (.091)^ (.007) (.064) .35 .50
(4")Cb/Ci + ,.185R, - .608R + .034T + .066r./r.
(.034) (.094) (.007) (.064)
+ .5121 + .46511 + .395111 + .4321v + .322v 
1 3 8 5 12
+ .333vl + .387vll + .378vlll + .4321% + .427% 
11 9 10 6 7
+ .439x1 + .495x11 
4 2 .51 .54
(5")
Cb/9b .009R, + .210R + .005T - .OlOr, + .1241 (.014) (.051)® (.003) (.006) 2
+ .11011 + .083111 + .1031v + .092v + .097vl 
5 12 7 10 9
+ .098vll + .092vlll +.1061% + .117% + .111x1 






number Equation and (standard error) r 2 d*
(6")




+ .145 r./r, 
(.063) '■ .13 .70
(7")
C^/Ci/qb/qi = .159R, - .157R + .021T 
(.029) (.109)= (.007)
+ .2171 + .21311 + .158111 
1 2  8
+ .079r./r, 
(.OIS)” ^
+ .190iv + .118v 
4 12
+ .120vi + .155vii + .134viii + .163ix 
n  9 10 7
+ .169x + .168x1 + .212x11 
5 6 3 .62 .52
Matrix of simple correlation coefficients for levels of variables
1.000
Rl Rc T ’̂b
.483 1.000
Rc .183 .585 1.000
T .444 .309 -.0002 1.000
rb -310 -.378 -.714 .158 1.000(
For the inost part the partial regression coefficients are 1.6 times as 
large as the respective standard errors although there are several excep­
tions depending on the form in which the dependent variable is expressed. 




The Inclusion of dummy monthly seasonal variables illustrates a 
strong seasonality of bank holdings of bills, regardless of the form in 
which holdings are brought in as the dependent variable. Comparison of 
the ranking of the seasonal regression coefficients shows little vari­
ability between equations 2", 4", 5", and 7" with December, January, and
February generally being well above "normal" and May, June, July, and
257August generally below the "normal" level.
The inclusion of dummy variables, however, does little to reduce 
the degree of autocorrelation of residuals.
In equations 1" and 2" the dependent variable is the level of 
member commercial bank bill holdings. The partial regression coefficients 
are large relative to the biased standard errors, with the dummy seasonal 
variables increasing the coefficient of multiple determination in equation 
2". The only partial regression coefficient which is changed by the inclu­
sion of dummy variables is T, Treasury deposits in member commercial banks, 
which decreases from 3.263 to .583.
The relationship between bill holdings and the bill rate is strong, 
indicating a one per cent increase in the bill rate (from two to three 
per cent) would "cause" an increase in bank holdings by approximately two 
billion dollars. However, if bank holdings of bills meet the liquidity 
requirement of commercial banks and are relatively insensitive to levels 
of the bill rate, it would be more sensible to measure the bill rate rela­
tive to a substitute in commercial bank portfolios. Therefore, in equa­
tions 3" through 7" the bill rate is expressed relative to the discount 
rate, r ^ ^ / r T h e  expected sign of this relationship is positive
257An estimation of the seasonality of member bank holdings of 
bills is presented below.
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indicating that the greater the bill rate relative to the discount rate 
the larger will be bank holding of bills, assuming the free reserves vari­
ables remain constant. The ceteris paribus assumption of free reserves is 
reasonable enough sinpe rediscounting at the Federal Reserve Bank has the 
same effect on free reserves as a reduction of bill holdings and vice 
versa. In other words, free reserves may remain constant as commercial 
banks substitute bills and rediscounting, dependent upon the relative 
rates.
Equations 3" and 4" yielded slightly poorer results as measured 
by the multiple coefficients of determination. Also there was no improve­
ment in the calculated degree of autocorrelation. The addition of dummy 
seasonal variables in equation 4" increased the partial regression coef­
ficients for Rg and T, and decreased the coefficient for r^/r^.
Equation 5" produced relatively poorer partial regression coeffi­
cients relative to the calculated standard errors, with the coefficient 
for R^ less than the standard error and near a zero value. Only the re­
gression coefficient for R^ is large relative to the standard error. The 
dummy seasonal variables account in large part for the multiple coefficient 
of determination of .56.
The dummy seasonal variables in equation 7" increase the coeffi­
cient of determination from .13 in equation 6" to .62. This indicates an 
important degree of seasonality in bank holdings of bills as a percentage 
of bank holdings of one year marketable debt relative to q̂ /̂q̂  that is not 
explained by the other dependent variables. It is possible that the "un­
explained" variance in the dependent variable may be caused by the vari­
ability in the ratio qy/q^. However, a comparison of the rankings of the 
coefficients of the dummy seasonal variables of various forms of the
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dependent variables Indicates that the seasonal factors of equations 7" 
are not very different from those estimated In equations 2"j 4", and 5".
A comparison of the common partial regression coefficients between equa­
tions 6" and 7" Indicate a change In the coefficient from from -.066
to -.157, an Increase In the coefficient for T from .001 to .021, and a
decrease In the coefficient for r./r. from .145 to .079. All three ofb d
these coefficients are larger relative to the standard errors In equation 
7" than In equation 6".
These estimated equations, although characterized by positively 
autocorrelated residuals. Indicate that free reserves of country banks 
and of non-country banks may be Important In explaining commercial bank 
holdings of bills. The results, however, may be spurious Instead of cause 
and effect related; for Instance, a purchase of bills, ceteris paribus, 
reduces free reserves of the bank making the purchase. It Is difficult to
evaluate these results. The determinants of commercial bank portfolio
policy are much more complex than the relationships presented here. Possi­
bly variables such as bank debits, deposit turnover, or System holding 
would assist In satisfactorily explaining commercial bank holdings of bills 
on a monthly basis. The bill rate, either as a level or as a ratio with 
the discount rate. Is highly related to bank bill holdings In the multiple 
regression estimates. It has been argued that bank holdings of bills need 
not be sensitive to bill rate movements, and Instead, the bill rate Is 
partially dependent upon changes In the level of bank holdings. It Is 
quite apparent that a theoretically sound system of structural equations 
Is necessary to measure the Interdependence of these variables.
In the latter part of this Chapter, an attempt Is made to measure 
the partial effect on the bill rate of changes In the level of commercial 
bank holdings of bills.
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Foreign governments and banks
Foreign governments and banks maintain large portfolios of short­
term Federal marketable debt. Although bill holdings alone are not avail­
able, Table 43 shows monthly holdings of Treasury bills and Certificates
of Indebtedness for the period January, 1953 through December, 1964. The
?
series shows no important degree of seasonality on a ratio-to-twelve-month-
average measurement, and generally shows a rather steady upward trend.
The low values, $2,898 billion, for international holdings of short-term
marketable Federal debt is registered at the beginning of the period in
February, 1953, and the high value, $9,121 billion, in June, 1963. The
series is relatively stable, although some rather large monthly changes
occur in the period 1962-1964.
Recently some empirical estimates have been attempted to measure
the sensitivity of this sector's holdings to interest rate changes or
differentials in bill rates between the United States and other money 
258market centers. Recently, the Federal Reserve Bulletin has begun to
present statistics to indicate the yield spreads (accounting for forward
currency rates) between bill rates in the United States and the United
Kingdom and Canada indicating whether the spread favors short-term-fund
259inflows or outflows with these two countries. Indeed, it has been the
258An example is provided by: J. L. Stein, "International Short-
Term Capital Movements," The American Economic Review, Vol. LV, No. 1 
(March, 1965), pp. 40-66. For a description of the activity in the short­
term market by the international sector, see: Andrew F. Brimmer, "Foreign
Banking Institutions in the United States Money Market," The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. XLIV, No. 1 (February, 1962), pp. 76-81.
259The weekly series was initiated regularly in late 1964. The 
article by Samuel I. Katz, "Yield Differentials in Treasury Bills, 1959- 
64," Federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 50, No. 10 (October, 1964), pp.1241- 
1260, carried the series back to the beginning of 1959.
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TABLE 43.— International sector holdings of U. S. Treasury bills and 
Certificates of Indebtedness: monthly, 1953-1964 (in billions of
dollars)
Month 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
January 2.938 3.630 3.819 ■ 4.450 5.033 5.534
February 2.898 3.662 3.670 4.530 4.859 4.996
March 2.992 3.648 3.655 4.820 4.909 4.600
April 3.180 3.615 3.816 4.798 4.837 4.372
May 3.190 3.648 3.817 4.883 4.878 4.429
June 3.144 3.458 3.849 4.746 4.875 4.297
July 3.196 3.531 3.827 4.742 5.034 4.408
August 3.412 3.470 3.832 4.790 5.138 4.800
September 3.517 3.615 4.008 4.969 5.021 5.115
October 3.587 3.635 4.150 5.039 5.410 5.322
November 3.585 3.612 4.166 4.790 5.427 5.340
December 3.445 3.611 4.209 5.151 5.371 5.372
Month 1950 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
January 5.404 7.464 7.681 6, 853 8.888 8.651
February 5.782 7.521 7.351 7.115 8.761 8.498
March 5.467 7.376 7.417 7.614 8.909 8.108
April 5.661 7.233 7.090 7.391 9.021 7.803
May 6.012 7.309 7.078 7.691 9.083 7.887
June 6.275 7.339 7.164 8.243 9.121 7.941
July 6.721 7.406 7.130 8.000 8.928 8.000
August 6.878 7.638 7.323 8.159 9.027 8.254
September 7.128 7.546 7.548 9.010 8.968 8.281
October 7.375 7.688 7.459 9.569 8.857 8.238
November 7.416 7.328 7.293 9.583 8.689 . 8.554
December 7.475 7.639 7.512 9.330 8.690 . 8.799
Sources: From 1952 through 1960, Supplement to Banking and Mone­
tary Statistics, "International Finance," (Section 15) Board of Governor's 
of the Federal Reserve System, 1962; from 1961 through 1964, Federal Re­
serve Bulletin, each monthly issue, "Short-Term Liabilities to Foreigners." 
For the period 1961 through mid-1963, special issues held by International 
Agencies were subtracted out. For the complete period, 1953-1964, other 
holdings were added to governmental and bank holdings.
deliberate policy of the Treasury and Federal Reserve System to bid up the 
short-term rate as an inducement for foreign governments and banks to hold 
financial balance of payments claims against the U. S. in the form of
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Federal marketable debt Instead of settling the account through gold trans­
fers. The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have been successful in 
bidding up the bill rate to a level remaining near the Canadian bill rate 
in the latter hhlf of 1963 and throughout 1964. The U. S. bill rate 
attained a level near the United Kingdom rate in late 1963--early 1964, 
but due to the recent Sterling crisis was more than 2.5 per cent points 
below the London rate at the end of 1964 as the United Kingdom rate rose 
to over 6.4 per cent (adjusted to discount basis for comparability with the 
U. S. rate). However, given the percentage discount on forward pounds, the 
effective differential still favored arbitrage movements toward the New 
York market.
Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that these differentials are 
not the overriding consideration in the determination of the level of hold-
y V
ings of short-term Federal marketable debt by the international sector.
The determinant factors of international holdings are more basic economic
factors such as balance of payments and relative macroeconomic trends.
Roland I. Robinson has pointed out that:
...although interest rates are somewhat influential in explain­
ing the movements of funds (and they often move for other 
reasons--usuBlly in search of economic and political stability), 
the funds themselves may have considerable influence on rates.
The purpose here is not to examine the determinants of holdings by 
the international sector, but rather to measure the effects of increased 
sector holdings on the bill rate. Again, there is not a clear direction 
of cause and effect, but rather interdependence between holdings and the 
rate. Given the quantity of bills available, increased demand by the 
international sector, ceteris paribus* should lower the bill rate.
260Roland I. Robinson, Money and Capital Markets (New York: McGraw-
Hill Bank Co., 1964), p. 352.
274
N.on-financial corporations play an Important role in the Treasury
bill market by holding large quantities of regular weekly bill issues and
the majority of tax anticipation bills. Recently corporations have been
important suppliers of credit to U. S. Government securities dealers. The
level of holdings of Treasury bills reporting to the Treasury survey are
provided in Table 44 for the period 1959 through December, 1964. The
corporations reporting to the survey account for approximately 50 per cent
of total corporate holdings, although it is probable that greater than one-
half of the bill holdings by the non-financial corporation are included in
the survey. In Chapter II above the empirical evidence indicated that non-
financial corporations were not very sensitive to levels or changes in the
bill rate. James S. Duesenberry has recently stated that:
In spite of a number of efforts to do so, I believe no one has
found a statistically significant relationship between short­
term variations in bill yields and the distribution of corporate 
liquidity between cash and g o v e r n m e n t s . 261
Duesenberry listed some of the more important reasons for corpora­
tions holding demand deposits or short-term, highly marketable assets.
First, some minimum of liquid assets is required to cover 
the day-to-day variations in receipts and expenditures without 
continually borrowing and repaying bank loans. Second, many 
corporations have wide seasonal variations in their cash in­
flows and outflows....Third, most, though not all, business 
firms seem to feel that it is desirable to fund all or a very 
large part of their tax liability....Fourth, most firms wish 
to have liquidity to meet the problems arising from a decline 
in cash flow from current operations during a d e p r e s s i o n . ^62
Ernest Block has concluded in a recent study that there is indeed 
a close relationship between corporate holdings of marketable Federal debt
261James S. Duesenberry, "The Portfolio Approach to the Demand for 
Money and other Assets," The Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol. XLV, 
No. I, Part 2 (Supplement: February, 1963), p. 15.
2 G % I b i d .. p .  1 1 .
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TABLE 44.— Non-fInanclal corporation holdings of Treasury bills of those 
corporations reporting to the Treasury Survey; monthly, January, 1960 to
December, 1964
Month 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
January 6.832 5.800 5.598 7.050 6.749
February 7.393 6.313 6.114 7.736 7.488
March 5.317 4.907 5.257 6.597 6.290
April 5.935 5.466 5.698 7.175 6.878
May 5.941 6.047 6.217 8.178 7.429
June 4.579 4.885 5.213 6.325 5.845
July 4.802 5.509 5.481 6.377 6.073
August 4.983 5.732 5.826 6.906 5.864
September 4.256 4.539 4.609 5.545 4.868
October 5.041 5.391 5.812 6.405 5.564
November 6.100 6.165 7.076 6.932 5.519
December 5.599 5.466 6.551 6.178 5.043
Sources: Federal Reserve Bulletin and Treasury Bulletin, various
monthly issues, September, 1960 through March, 1965.
and corporate accrued tax l i a b i l i t i e s . H e  noted however that large manu­
facturing corporations consistently held a greater volume of securities than 
accrued tax liabilities, while the reverse was true of "smaller" corpora­
tions. Block defined "free governments" as holding of Federal securities 
by large manufacturing corporations above their accrued tax liabilities, 
and attempted to explain the movement of "free governments" over the period 
1948-1961. Block concluded that: "There is no interest-rate relationship
Ernest Block, "Short Cycles in Corporate Demand for Government 
Securities and Cash," The American Economic Review. Vol. LIII, No. 5 
(December, 1963), pp. 1058-1077.
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that can consistently explain either the level of holdings or changes In 
264holdings," although "free governments" moved cyclically between limits 
of near zero In late 1951-early 1952 to over $4 billion In 1959. Block 
Indicates that holdings of "free governments" are dependent on "real" 
factors such as Inventories and Investment plans. Nevertheless, the sea­
sonal movement of that portion of Federal securities associated with 
accrued tax liabilities Is greater than "free governments" even for the 
peak level of "free governments" In 1959.
Block points out that the advent of negotiable certificates of 
deposit and the realization of corporate treasurers that there was little 
risk In holding sales finance paper allowed great diversification In the 
holding of short-term assets. Stephen H. Axllrod and Janice Krummack 
have remarked that the market for negotiable certificates of deposits "may 
have taken some of the dally pressure off bill rates because these certifi­
cates provide Investors, mainly businesses, with another Instrument through 
which they could make adjustments In their liquidity positions."
Table 44 Indicates that corporations reporting In the Treasury survey held 
a smaller volume of bills In every month of 1964 than the corresponding 
month In 1963. Nevertheless, a breakdown of the bill holdings of Treasury 
bills of those corporations reported In the Treasury survey Indicates the 
Importance of accrued tax liabilities. As of December 31, 1964, the 469
264Ibid., p. 1064.
265Ibid.. pp. 1074-1075.
266Stephen H. Axllrod and Janice Kummack, "Federal Reserve Security 
Transactions, 1954-63," Federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 50, No. 7 (July, 
1964), pp. 834-835.
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surveyed corporations held $1,371 billion of their $5,043 billion total 
bill holdings In the form of tax anticipation bills. Except for hold­
ings of commercial banks, other reporting sectors held relatively small 
quantities of tax anticipation bills, and If the residual holdings of tax 
anticipation bills In the "all other" category were added to corporate 
holdings of TA's, this would account for $2.643 billion of the total tax 
anticipation bills outstanding of $4.008 billion, or approximately 65 per 
cent of the total. Commercial banks held nearly a billion dollars of the 
remainder.
State and local governments
State and local governments Invest Idle balances from general 
operating funds In Treasury bills and other short-term marketable debt. 
Also state pension funds and trust funds, which are not Included In these 
series, are heavily Invested In Federal securities, but In longer maturi­
ties than bills, according to a survey carried out by the Public Affairs 
Research Council of Louisiana In 1956, 12 states were restricted to Fed­
eral securities In regard to Investing Idle balances from general funds
while 18 other states were authorized. In addition, to purchase their own 
268Issues. A wide range of authority exists In the Investment of local 
funds.
For those governmental units holding Federal debt, holdings will 
vary because of seasonality In receipts and payments. For state and local
267Treasury Bulletin. February, 1965.
268Investment of Idle Cash Balances bv State and Local Governments, 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Washington, D. C., 
January, 1961, p. 16.
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government general fund expenditures, school expenditures may be reduced
in the summer months, but this is probably the only common cause of large
fluctuations in expenditures. The variability of revenues will probably
be more pronounced, dependent of course, on the type of taxes and schedule
of collections. The majority of the 36 states having an income tax have a
filing date corresponding to that of the Federal government, April 15.
Also, most of the states require withholding, with the employer submitting
returns quarterly, although it appears that more states are moving toward
269a requirement of monthly employer returns. Essentially the same states 
which require personal income tax have a form of corporate income tax but 
the rates are relatively low, and the revenue derived small relative to the 
personal tax.
By far the greatest single source of revenue for state governments
is derived from the general sales tax, which now accounts for about 25 per
cent of total state revenues. Of the 37 states relying on a general sales
tax in 1964, over one-half require monthly returns, with the remainder
requiring quarterly returns. Some states permit either monthly or quar- ■ 
270terly returns.
The property tax provides the greatest revenue for local govern­
ments with county governments, city governments, and "authorities" sharing 
to widely varying degrees the assessment, collection, and administration
269Tax Overlapping in the United States. 1964. Advisory Commis­
sion on Intergovernmental Relations, Washington, D. C., July, 1964, p. 128.
270Ibid., p. 106.
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of the tax under the supervision of the state governments. The collection 
of the property tax is noirmally on an annual basis.
A great deal of aggregation is entailed when state and local govern­
ment holdings of bills are examined. Seasonality in the aggregate holdings 
results from a weighted average of state and local government revenue— ex­
penditure flows and investment policies. The series of state and local 
government general fund holdings as measured by the Treasury survey are 
shown in Table 45. Until January, 1964 the survey covers 295 general funds, 
and since this date, 316 general funds are included. Therefore, in addi­
tion to the inadequacies due to length and coverage, this series is also 
inconsistent in the degree of coverage. Treasury estimated total holdings 
of Federal debt for state and local governments as of the end of December, 
1964 were $21.6 billion. State and local governments reporting to the 
Treasury survey accounted for approximately $15.0 billion of the total with 
more than 30 per cent of these holdings in maturities less than one year—  
slightly less than $4 billion of this in Treasury bills. Over-20-years-to- 
maturity Federal securities accounted for roughly the same percentage of 
holdings as the one year category.
Dealers
Dealer portfolios, at any point in time, reflect rather large bill 
holdings. Since seventy-five per cent, more or less, of the total volume 
of transactions in the Government securities market are in the form of 
bills, dealers require an ‘'inventory'' of bills in order to satisfy purchase 
orders. Dealers earn an interest return on securities in their portfolio. 
However, a dealer has to borrow to maintain a position and the rate charged 
him is usually enough higher than the bill rate to discourage any attempts
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TABLE 45.— Holdings of Treasury bills of general purpose funds of state 
and local government reporting to the Treasury survey; monthly, January, 
1961 through December, 1964 (In billions of dollars)
Month 1961 1962 1963 1964
January 2.384 2.566 3.456 4.263*
February 2.693 2.800 3.684 4.569
March 2.839 2.937 3.506 4.694
April 2.747 3.259 4.119 5.404
May 2.771 3.661 4.184 5.334
June 2.522 3.527 4.246 5.136
July 2.643 3.614 4.125 4.891
August 2.701 3.541 4.306 5.174
September 2.604 3.336 3.896 4.772
October 2.398 3.181 3.553 4.577
November 2.326 2.992 3.393 4.367
December 2.517 3.282 3.896 3.961
^Beginning In January, 1964, approximately 316 units of government 
are reporting, whereas prior to this data approximately 295 units were re­
porting.
Sources: Federal Reserve Bulletin and Treasury Bulletin, various
monthly Issues, September, 1964 through March, 1965.
to break even on maintenance of a portfolio. The dealers earn their return 
by the difference In the price at which they buy and sell securities. In 
periods when the bill rate Is Increasing (prices decreasing). It would be 
expected that a dealer's portfolio would be smaller than If the rate were 
decreasing, and vice versa: therefore, an Inverse relationship should be 
expected. However, the relationship Is much more complex, principally 
because dealers are not acting simply as brokers, and stand ready to buy 
or sell regardless of portfolio considerations. If market conditions are
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such that other Institutional sectors are generally reducing their hold­
ings and dealer portfolios are expanding, interest rates will increase as 
dealers lower bid prices to reduce upward pressures on positions.
The monthly average daily value of dealer holdings of Federal mar­
ketable securities maturing within one year are shown in Table 46, for the 
period September, 1960 through December, 1964. The low average daily posi­
tion, $1.6 billion, was registered in March, 1961, and the high value,
$3.6 billion, in January, 1963. Although these holdings are largely bills, 
a highly variable proportion are in other types of near-maturity issues. 
Bill positions are available on a weekly basis for the period October, 1957 
through December, 1958 from the Treasury-Federal Reserve Studv of the Gov­
ernment Securities Market, and from September, 1960 through December, 1961 
from unpublished information furnished by the Market Statistics Division 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. These sets of data, however, are 
not exactly comparable, and are not utilized in any of the empirical esti­
mates.
Dealer transactions
Data on dealer transactions are available on the same basis as 
dealer positions and for identical periods. Transactions in Government 
marketable securities of less than one year maturity are shown in Table 47. 
The expected relationship of this variable with the bill rate may be either 
positive or negative depending on whether the volume of transactions is 
induced from the demand or the supply side. If the increased volume of 
gross transactions is demand induced the relationship with the bill rate 
should be positive, if supply induced the relationship should be negative. 
Therefore, the level of transactions may be either positively or negatively
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TABLE 46.— Dealer positions in U. S. Government Securities having less 
than one year to maturity, monthly average at daily figures; January, 1961 
through December, 1964 (in billions of dollars)
Month 1961 1962 1963 1964
January 2.338 2.589 3.622 3.218
February 2.128 1.914 2.863 2.787
March 1.600 2.721 2.439 2.486
April 2.115 3.388 2.934 2.316
May 2.227 2,985 2.810 2.670
June 1.973 3.398 2.666 3.217
July 2.247 2.818 2.505 3.121
August 2.350 2.484 2.871 2.978
September 2.339 2.643 3.099 3.302
October 3.004 2.991 2.899 2.966
November 3.272 3.309 3.008 3.073
December . 2.655 3.829 2.800 2.675
Source; Federal Reserve Bulletin: monthly issues. September,
1960 through December, 1964.
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TABLE 47.— Dealer transactions in U. S. Government Securities having less 
than one year to maturity, monthly averaged daily figures; January, 1961 
through December, 1964 (in billions of dollars)
Month 1961 1962 1963 1964
January 1.113 1.478 1.485 1.656
February .934 1.520 1.646 1.336
March 1.144 1.332 1.241 1.361
April 1.200 1.350 1.438 1.528
May 1.092 1.338 1.160 1.264
June 1.143 1.357 1.208 1.201
July 1.441 1.457 1.440 1.433
August 1.173 1.318 1,060 1.099
September 1.185 1.432 1.208 1.214
October 1.389 1.517 1.261 1.476
November 1.295 1.266 1.300 1.426
December 1.328 1.446 1.348 1.596
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin: monthly issues, September, 1960
through December, 1964.
related to dealer holdings depending on whether a supply-induced volume 
adds to holdings or a demand-induced volume reduces portfolios.
Seasonalitv of Holdings 
Given a fixed stock of bills available to the public, seasonality 
in holdings by various sectors would cause seasonality in the bill rate 
corresponding to a weighted average of the seasonal holdings of the sectors. 
The Treasury, by tailoring bill issues to demand, could offset bill rate 
seasonality by supplying bills inversely to "net" demand seasonality. The 
Federal Reserve System, as well, could adjust their holdings through open 
market operations to offset seasonality.
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In order to gain some information regarding the relative season­
ality of the bill rate, the quantity of bills, and the holding of the 
sectors just reviewed, the specific seasonal factors have been calculated 
for each month. The principal difficulties in these comparisons are the 
differences in the quality of the data and the inadequate length of the 
series for non-financial corporations, state and local governments, dealer 
positions, and transactions, also holdings are end-of-month values which 
do not necessarily reflect the level of holdings during the month. The 
series for state and local governments, for instance, is only four years 
long, with a change in coverage in the last year.
Specific seasonal factors were calculated by a ratio-to-twelve­
month-moving-average method. The method centers the average, which with 
the end-of-month data, causes the seasonal factors for several of the 
series, especially corporate holdings, to appear to belong to the month 
prior to the actual location. The seasonal factors calculated for the 
short series should be interpreted as being crudely descriptive and highly 
conjectural. A subjective evaluation of the consistency and stability of 
the seasonal factors will be provided for each series.
Table 48 provides the specific seasonal factors for the bill rate, 
the quantity of bills issued by the Treasury, the quantity of bills in 
the hands of the public. System holdings, commercial bank holdings, non- 
financial corporation holdings, state and local government holdings, 
dealer positions, and dealer transactions. The bill rate factors are 
those calculated for the period 1952-1964 in Chapter III and their 
quality has been discussed. The quantity-of-bills-series were calcu­
lated for the period 1952-1964 and show a high degree of stability. The
TABLE 48.-“Specific seasonal factors for: Treasury bill rate (r^); quantity of bills issued by the
Treasury less agency and trust fund holdings (Qy), quantity of bills available to the public (q^), 
Federal Reserve System holdings of bills (S), member commercial bank holding of bills (C_), non- 
financial corporation holding of bills (B), state and local government holding of bills (G), Govern­
ment securities dealers position in Federal marketable securities having less than one year to maturity 



























January 102.5 103.6 104.9 83.8 114.2 104.4 95.7 112.8 108.2
February 98.8 104.0 104.2 72.8 106.2 114.8 100.5 96.6 110.8
March 96.7 99.6 101.3 82.5 82.8 95.4 97.7 85.8 95.9
April 99.1 99.2 100.3 82.6 94.1 103.0 109.5 97.9 106.2
May 95.8 99.3 99.5 91.2 91.2 113.6 113.2 94.3 92.1
June 94.2 93.3 93.1 101.3 87.3 91.4 106.3 110.5 90.1
July 95.0 96.9 95.7 110.7 97.1 93.4 105.9 94.8 107.1
August 101.0 98.2 99.5 110.7 93.3 99.4 106.3 99.1 92.1
September 103.3 97.9 97.9 97.4 102.0 80.4 98.3 97.1 96.1
October 102.8 100.4 100.0 105.3 106.4 94.5 90.6 102.8 105.3
November 103.1 103.6 101.1 122.3 104.6 110.7 85.3 109.4 9 6 . ^
December 107.2 104.0 102.1 139.5 120.7 99.1 90.4 99.8 99.7
to00Ln
Source: Calculated from series shown in preceding Tables.
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holdings of the Federal Reserve System for the period 1952-1964 are quite 
volatile, and although the ratios-to-moving-average vary considerably, the 
specific seasonal factors seem fairly reliable. Commercial bank holdings 
for the period 1952-1964 are volatile, but the seasonal factors exhibit 
considerably more consistency than System holdings. The seasonal factors 
for bill holdings for non-financial corporations are fairly consistent as 
are the factors for state and local government holdings, but the series 
are extremely short and the coverage incomplete. Seasonal factors for 
dealer holdings and dealer transactions are also calculated from short 
time series, but coverage is relatively complete. However, the volatility 
of the series causes the seasonal factors to be unstable and highly tenta­
tive. The series for the year 1960-1964 or 1961-1964 are used to measure 
seasonality for a period where some argue that bill rate seasonality was 
subsiding. Despite the inadequacies some tentative conclusions regarding 
whether bill rate seasonality arises on the demand side or the stock side 
are possible.
Beginning with commercial bank holdings, a rather large seasonal 
variation is apparent with holdings increasing from August to the high in 
December, declining to the low in March, with relatively large seasonal 
fluctuations between April and August. The quantity of bills issued by 
the Treasury shows a seasonal pattern above and below "normal" in approxi­
mately the same months as bank holdings, indicating that the Treasury may 
be issuing bills in response to periods of high demand. Bank holdings 
above "normal" would indicate downward pressure on the bill rate, while 
the Treasury issues above "normal" would provide upward pressure on rates.
The bill holdings of the Federal Reserve System exhibit extremely 
large seasonal movements, although the quantity of holdings are smaller
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than commercial bank holdings, and only a fraction of total bills issued* 
The effect of System holdings in offsetting the seasonal effects of Treas­
ury issues of bills is easily discerned by comparing the seasonality of 
the quantity of bills in the hands of the public with the seasonality in 
the quantity of bills issued by the Treasury. System holdings appear to 
counteract seasonality in Treasury bill issues in the months of March, 
April, May, November, and December; and to accentuate seasonality in the 
months of January and February, with the factors for most other months 
being relatively neutral.
Corporation holdings of bills indicate holdings are low at the 
end of the quarters— March, June, September, and December. The end-of- 
month data reflect that payment of corporate taxes has already been accom­
plished, and it is expected that very large bill quantity changes for this 
sector arise just as the month ends; therefore, it would probably be more 
meaningful for the corporate sector's factors to be viewed as the begin­
ning of the following month instead of the end of a current month--shift- 
ing all factors forward one month.
State and local government holdings appear to do as much as any 
other sector to "cause" bill rate seasonality arising from the demand side. 
The calculated seasonal factors indicate that state and local governments 
consistently hold relatively large quantities of bills when the bill rate 
is seasonally low and, hold relatively small quantities when the bill rate 
is seasonally high. The largest seasonal factor is for May (113), and the 
smallest factor is for November (85).
Dealer positions in marketable securities of less than one year to 
maturity exhibit rather large seasonality, being above "normal" (by
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decreasing magnitude) in January, June, November, and October; below "nor­
mal" (by increasing magnitude) in March, May, July, February, September, 
and April; and near normal in August and December. Comparing the seasonal 
factors of dealer positions with the seasonal factors of the bill rate 
indicate that the above or below "normal" factors correspond in nine of 
the twelve month indicating generally that dealer positions act to off­
set the seasonality of the bill rate in the majority of the months.
Dealer transactions in marketable Federal debt within one year to 
maturity indicate larger than average transactions in January, February, 
April, July, and October, with February having the largest factor. Trans­
actions appear to be lightest in the months of May, June, and August.
To summarize, an example of the offsetting and contributing factors 
to bill rate seasonality for the month of January are discussed. The bill 
rate seasonal factor for this month is roughly four per cent above aver­
age. The quantity of bills issued by the Treasury (high) and System hold­
ings (low) in January are such that they contribute toward the seasonality 
of the rate. If a relatively larger quantity of bills are available for 
this month, some sector holdings must be above normal, and it is seen that 
commercial bank holdings and dealer positions are both 13 to 14 per cent 
above average, and corporate holdings about four per cent above average. 
Only state and local government holdings are below average for January and 
only by about four per cent. The relatively larger quantity of bills 
available to the public and the lower than average holdings of the state 
and local sector contribute toward upward pressure on the bill rate which 
apparently is not offset by the higher than average holdings of commercial 
banks, dealers, and non-financial corporations.
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Regression Results Emohaslzine Sector. Holdings 
It Is obvious that the quantity and quality of data on sector 
holdings Is not adequate to do any extensive empirical estimation of the 
effect on the bill rate by changes In holding patterns. A few regression 
equations were calculated In order to see If the algebraic signs were 
appropriate. The Independent variables In these equations, and the ex­
pected relationship with the bill rate--posltlve (+) or inverse (-) are 
shown In Table 49.
TABLE 49.— Independent demand variables utilized In explaining bill rate 
movements and the expected relationship with the rate; positive (+) or
Inverse (-)
Symbol Variable Expected sign
Cb Commercial bank holdings of bills -
s Federal Reserve System holdings of bills -
I International government and bank hold­
ings of bills and certificates -
B Non-flnanclal corporation holdings of 
bills -
G State and local government general fund 
holdings of bills -
D Dealer positions In marketable Federal 
securities within one year of maturity -
V Dealer transactions In marketable Federal 
securities within one year of maturity + or -
Increased holdings by a sector are Indicative of a shift In the 
demand schedule to the right and decreased holdings Indicative of a shift 
In the schedule to the left. Assuming however, that the quantity of bills
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available to the public to hold is constant, increased holdings by one 
sector require that other sector holdings are reduced by the same amount. 
Equation 8" was estimated for the period January, 1953 through December, 
1964 utilizing holdings for those sectors for which data are available 
over the complete period— commercial banks, the Federal Reserve System and 
international governments and banks. These variables resulted in the equa­
tion;
(8") r. = .743 - .118Cv - .0518 + .4191
(.038) (.065) (.040)
with a coefficient of multiple determination of .51. The commercial bank 
and System holdings variables had the proper signs but holdings of the 
international sector had a large positive coefficient. The positive co­
efficient is no doubt caused by the strong positive trend in the holdings
•  i  •
of this sector and the positive trend of the bill rate. The coefficient
for System holdings was smaller than its standird error.
The same variables were used for the same time period and dummy
monthly seasonal, variables were added. This resulted in:
(9") r, = -.152C - .043S + .4361 + .994i + .805Ü + .601iii
(.042)° (.072) (.040) 2 6 11
+ .745iv + .618v + .563vi + .671vii + .723viii + .887ix 
2  10 12 9 8 5
+ .897x + .959x1 + 1.160xii,
4 3 1
a coefficient of multiple determination of .55 and a Durbin-Watson statis­
tic of only .15 indicating highly significant positive autocorrelation of 
residuals. The partial regression coefficients and standard errors are 
basically the same as those of equation 8". The coefficients for the 
dummy seasonal variables indicate again that December is the seasonal high
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for the bill rate with the months September through January generally 
larger than those months February through August.
The strong positive trend in the quantity of bills over the period 
1953-1964 requires that holdings by sectors increase. To obtain the nega­
tive partial coefficients for Cy and S, the partial coefficient of I must 
be positive and large. In order to eliminate the biases due to bill quan­
tity increases^ the sector holdings variables were expressed as percentage 
of bills in the hands of the public^ and holdings of non-financial corpora­
tions, state and local governments, dealer positions and dealer transac­
tions were added. System holdings were expressed as the percentage of the 
quantity of bills issued by the Treasury; dealer positions and transactions 
are utilized as levels instead of as percentages. The results of this 
equation, with 48 observations from January, 1960 through December, 1964 
were;
(10") rv = 4.059 - 5.729CV/ + 4.9298/q - 8.3061/-
(2.127) 9b (3.823) (3.426) ®
- 5.422B/q + 6.63lG/q. + .239D + .612V
(3.203) b (4.436) ® (.089) (.304)
with a coefficient of multiple determination of .74, and a Durbin-Watson 
value of .60 which indicates a very high probability of positively auto­
correlated residuals. With most of the variables expressed as percentages 
of bill quantities, the partial coefficients for holdings of commercial 
banks, international government and non-financial corporations were of the 
expected sign; while System holdings, state and local government holdings, 
and dealer positions had signs opposite expectations.
Eight independent variables with 48 observations leaves 39 degrees 
of freedom, but the additional dummy seasonal variables would reduce the
292
degrees of freedom to 28. A greater number of observations would be 
desirable, but an equation utilizing the variables in 10" plus eleven 
dummy seasonal variables resulted in:
(11") r .  = -  5.312C, /  + 5.457S/Q, -  2 .5651/qh -  1.360B/qv
(1 .558) (3 .066) (2 .870 ) (3 .167)
+ 2.032G/q. - .074D + .075V + 1.2031 + 1.07111
(4.905) (.061) (.011) 4 9
+ 1.020111 + 1.0411V + .954v + 1.174vi + 1.236vii 
11 10 12 6 2
+ 1.125viii + 1.2221% + 1.160% + 1.191%i + 1.335%ii 
8 3 7 5 1
2 ‘ with an R of .95 and a Durbin-Watson statistic of .90. The Durbin-Watson
statistic indicates a very high probability of positively autocorrelated 
residuals. The constants, or the coefficients for the dummy variables, 
are smaller in equation 11", ranging from 195 for May to 1.34 for Decem­
ber, than the constant of 4.059 in equation 10". The signs of the partial 
regression coefficients in equation 11" are negative with the exception of 
System holdings and state and local governments. Several of the coeffi­
cients, however, are only slightly larger than the standard errors, with 
the state and local government coefficient being only about one-half as 
large as the standard error. This is not surprising given the poor quality 
of this particular series.
It is felt that if better data were available for longer time 
periods much more meaningful results would be possible. Ideally, a struc­
tural model should be constructed, but without better data, there is little 
hope of obtaining meaningful estimates of the parameters.
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Summary and Conclusions 
This portion of the study has attempted to explain bill rate move­
ments from the point of view of demand for bills by institutional sectors. 
The attempt at explanation has been complicated because of unavailability 
of consistent bill holdings data for several sectors over the period.
Since complete data were available for member commercial banks, 
and also since it is believed that this sector is one of the most important 
demandera of bills, an attempt was made to explain the level of bank hold­
ing of bills. The empirical estimates, using various combinations of free 
reserves. Treasury deposits, bill rates, and System rediscount rates, 
generally yielded poor results. A tentative conclusion is that free re­
serves appear to be highly related to bill holdings.
Data on holdings of bills and Certificates for the international 
sector are available for the complete period, but are not very volatile, 
showing instead a strong positive trend and no seasonality. Over the 
complete period the increased holdings of the international sector have 
contributed to higher bill rates, but the holdings of this sector have not 
played a very important role in short-term bill rate movements.
With the exception of bill holdings of the Federal Reserve System 
and member commercial banks, and the bill and Certificate holdings of the 
international sector, holdings data for other institutional classifications 
are available, on a sample basis, generally for the period since 1960 or 
1961. Therefore, it is not possible to relate bill rate movements with 
changes in holdings by all sectors over the complete period. In order to 
gain some insight into the short-term movements of the bill rate brought 
about from the demand side, the seasonality of holdings by the various
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sectors was estimated and the seasonal factors compared with the bill rate 
seasonal factors to see which sectors might account for a portion of bill 
rate seasonality.
Finally, the holdings data for the various sectors were used as 
independent variables in "explaining" bill rate movements. The regression 
coefficients were usually of the sign expected, but there are indications 
that the estimates are biased by strong positive autocorrelation of the 
residuals.
The study of the "demand" factors has been incomplete and basically 
descriptive. Until a longer series of more accurate holdings data become 
available, not much can be done to measure the effect of demand shifts on 
short-term movements in the bill rate.
CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This study has emphasized an analytical and empirical approach in 
attempting to explain the determinants of the average monthly Treasury 
bill rate over the period 1953-1964. The basic theoretical structure uti­
lized was the schedule measuring the demand to hold Treasury bills at 
various rates, and the stock of bills as determined by Treasury and Fed­
eral Reserve System debt management operations. The; hypotheses were de­
veloped from partial-equilibrium, comparative-static assumptions, with 
shifts in the demand schedule having an inverse relationship with the 
bill rate, and stock changes being pdsitively associated with bill rate 
movements.
The monthly movements of the bill rate were shown to possess a 
definite seasonal pattern, although the pattern was changing over time.
The X-10 version of Census Method II was used to measure the seasonality 
of the bill rate, first on a monthly basis, then on a weekly basis. It 
appeared that the monthly seasonal movements ini the rate were probably an 
average of within month seasonal variations. Over the time period 1953- 
1964, the bill rate showed a positive trend and a great degree of vola­
tility, complicating the measurement of the seasonal factors.
In order to examine the movements of the rate on a single asset, 
it is necessary to assume that the factors determining a particular rate
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are different from factors determining other rates--or more technically 
that the particular asset is not perfectly substitutable with a relatively 
large quantity -of other assets. The bill rate was correlated with the rate 
on several other maturity categories of Federal marketable debt, leadiiig 
to the conclusion that the longer the term to maturity of Federal market­
able securities, the less the degree of substitutability with bills. This 
conclusion, however, ignores the "expectational" hypotheses of interest 
rate determination which, since it states generally that long-term rates 
are dependent on future expected short-term rates over the life of the 
long-term asset, does not necessitate equality of rates for perfect sub­
stitutability between longs and shorts.
There was no attempt in the empirical portion of the study to 
include any variable to measure expectations, principally because of the 
difficulties involved of finding a suitable variable. If such a variable 
were included, it is expected that it should influence the bill rate 
through shifting the demand schedule. An "expectations" variable probably 
would significantly improve the quality of the empirical relationships.
According to the "pure" expectational hypotheses, the quantity of 
a security available should have no effect on the market yield of that 
security. According to the empirical estimates made in the study the 
quantity of bills does indeed appear to be positively related to the bill 
rate, as expected from the theoretical framework. The quantity of non­
bill Federal marketable debt available to the public also influenced the
bill rate in a positive direction, but to a lesser degree than the quantity
of bills, indicating a cross elasticity of demand between Treasury bills
and close substitutes. Also, the average maturity of the Federal market­
able debt was negatively related with the Treasury bill rate indicating
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that the greater the quantity of short-term Federal marketable debt rela­
tive to long-term, the higher the bill rate. The bill rate was generally 
negatively related to the quantity of bills held by the Federal Reserve 
System, but the standard error of this coefficient relative to the coef­
ficient in the multiple regression equations was usually large, and the 
partial regression coefficient was occasionally of the wrong sign.
The principal statistical problems encountered in regressing the 
monthly bill rate as the dependent variable on quantity-of-debt variables 
were those of autocorrelation and specification. None of the empirical 
equations was adequate in explaining bill rate movements. Important ex­
planatory variables, for instance expectations, were missing, and although 
many variables were entered in trial and error fashion, a high degree of 
autocorrelation of the residuals resulted. Utilization of successive 
differences of the variables reduced the problem of autocorrelated resid­
uals, but the estimated equations explained a very small portion of the 
total variation in monthly changes in the bill rate.
Free reserves of member banks were included as an independent vari­
able along with the quantity-of-debt variables principally to avoid spu­
rious relationships between the bill rate and quantity variables. The 
free reserves variable was highly inversely related to the bill rate, as 
hypothesized, indicating that the "demand" variables were probably much 
more important in explaining bill rate movements than the quantity of 
bills, the quantity of non-bill marketable Federal debt. System holdings 
of bills, and the average maturity of the Federal marketable Federal debt. 
Dividing member bank free reserves into country bank free reserves and 
free reserves of non-country banks increased the portion of the variance
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In the bill rate which could be explained by the regression equations. The 
regression equations .emphasizing the quantity-of-debt variables indicated 
that Treasury debt management operations and System open market operations 
did directly influence the level of the bill rate, but very large opera­
tions would be necessary to appreciably influence the rate. Evidently the 
demand to hold schedule is highly elastic relative to the bill rate. 
"Operation Nudge," attempting to raise the short-term rate by increasing 
the quantity of short-term debt outstanding, appears to have been success- < 
ful, but according to the empirical estimates presented above, some of the 
upward movement of the bill rate since 1961-1962 must have been brought 
about by demand factors. A possible demand variable which could have been 
influential in a relative decrease in demand for bills is the innovation 
and rapid acceptance of the negotiable certificate of deposit.
The success of the free reserves variable in explaining bill rate 
changes led to the assumption that commercial bank demand for Treasury
bills might be the most important variable in explaining bill rate changes.
An attempt was made to explain the level of holdings of bills by member 
commercial banks utilizing free reserves of country banks, free reserves 
of non-country banks. Treasury deposits in commercial banks, and the bill 
and discount rate. This attempt was not as successful as had been antici­
pated. It is felt that an explanation of the determinants of bill hold­
ings hy commercial banks would necessitate a structural model of a high
degree of sophistication. Nevertheless, the algebraic signs were appro­
priate indicating increases in free reserves. Treasury deposits, and the 
bill rate were positively related to commercial bank holding of Treasury 
bills.
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Although it appeared that changes In demand for bills by various 
institutional sectors should explain more of the variance in the bill 
rate than changes in the stock of bills, bill holding data for most of the 
institutional sectors is unavailable prior to 196t and the data for several 
sectors since 1961 is based on surveys and inadequate for obtaining mean­
ingful results with short time periods. Therefore, the seasonality of 
holdings of bills by: member commercial banks, the Federal Reserve System,
non-financial corporations, state and local governments; transactions and 
holdings of less-than-one-year maturities by Government securities dealers; 
and the quantity of bills outstanding was measured by the ratio-to-twelve- 
month-moving-average method and the resulting seasonal factors compared to 
the seasonal factors calculated for the bill rate. It seems very feasible 
that the seasonality in holdings by sectors and the seasonality in the 
quantity of bills could be responsible for the seasonality of the bill 
rate.
Multiple regression equations were estimated for the period 1961 
through 1964 regressing the bill rate on sector holdings. The results of 
these estimates, in spite of the shortcomings of the data, show that 
changes in bill holdings by institutional sectors affect the bill rate 
according to expectations from the simple stock model. The addition of 
dummy seasonal variables improved the estimates of the bill rate in the 
"demand" equations, as they had assisted earlier in the "supply" equations.
The principal hypotheses tested, which received some degree of 
empirical support, were: (1) the bill market can be analyzed in partial
equilibrium and the demand for bills is relatively independent of the de­
mand for other securities of equal risk, (2) the bill rate is affected by
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changes In the quantity of bills made available by the Treasury and mone­
tary authorities, (3) the bill rate is affected by the demand for bills,
.. and (4) the bill rate movements are predictable (at least in direction) 
from changes in "institutional" variables, ignoring "expectations." With 
the exception of the measurement of the seasonality of the bill rate, much 
of the empirical work in this study should be viewed as exploratory and 
many of the conclusions tentative. On the basis of the empirical results, 
it should be feasible to construct different hypotheses in such a way that 
the statistical tests are more specific. Also, as additional sector bill 
holding data becomes available it should be possible to estimate more 
directly the effect on the bill rate of demand changes.
Ideally, an econometric model measuring the simultaneous effects 
of both the "demand" and "supply" side should be formulated and estimated. 
This may necessitate tying the Treasury bill market more closely to a 
macroeconomic, general-equilibrium model. Surely the level of aggregate 
economic activity is important to the determination of the Treasury bill 
rate, but the shortest time periods for observations of relevant macro- 
economic variables are quarterly, and it seems obvious that many bill 
rate determinants are effective, important, and interesting over shorter 
periods--at least monthly, probably weekly, and possibly daily.
Several variables which were not included in the empirical esti­
mates which may improve the relationships are: debits to demand deposits
or the turnover rate of demand deposits, a measure of the money supply 
more meaningful than the simple level, the quantities of other maturity 
categories of marketable Federal debt, a measure of the average maturity 
of the Federal marketable debt in the hands of the public, a meaningful
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measure of expectations of the future course of rates, and a measure of 
idle balances. Some estimates of changes In holdings of total Federal 
marketable debt by Institutional sectors may be helpful In gaining usable 
data for the demand by sectors.
Several topics discussed briefly In this study deserve analysis In 
greater depth. These topics Include:
1. Transactions costs for buying and selling bills, stated 
and effective spreads between the bid and asked prices, 
and holding period yields on bills after adjusting for 
transactions cost;
2. The determinants of the "stop-out" price In the primary 
market and determinants of the spread between the mean 
of the accepted bids and the low accepted bid;
3. The determinants of the term structure of Treasury bill 
yields;
4. The determinants of weekly seasonality In the bill rate;
5. The relationship between the bill rate and yields on 
substitutable assets with equal and greater risk;
6. The determinants of bill holdings by commercial banks; 
and
7. The reasons for the high degree of relationship between 
the bill rate and the level of member bank free reserves.
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